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Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT

Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Tue, 02 May 2017 18:20 UTC

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From: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Tue, 02 May 2017 11:17:42 -0700
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT
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On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 11:00 AM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
wrote:

> I would think that the ticket itself is enough for that when using
> 0-rtt.  I.e., if you don't want connection correlation to be possible,
> you can't use 0-rtt.


I don't think so. If the ticket is encrypted when it issued, I don't follow
how it could be used to correlate the original connection with the 0-RTT
connection.

-- 
Colm

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