Re: [v6ops] LISP support for draft-ietf-v6ops-rfc7084-bis-00

Fred Baker <fredbaker.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 12 April 2017 17:22 UTC

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From: Fred Baker <fredbaker.ietf@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <2D09D61DDFA73D4C884805CC7865E6114DB194A8@GAALPA1MSGUSRBF.ITServices.sbc.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2017 10:22:14 -0700
Cc: JORDI PALET MARTINEZ <jordi.palet@consulintel.es>, "v6ops@ietf.org" <v6ops@ietf.org>
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To: "STARK, BARBARA H" <bs7652@att.com>, "mohamed.boucadair@orange.com" <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>, "otroan@employees.org" <otroan@employees.org>
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Subject: Re: [v6ops] LISP support for draft-ietf-v6ops-rfc7084-bis-00
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> On Apr 12, 2017, at 5:52 AM, STARK, BARBARA H <bs7652@att.com> wrote:
> 
>> I tend to agree with you but with a slightly different proposal:  pick ONE
>> mandatory stateful mechanism (DS-Lite) and ONE mandatory A+P
>> mechanism (MAP-E).
> 
> Because RFC 7084 is also used as a mandatory reference in BBF TR-124 (used by telco ISPs to help with CE router RFPs), and most ISPs have no interest in requiring capabilities that are not useful to or relevant in their deployment, there MUST NOT be any mandatory transition mechanisms included in a 7084-bis.

No hats

I'm not sure I would go so far as your respective statements, but I agree that we don't want a laundry list of mechanisms that mostly make equipment more expensive, harder to use, and harder to sell. It's kind of pointless. It seems to me that if a network wants to use a given transition technology, it should specify that to its vendor(s) in the RFP/RFQ.

A data point of interest: https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/hedgehog-fog-creating-and-detecting-ipv6-transition-mechanism-based-information.html is being flagged in the media as a reason to not deploy IPv6 - transition technologies that use tunnels apparently bypass intrusion detection technologies. I would argue that the point is flawed; put the tunnel intrusion detection technology between the tunnel endpoints and the user, problem solved. One issue there might be with the IDS itself - if it only looks at IPv4, it's not going to detect much in IPv6.

But in general, I tend to think that a better recommendation would be to walk through our list of technologies and obsolete them - like we did with 6to4.

> Barbara
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