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Re: [Asrg] Consent Proposal

Yakov Shafranovich <research@solidmatrix.com> Wed, 02 July 2003 00:14 UTC

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To: Markus Stumpf <maex-lists-spam-ietf-asrg@Space.Net>, Danny Angus <danny@apache.org>
From: Yakov Shafranovich <research@solidmatrix.com>
Subject: Re: [Asrg] Consent Proposal
Cc: asrg@ietf.org
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Date: Tue, 01 Jul 2003 20:13:05 -0400

At 01:57 AM 7/2/2003 +0200, Markus Stumpf wrote:

>On Tue, Jul 01, 2003 at 10:54:46PM +0100, Danny Angus wrote:
> > We can look outside the domain of mail to find workable examples of trust,
> > PGP and SSL both make provision for the inclusion of out-of-channel trust
> > verification. I suppose in this situation it is whom you choose to inherit
> > trust from, and ultimately your trusted root trust providers.
>[..]
>
>There is no such thing as established working "trust" mechanisms in the
>Internet of today (IMHO!!) They all fail miserably as early as because of
>non existant working revocation spreading mechanisms. If I get a CERT
>from Verisign for 2 years and they revoke it after one year, who do you
>think will notice that? With their security breach some months ago
>antivirus producers added the falsly issued certs to their antigenes
>so that the end user has at least a very little chance to notice abuse.

What about a central CA issuing certificates to other CAs, controlled by 
IANA or ICANN-type of organization? There are mechanisms in place to check 
verifications of certificates in real-time, and that can be implemented as 
well.

Yakov



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