Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically better for TLS 1.3

Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> Tue, 05 November 2013 17:56 UTC

Return-Path: <ynir@checkpoint.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D45921E8175 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 5 Nov 2013 09:56:04 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.513
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.513 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.086, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KLth68a2mzvf for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 5 Nov 2013 09:55:50 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp.checkpoint.com (smtp.checkpoint.com [194.29.34.68]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D71B021F9D34 for <tls@ietf.org>; Tue, 5 Nov 2013 09:55:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from DAG-EX10.ad.checkpoint.com ([194.29.34.150]) by smtp.checkpoint.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id rA5HtNUK017719; Tue, 5 Nov 2013 19:55:23 +0200
X-CheckPoint: {52792FA6-0-1B221DC2-1FFFF}
Received: from IL-EX10.ad.checkpoint.com ([169.254.2.106]) by DAG-EX10.ad.checkpoint.com ([169.254.3.213]) with mapi id 14.03.0123.003; Tue, 5 Nov 2013 19:55:23 +0200
From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: Johannes Merkle <johannes.merkle@secunet.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically better for TLS 1.3
Thread-Index: AQHO1ngUoMjfWHp8eUeJG+rmdHIlV5oPTiyAgAFPL4CAAwGAAIACEOsAgAAYNoCAALytgIAATUQA
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 17:55:23 +0000
Message-ID: <4C24FFCF-6BC0-47D6-B9F3-41E9614539A7@checkpoint.com>
References: <CA+BZK2pZ=AFs5qw8dTbiV+s0KdSeFJH1-Z+UbaJZnQwHNgdXuA@mail.gmail.com> <20131105003652.5B7AF1AA54@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp> <CA+BZK2rG4L_+oMOQ3xBEogWNtrspeFM5cUJw9ciwtmEQpvgGjQ@mail.gmail.com> <5278F039.2060404@secunet.com>
In-Reply-To: <5278F039.2060404@secunet.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-originating-ip: [172.31.20.188]
x-kse-antivirus-interceptor-info: scan successful
x-kse-antivirus-info: Clean
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <2202A8F63C36FF4793C63E5E2F37A239@ad.checkpoint.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] What would make TLS cryptographically better for TLS 1.3
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 05 Nov 2013 17:56:04 -0000

On Nov 5, 2013, at 5:18 AM, Johannes Merkle <johannes.merkle@secunet.com> wrote:

> Ralf Skyper Kaiser schrieb am 05.11.2013 03:03:
>> A securely configured TLS client would verify the certificate chain.
>> 
>> The server has no way to check if the TLS client is configured securely.
>> The server blindly trusts the client that it is configured securely. That
>> does not scale. Users make mistakes. Users will connect to a service not
>> knowing that the connection is not secure (even over TLS) because they did
>> not configure the TLS correctly.
> 
> I don't see the point. You are referring to a verification of the server's certificate by the client.
> When a client identifies a server, what is the benefit for the server to ensure that the client performs the
> identification in a proper way?

There is a benefit in making the whole ecosystem more secure, and rejecting components that are insecurely configured, because they can compromise the whole system.

I don't think that's enough to justify this kind of thing.

Yoav