Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 process

"Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> Sun, 30 March 2014 16:23 UTC

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Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 09:23:15 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Bill Frantz" <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 process
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On Sat, March 29, 2014 8:05 pm, Bill Frantz wrote:
> On 3/29/14 at 6:57 PM, dharkins@lounge.org (Dan Harkins) wrote:
>
>>See /etc/services. Basically, everything that uses the transport layer
>>should be able to use transport layer security if it wants to.
>
> Transport layer doesn't have key agreement, end point
> authentication, reconnect etc. etc. etc.

  That's what Transport Layer _Security_ (i.e. TLS) is for.

>                                                              We need use
cases to
> define what is needed in these areas.

  I disagree.

> Watson is correctly concerned that we get the transport
> encryption to work correctly. Transport layer encryption might
> include bi-directional data transport, end point synchronization
> etc., but if there are no use cases, it is hard to justify
> spending a lot of effort to support them.

  Well bully for Watson. But everyone in the WG is concerned
about getting encryption to work correctly. We're also all
concerned about getting authentication to work correctly.
And about getting authenticated encryption to work correctly.

  I fail to see how documenting use cases will help us get
encryption to work correctly, unless you think there are some
use cases for which correctly working encryption is not a
requirement. If that's the case then then have no impact on
TLS 1.3.

> We need use cases if only to be sure we are supporting what
> needs to be supported.

  Documenting use cases is an unnecessary distraction from
doing actual work. You'll note that our charter does not say
"enumerate applications that want to use TLS".

  Dan.

> Cheers - Bill
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Bill Frantz        | Since the IBM Selectric, keyboards have gotten
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>