Re: [arch-d] IAB Statement on Encryption and Mandatory Client-side Scanning of Content

S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com> Mon, 18 December 2023 23:01 UTC

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Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:59:50 -0800
To: Mallory Knodel <mknodel@cdt.org>, architecture-discuss@ietf.org
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
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Subject: Re: [arch-d] IAB Statement on Encryption and Mandatory Client-side Scanning of Content
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Hi Mallory,
At 12:17 PM 18-12-2023, Mallory Knodel wrote:
>I just came back here to address the scanning, too. This line that 
>client-side scanning "isn't well defined" or "means too many things" 
>is just utter smoke and mirrors. Quite the opposite-- because there 
>are so many ways to violate a person's civil liberties by breaking 
>into their agents and devices means that *all* of them are to be 
>rejected, early and often, despite their inner workings.

There are academic papers about client-side scanning (CSS).  I forgot 
about CSS as the topic was in the news in 2021.  Let's assume that 
there are two jurisdictions, X and Y.  A company under jurisdiction X 
implements CSS as that is mandated by law.  A company under 
jurisdiction Y does not implement it as there is no law which 
mandates that.  Some of users from the company in X will likely move 
to the company in Y.  There is a decrease in MAU for the company in X.

The second part of your comment is not clear.  I am not sure whether 
it is an argument for or against CSS.  Anyway, I am not keen about 
intrusive surveillance.  As for CSS, the discussion is a bit 
hazy.  For what it is worth, the persons who run SMTP services 
generally have software scanning for unwanted emails.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy