[TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus
Laura Bauman <l_bauman@apple.com> Wed, 14 October 2026 22:06 UTC
Received: from ma-mx01.apple.com (ma-mx01.apple.com [17.23.4.16]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange x25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F0C6346 for <tls@ietf.org>; Wed, 14 Oct 2026 22:06:54 +0000 (UTC)
Authentication-Results: mx.ietf.org; dkim=pass header.d=apple.com header.s=20180706 header.b=ICaTm7sc; spf=pass (mx.ietf.org: domain of l_bauman@apple.com designates 17.23.4.16 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=l_bauman@apple.com; dmarc=pass (policy=quarantine) header.from=apple.com
Received: from mr55p01nt-mtap05.apple.com (mr55p01nt-mtap05.ise.apple.com [10.170.185.195]) by st47p01nt-mxp01.apple.com (Oracle Communications Messaging Server 8.1.0.28.20250821 64bit (built Aug 21 2025)) with ESMTPS id <0TMX1WGCN43AKV10@st47p01nt-mxp01.apple.com> for tls@ietf.org; Wed, 14 Oct 2026 22:06:48 +0000 (GMT)
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1176,Hydra:6.1.134,FMLib:17.12.100.49 definitions=2026-10-13_01,2026-10-14_01,2025-10-01_01
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=apple.com; h=cc :content-type:date:from:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:to; s=20180706; bh=nxmvZbXhdda4hvmDzx9twfCPE rmQfIvDKe/rk/nTxQo=; b=ICaTm7scjG3ShNHepH6lqiD85MyE95RCyR/nDWgl/ /1eFZFs2Arn6sE5k7Ri6uJl1J/qMEndhkwWumqEh2Q6bYJIBZ6ix7bKJHHRY1paL OoGzVY+q8nlzoCND+jRhs5mlBYyjJT01vcQbGqM8vn3L+iUUA2vVdRuhXxZMVR2t sgSphdoQ56FRw33z1HL/dkMvKcWyvgvYgQOmn9UHXxOs2D4qM09YIGFqrBScFBRQ NcsNh4cR5nC7bWhln83V/oCG6Q4XXFJZho0QpiVAIyYZksKiLujYpxvSZSiB63JO 4qZN1eI8ync1KbwPSzuCtNo0KeclY8/9R3eO2lCpPWy2Q==
Received: from mr55p01nt-mmpp01.apple.com (mr55p01nt-mmpp01.ise.apple.com [10.170.185.219]) by mr55p01nt-mtap05.apple.com (Oracle Communications Messaging Server 8.1.0.28.20250821 64bit (built Aug 21 2025)) with ESMTPS id <0TMX1DTYC43A5A50@mr55p01nt-mtap05.apple.com>; Wed, 14 Oct 2026 22:06:46 +0000 (GMT)
Received: from process_milters-daemon.mr55p01nt-mmpp01.apple.com by mr55p01nt-mmpp01.apple.com (Oracle Communications Messaging Server 8.1.0.28.20260513 64bit (built May 13 2026)) id <0TMX1G6003MSGP00@mr55p01nt-mmpp01.apple.com>; Wed, 14 Oct 2026 22:06:46 +0000 (GMT)
X-Va-AV-Result: v=1, result=clean, clamav=clean, scanned=1, total=1, ms=8
X-Va-AV: accept
X-Va-A:
X-Va-T-CD: 63bfe8f6e4fba8b79b92151936c6c741
X-Va-E-CD: b4a8477af9a3c3fa812576386522c078
X-Va-R-CD: c23f1d09812e2f3029e0ed00196d5f88
X-Va-ID: 462b801f-64cb-4f3e-9847-03c6512f2c76
X-Va-CD: 0
X-V-A:
X-V-T-CD: 63bfe8f6e4fba8b79b92151936c6c741
X-V-E-CD: b4a8477af9a3c3fa812576386522c078
X-V-R-CD: c23f1d09812e2f3029e0ed00196d5f88
X-V-ID: 98ef3e40-b453-4bd1-9368-acb203364014
X-V-CD: 0
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1176,Hydra:6.1.134,FMLib:17.12.100.49 definitions=2026-10-13_01,2026-10-14_01,2025-10-01_01
Received: from smtpclient.apple ([17.231.161.213]) by mr55p01nt-mmpp01.apple.com (Oracle Communications Messaging Server 8.1.0.28.20260513 64bit (built May 13 2026)) with ESMTPSA id <0TMX1GR2Z43ARO00@mr55p01nt-mmpp01.apple.com>; Wed, 14 Oct 2026 22:06:46 +0000 (GMT)
From: Laura Bauman <l_bauman@apple.com>
Message-id: <55643038-01B7-4BD1-9FBF-5BC9C2C814A9@apple.com>
Content-type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_B513BFED-6EFC-4D66-9929-78734AD09BAD"; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha-256"
MIME-version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 16.0 \(3901.100.1.1.11\))
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2026 15:06:35 -0700
In-reply-to: <A383CF85-CF66-4A3D-AFBC-3F2CCFEE265C@sn3rd.com>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
References: <A383CF85-CF66-4A3D-AFBC-3F2CCFEE265C@sn3rd.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3901.100.1.1.11)
X-Spamd-Bar: -----------------------------------
Message-ID-Hash: QVAIN5USSVHG3YRE6EB7TNBAMVEY2S2C
X-Message-ID-Hash: QVAIN5USSVHG3YRE6EB7TNBAMVEY2S2C
X-MailFrom: l_bauman@apple.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; loop; banned-address; header-match-tls.ietf.org-0; header-match-tls.ietf.org-1; header-match-tls.ietf.org-2; header-match-tls.ietf.org-3; header-match-tls.ietf.org-4; header-match-tls.ietf.org-5; header-match-tls.ietf.org-6; header-match-tls.ietf.org-7; header-match-tls.ietf.org-8; emergency; member-moderation; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.10
Precedence: list
Subject: [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/VyfFW8xJd-0XeSCPKB-c_ADSSc8>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:tls-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:tls-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:tls-leave@ietf.org>
Hi Sean, Outside of the Web PKI ecosystem, which is working on its own solutions, there are several TLS use cases that would benefit from the combined security of PQC and traditional ECC/RSA signatures. Apple supports proceeding with standardizing and allocating composite ML-DSA code points to unblock implementation and deployment in pursuit of these use cases. Specifically, we would like to see the recommended subset of algorithmic combinations from draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs [1], which balances the need to service different security levels against the combinatorial complexity of the broader set of options. To address the specific questions on the suggested path forward: > 1. Should the WG work on PQ + T Hybrid Signatures for TLS? Yes > 2. Should the WG only work on one: -pqt-dual-certs or -composite-ml-dsa? Yes, just one > 3. Should the WG work on: -pqt-dual-certs? No > 4. Should the WG work on: -composite-ml-dsa? Yes Best, Laura Bauman [1] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-19.html#name-profiling-down-the-number-o > On Sep 28, 2026, at 9:52 AM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote: > > At IETF 126, the chairs conducted a series of polls [1] to determine the way forward for PQ+T hybrid signatures after hearing from the -composite-mldsa [2] and -pqt-dual-certs [3] authors; you can watch the setup, authors presentations, and the polls at [4] from around 0:16:47 until 1:08:00. The polls' results showed in-room consensus to 1) work on PQ + T Signatures for TLS and 2) work only on -composite-mldsa. The chairs now need to confirm this consensus on list. We are going to do this by asking the four questions that follow. Please take note of the take note of the following: > > 1. Framing of the questions is found in this deck [5]; in case it is/was not clear a "Yes" on Question 1 implies WG adoption of a draft. > 2. Again, a "Yes" for 3 or 4 implies you are in favor of adopting the associated draft as a working group item. > 3. Based on the responses we got during the session we only asked the 1st 4 questions in [5]. > > Please provide your answers to the following questions by 12 October 2026: > > 1. Should the WG work on PQ + T Hybrid Signatures for TLS? > 2. Should the WG only work on one: -pqt-dual-certs or -composite-ml-dsa? > 3. Should the WG work on: -pqt-dual-certs? > 4. Should the WG work on: -composite-ml-dsa? > > Cheers, > spt (for the chairs) > > [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/polls-126-tls-202607241600/ > [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa/ > [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs/ > [4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qp1s1UMmhTI > [5] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-tls-framing-pq-t-signatures-for-tls-00 > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-leave@ietf.org
- [TLS] Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Sean Turner
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus John Mattsson
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatur… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatur… Loganaden Velvindron
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Watson Ladd
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Yaakov Stein
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Martin Thomson
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Russ Housley
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… John Mattsson
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Muhammad Usama Sardar
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… John Mattsson
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Samuel Lee (ENS/Crypto)
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Soatok Dreamseeker
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus David Benjamin
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Filippo Valsorda
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Samuel Lee (ENS/Crypto)
- [TLS] Re: [EXT] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Si… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Andrey Jivsov
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Bas Westerbaan
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus loic.ferreira
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Watson Ladd
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Ilari Liusvaara
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Sophie Schmieg
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Ilari Liusvaara
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Paul Wouters
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Andrey Jivsov
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Soatok Dreamseeker
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Joe Birr-Pixton
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus olivier.sanders
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Daniel Van Geest
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… John Gray
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Ira McDonald
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Richard Barnes
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Chase Abbott
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Jan Klaußner
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Ryan Appel
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Yaroslav Rosomakho
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Damien Miller
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Loganaden Velvindron
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Wang Guilin
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Hannes Tschofenig
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Sean Turner
- [TLS] Re: 答复: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus song.xueyan2
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Meiling Chen
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Dennis Jackson
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Bas Westerbaan
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Laura Bauman
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Bashiri, Kaveh
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Dan Wing