Re: [Uri-review] ssh URI

Conrad Parker <conrad@annodex.net> Tue, 13 October 2009 03:35 UTC

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From: Conrad Parker <conrad@annodex.net>
To: David Booth <david@dbooth.org>
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Cc: uri-review@ietf.org, uri@w3.org
Subject: Re: [Uri-review] ssh URI
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2009/10/13 David Booth <david@dbooth.org>:
>
> I was referring to the adoption rate for clients (such as browsers)
> recognizing these new SSH URIs and using them for their intended
> purpose.  A browser encountering a URI beginning "ssh:..." will not be
> able to do anything useful with it until it knows the special semantics
> assigned to the "ssh:" prefix.  But a browser encountering a URI
> beginning "https://sshuri.org/..." could try to dereference that URI and
> could be led to software that, once installed, *would* know to open an
> SSH connection when encountering such a URI.  This could dramatically
> improve the rate at which browsers learn how to handle these SSH URIs.
> Make sense?

Encouraging end-users to download ssh client software from a random
web site specified by a third-party web-page author, and then
(automatically) using that software to connect to the desired ssh
server ... and hoping that this is somehow secure by using an SSL/TLS
connection to access that software?

No, this does not make sense. It encourages use of untrusted ssh
client software (eg. not sourced from your operating system vendor,
unsigned etc.) so the scheme could be easily exploited by a third
party to serve an ssh client with a backdoor. Using https to access
that info/software does nothing to secure the initiation of the ssh
connection.

If anything, ssh provides a good use-case for a custom uri scheme.

Conrad.