Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically better for TLS 1.3

[Johannes Merkle <[e-mail]>]

Ralf Skyper Kaiser schrieb am 05.11.2013 03:03:
> A securely configured TLS client would verify the certificate chain.
> 
> The server has no way to check if the TLS client is configured securely.
> The server blindly trusts the client that it is configured securely. That
> does not scale. Users make mistakes. Users will connect to a service not
> knowing that the connection is not secure (even over TLS) because they did
> not configure the TLS correctly.

I don't see the point. You are referring to a verification of the server's certificate by the client.
When a client identifies a server, what is the benefit for the server to ensure that the client performs the
identification in a proper way?

If the verification is not done properly by the client, the client may be susceptible to impersonation attacks on the
server side, i.e. may trust a malicious server pretending to be the honest server. If such a case occurs, i.e, if the
client has connected to a malicious server, what were the point in the honest server's checking the client's policy? In
such a case, the honest server is not even participating in the communication, and the malicious server, who is
participating in the communication, will certainly not insist on a strict client policy (not if he is a clever attacker,
at least).

So, what threat scenario is your requirement (of the server being able to verify the client's policy) addressing?

-- 
Johannes