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Re: [TLS] Closing some open comments on draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation

Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk> Tue, 08 December 2009 12:48 UTC

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Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2009 12:47:54 +0000
From: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Closing some open comments on draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation
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Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> I'll also make whatever small editorial changes I see. 
> If I've missed something important that people think there is
> consensus on, please let me know. There are a lot of messages, 
> so I may well have.
> 

In 6.1:

   If clients wish to ensure that such attacks are impossible, they MUST
   terminate the connection immediately upon failure to receive the
   extension without completing the handshake.

Should we be more specific about what "terminate the connection" means? Does
that mean drop the connection immediately without sending anything else or by
sending a fatal alert? If a fatal alert which one? Presumably handshake_failure?

I'm thinking here in terms of sending something useful which would most likely
appear in server logs to help diagnose the cause: i.e. unpatched server which
strict clients refuse to connect to.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Freelance consultant see: http://www.drh-consultancy.co.uk/
Email: shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk, PGP key: via homepage.

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