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Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Tue, 01 March 2016 09:20 UTC

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Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2016 20:20:38 +1100
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
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On 1 March 2016 at 16:06, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wrote:
>> It is much easier to mandate PSS in TLS 1.3 now, than to remove it
>> later.  Servers that can't do PSS will use TLS 1.2.  This avoids
>> a break-the-web day.
>
> Sorry, ... than to remove *PKCS#1.5* later ...

Yes, this is true for some people, and likely it will be more true in
the future.  However, a MUST implement PSS is enough for me.  If it
seems like consensus is against this position, I'll back that all the
way.  However, on the web side of things, we've some experience with
killing stuff that we don't like.  It's not always painless (see
SHA-1), but I'd rather rely on that system than risk holding back 1.3.

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