Re: [arch-d] Time to reboot RFC1984 and RFC2804?

Toerless Eckert <> Wed, 14 October 2020 15:31 UTC

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Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 17:31:49 +0200
From: Toerless Eckert <>
To: Brian E Carpenter <>
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Subject: Re: [arch-d] Time to reboot RFC1984 and RFC2804?
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If i may rant about context, and like the rest of the thread
it is somewhat recurring:

We should remember that a good amount of desire for end-to-end encryption is
not only driven by user privacy desire but by the commercial interests of over the
top providers wanting to prohibit the underlay operator to interfere with its
business model. This is never openly talked about in the IETF, but instead all those
OTT that want Internet end-to-end encryption for this reason put all their
efforts into promoting the value of privacy over any other conflicting goals:
Sounds a lot better than "we don't want SP to get a share in our ad revenue
for just transporting our bits" (just as an example).

Aka: The IETF has a commercially driven biased view on the relative importance
of privacy via end-to-end encryption. And its behaving like a single-issue
organization in this respect. As shown through the complete absence of
any attempts to tackle / discuss the competing problems that need to be solved
such as those of law enforcement. I sent a prior email about additional work
that could be done. Same as writing to /dev/null.

Let me try a more fundamental competing issue: Firewalls in any commercial
organization are there to keep bad stuff from coming in and protected stuff
from going out. To that end, in the face of encryption, more and more data-model
level inspection devices are emerging allowing organizational security teams
to control / inspect if/how cloud based services do comply with those organizational
security demands. Nothing of this AFAIK is done in the IETF.

Even as a "User", i am a lot more worried these days about all the IoT devices i
could have at home and how they perpass and resell my data, than law enforcement
agencies putting backdoors into my PC. Where is the IETF on this problem ? It is
owned primarily by organizations whose core business model is the (ab)use of User data
or those that support such organizations through infrastructure (depending on them) .
Considered IOTOPS WG of course has this problem not on the proposed charter either.

Any similar IETF statements like  RFC7258 about this application level behavior ?
AFAIK, no: It is the "evil" (see below) EU that did the first globally relevant scheme to
put limits to that abuse: GDPR. Is it as simple and elegant as TLS ? Of course not.
Its just like Democracy: worst solution except for all the others.

Sorry for the interruption. Please carry on.

On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 08:27:05AM +1300, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
> Not to mention RFC 7258.
Well, obviously all the law enforcemenet actions are not pervasive but highly selective
against legally determined suspects of criminal activity for whom then the right
of privacy is forfeit for the subject of the investigation. So democratic governments
would never do PerPass
> Orders from the Top: The EU???s Timetable for Dismantling End-to-End Encryption:
> Five Eyes and Japan call for Facebook backdoor to monitor crime
> Regards
>    Brian Carpenter
> _______________________________________________
> Architecture-discuss mailing list