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Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4-01.txt

mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Thu, 02 October 2014 00:58 UTC

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Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 02:58:04 +0200
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From: mrex@sap.com
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/iny3G5Mf0ACFkj9ocWLdtV6SbtY
Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4-01.txt
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internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> 
>       Title           : Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites
>       Author          : Andrei Popov
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4-01.txt


The list of cipher suites in that document should better include
the cipher suite code points!  The code points are unique and unambiguous,
whereas the artificial symbolic names vary greatly among implementations

-Martin

PS: I still object to the MUST fail requirement to the server.
    It is not just plain silly it is also incompatible with
    rfc2119 section 6.  In many situations, the risk in accepting
    a TLS session with RC4 as a last resort for interop will be
    quite managable and pretty close to negligible.

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