Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")
Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> Sat, 19 August 2023 13:05 UTC
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From: Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com>
Date: Sat, 19 Aug 2023 15:05:21 +0200
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To: Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk>
Cc: Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com>, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com>, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, "Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)" <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org>, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com>, Leonid Reyzin <leonid.reyzin@gmail.com>, IRSG <irsg@irtf.org>, Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>, RFC System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>, auth48archive@rfc-editor.org
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Subject: Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")
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Do we need to re-approve 9381 (vrf)? If so then approving as well. Thanks! Jan Dne so 19. 8. 2023 10:02 uživatel Dimitrios Papadopoulos < dipapado@cse.ust.hk> napsal: > I also approve. > > -Dimitris > > > On 18 Aug 2023, at 11:45 PM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> > wrote: > > > > Hi, Tim. We have noted your approval: > > > > https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383 > > > > Thank you! > > > > RFC Editor/lb > > > >> On Aug 17, 2023, at 5:44 PM, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com> wrote: > >> > >> Thank you Lynne! I also approve publication of RFC 9383. > >> > >> — Tim > >> > >> > >>> On Aug 17, 2023, at 00:04, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> > wrote: > >>> > >>> Hi, Chris. So noted: > >>> > >>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383 > >>> > >>> Thank you! > >>> > >>> RFC Editor/lb > >>> > >>>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 2:39 PM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Thanks, Lynne. I approve publication of RFC9383. > >>>> > >>>> Sent from my iPhone > >>>> > >>>>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 5:19 PM, Lynne Bartholomew < > lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Dear Chris, Eliot, Sharon, Leonid, and Tim, > >>>>> > >>>>> Thank you for your replies. We have updated RFCs-to-be 9381 and > 9383 to use "Prover" and "Verifier". > >>>>> > >>>>> ** RFC-to-be 9381: The latest files are posted here. Please > refresh your browser: > >>>>> > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html > >>>>> > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> ** RFC-to-be 9383: The latest files are posted here. Please > refresh your browser: > >>>>> > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.txt > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.pdf > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.xml > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-diff.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-rfcdiff.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-auth48diff.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastdiff.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastrfcdiff.html > >>>>> > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff1.html > >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff2.html > >>>>> > >>>>> We will continue the publication process for RFC-to-be 9381. > >>>>> > >>>>> RFC-to-be 9383 will be published when RFC-to-be 9382 is published, > as noted on <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383>. > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks again! > >>>>> > >>>>> RFC Editor/lb > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 8:06 AM, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com> > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Capitalized is fine to me as well. Thanks! > >>>>>> > >>>>>> — Tim > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On 16. Aug 2023, at 02:48, Leonid Reyzin <leonid.reyzin@gmail.com> > wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Agreed. Capitalized makes more sense to me, but I don't feel > strongly. Thanks for catching! > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Since my email forwarding seems wonky still, can you contact me at > leonid.reyzin@gmail.com instead of @bu? > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 3:55 PM, Sharon Goldberg < > sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I agree with Chris. Go with capitals. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks > >>>>>> Sharon > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 1:53 PM, Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot > Lear) <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I generally prefer lowercase - we're not writing legal contracts > here, but the authors can have the final say, so long as they agree. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Eliot > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 15.08.23 22:42, Lynne Bartholomew wrote: > >>>>>>> Hi, Chris and *Eliot. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Chris, thank you for the quick reply! We'll wait a bit to see if > anyone objects; if not, we'll update per your note. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> *Eliot, as ISE for RFC-to-be 9383, please let us know if you're OK > with us updating per Chris's note. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thanks again! > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb > >>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 4:34 PM Christopher Wood < > caw@heapingbits.net> wrote: > >>>>>> Hi Lynne, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Specifications I've worked with in the past have capitalized these > sorts of terms as proper nouns, but I don't think it really matters much. > If we need to choose, and assuming no one else cares strongly, I would go > with Prover and Verifier. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, > >>>>>> Chris > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023, at 3:09 PM, Lynne Bartholomew wrote: > >>>>>>> Dear authors of RFCs-to-be 9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) and 9383 > >>>>>>> (draft-bar-cfrg-spake2plus-08), > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Apologies, but while preparing RFC-to-be 9381 for publication, we > found > >>>>>>> two items that we had previously flagged internally for these two > >>>>>>> documents but that were not conveyed to you when these documents > were > >>>>>>> moved to the AUTH48 state last Spring: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> These documents use both "prover" and "Prover", and both > "verifier" and > >>>>>>> "Verifier" (e.g., "the prover", "the Prover", "the verifier", "the > >>>>>>> Verifier"). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> We believe that usage (capitalization or not) for these terms > within > >>>>>>> and between these documents should be consistent. Please let us > know > >>>>>>> which form is preferred for each. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thank you, and again, apologies for not asking about this earlier. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 10:13 AM, Lynne Bartholomew < > lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Dear Dimitris, Sharon, and Jan, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> We have noted your approvals on the AUTH48 status page: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> As this document is part of Cluster C450 ( > https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C450) and normatively > depends on RFC-to-be 9380 (draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve), this document > will be published when RFC-to-be 9380 is published. You can follow the > progress of RFC-to-be 9380 at <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9380>. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Thank you! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 1:43 AM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Thank you for the edits, everyone. The document looks good to > me. I > >>>>>>>>> also approve it for publication. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Jan > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On May 20, 2023, at 8:50 AM, Sharon Goldberg < > sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Thank you, I approve this as well. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sat, May 20, 2023 at 4:05 AM Dimitrios Papadopoulos < > dipapado@cse.ust.hk> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> Many thanks for the detailed editing. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I also approve its publication. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Regards, > >>>>>>>>> -Dimitris > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On 19 May 2023, at 11:52 PM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Thank you! I now approve it for publication. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> (NB: Jan, Sharon, Dimitris: you each need to send your approval > before it can be published.) > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 18, 2023 at 6:29 PM Lynne Bartholomew < > lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> Hi, Leo. No worries! Fixed, and the latest files are posted > here. Please refresh your browser: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html > >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Thank you! > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On May 17, 2023, at 3:00 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Oh, so sorry for that bug. It should be 3.2.1.3. Could you > please fix that? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 4:00 AM Lynne Bartholomew < > lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> Dear Leo, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for the latest updated XML file as well! > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Thanks also for the working NIST URL. We updated the > reference listing accordingly. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> However, please note that the NIST document associated with > this URL does not have a Section 3.1.2.3. Which section should be cited in > the following sentence (from Section 5.5 of this document)? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> * The EC group G is the NIST P-256 elliptic curve, with the > finite > >>>>>>>>>>> field and curve parameters as specified in Section 3.1.2.3 of > >>>>>>>>>>> [SP-800-186] and Section 2.6 of [RFC5114]. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> We have posted the latest files here: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html > >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Thanks again! > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On May 12, 2023, at 7:43 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks so much for the quick turnaround! I made the change I > had failed to make the previous time; fixed another nit for clarity; > changed the mailing addresses for two of the authors; and provided an > alternative URL for the NIST document. All new changes are annotated with > [auth48response] in the attached xml file. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Best, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Leo > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 8:31 PM Lynne Bartholomew < > lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Leo, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for the updated XML file! The updates > and your notes were most helpful. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Regarding this item: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> <!-- [auth48response] Removed "four" becuase it's incorrect. > Added "to" before > >>>>>>>>>>>> "each other". ... > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> We did not see this update. Should "unlikely to equal each > other or to any inputs" be changed to "unlikely to be equal to each other > or to any inputs"? > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Regarding your note related to the stability of [X25519]: > Thank you for the information. We left as is; seventeen years seems a good > track record and indicates that it should remain stable. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here (please refresh your > browser): > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html > >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks again! > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On May 10, 2023, at 10:58 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne et al., > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Attaching the updated XML file. Responses to edits / > comments, as well as a few new minor edits, are explained in the comments > prefixed with [auth48response]. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for such a thorough pass through the > document and for all the excellent suggestions! > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sincerely, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Leo > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 5:40 PM Lynne Bartholomew < > lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi, Jan. Thank you for checking in with us! > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 26, 2023, at 10:19 PM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hello Lynne. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you. We will look at the questions and get back to > you soon. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jan > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dne pá 21. 4. 2023 20:13 uživatel Lynne Bartholomew < > lbartholomew@amsl.com> napsal: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear authors, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Checking in with you regarding the status of this > document. Please review the questions below, and let us know how this > document should be updated. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The AUTH48 status page is here: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you! > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, at 11:03 PM, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Authors, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please > resolve (as necessary) the following questions, which are also in the XML > file. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) <!-- [rfced] Please ensure that the guidelines listed in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 2.1 of RFC 5743 have been adhered to in this > document. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2) <!-- [rfced] Would you like the references to be listed > in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alphanumeric order? --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3) <!-- [rfced] Jan: We have seen both "Vcelak" and > "Včelák" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in recent RFCs-to-be. Please let us know your preference. > --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 4) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5: We could not find anything > in Section 3.4 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that indicates that pseudorandomness cannot hold against > malicious > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> key generation. Please confirm that this section number > is correct and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will be clear to readers. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As explained in Section 3.4, pseudorandomness cannot hold > against > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious key generation. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 5) <!-- [rfced] Sections 4.2 and 5.2: Is pi_string > sometimes known to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove (in which case "only > on a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string value that is known to have been produced by > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_prove" would be correct), or always (in which > case "only on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string, which is known to have been produced by > RSAFDHVRF_prove" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be correct)? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string > that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove, or from > within > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_verify as specified in Section 4.3. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that > is known > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to have been produced by ECVRF_prove, or from within > ECVRF_verify > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as specified in Section 5.3. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 6) <!-- [rfced] Section 5: We don't see any mention of > the field F in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5. Please confirm that this listing will be > clear to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> readers. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fixed options (specified in Section 5.5): > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> F - finite field --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 7) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.1.1: This sentence does not > parse. If the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified"* and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "roughly half hash_string values". > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * We see "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point - a function > that attempts" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> earlier in this section.) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note even though the loop is infinite as written, and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified in > Section 5.5 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will succeed on roughly half hash_string values. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested (we could not find evidence of multiple > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions): > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note that even though the loop is infinite as written and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point function, as specified in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5, will succeed on roughly half of the > hash_string > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> values. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1: This sentence is > confusing as written, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because the ECVRF_nonce_generation function is not > specified in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [RFC6979]. If the suggested text is not correct, please > clarify the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is as specified in > [RFC6979] > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 3.2 where > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is implemented per the > process > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> specified in Section 3.2 of [RFC6979], where --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 9) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a) Please confirm that "output length hlen" is correct > (i.e., should > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not be "output length hLen"). We ask because this is the > only > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instance of "hlen" in this document. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is this something that should be clarified, along the > lines of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "this qlen is not to be confused with qLen" text a few > lines later? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The hash function H is Hash and its output length hlen (in > bits) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Possibly: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * The hash function H is Hash, and its output length hlen > (in bits) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8 (this hlen is not to be confused with > hLen, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is used in this document to represent the length of > Hash in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> octets). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> b) The last bullet item in this list was the only sentence > fragment. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We added a verb ("are"). If this is incorrect, please let > us know > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how we can make this list parallel (i.e., either all > sentence > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fragments or all complete sentences). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> All the other values and primitives as defined in [RFC6979] > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * All the other values and primitives are as defined in > [RFC6979]. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 10) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: We changed "given to this > procedure" to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "used in this procedure" here. If this is incorrect, > please provide > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying text. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: the public key Y given to this procedure > MUST be a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid point on E. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The public key Y used in this procedure MUST be a valid > point on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> E. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 11) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: Does "in order to" refer > to clearing > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the x-coordinate or something else? If the suggested text > is not > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4), > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each > match two bad > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which > was cleared > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in step 3, in order to make sure that it does not affect > the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comparison. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4), > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each > match two bad > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which > was cleared > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Step 3 in order to make sure that it does not affect the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comparison. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 12) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: Please confirm that > "their y-coordinate" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should not be "their y-coordinates" here. We ask because > of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plural "Their y-coordinates" in the third sentence of this > paragraph. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no need to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> shift the other bad_pk values by p (or any bad_pk values > by a larger > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> multiple of p), because their y coordinate would exceed > 2^255; and we > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ensure that y_string corresponds to an integer less than > 2^255 in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> step 3.) --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 13) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.5: This sentence is confusing > as written, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because the int_to_string function is not specified in > [RFC8032]. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the > meaning. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * The int_to_string function as specified in the first > paragraph of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * The int_to_string function is implemented as specified > in the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first paragraph of Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14) <!-- [rfced] Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3: We had trouble > following > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this sentence. Does "the modulus n or the exponent e are > chosen not > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in compliance with [RFC8017]" mean "the modulus n or the > exponent e > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not chosen, in compliance with [RFC8017]" or > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "the modulus n or the exponent e is chosen without > complying > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with [RFC8017]" or otherwise? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, for RSA-FDH-VRF, uniqueness and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance may not hold if the keys are generated > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> adversarially (specifically, if the RSA function specified > in the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> public key is not bijective because the modulus n or the > exponent e > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017]); thus, > RSA-FDH-VRF > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined in this document does not have "full uniqueness" > and "full > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance". > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Specifically, the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> VRF output may be predictable if the RSA function > specified in the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> public key is far from bijective because the modulus n or > the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exponent e are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017].) > --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 15) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.2: We found the phrasing in > these sentences > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> confusing, as the text appears to indicate that the > equations in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> question can be found in the cited documents. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested updates would preserve your intended > meaning, may we > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rephrase? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * For trusted collision resistance: approximately > 8*min(k/2, hLen/2) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (as shown in [PWHVNRG17]). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * For selective pseudorandomness: approximately as strong > as the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> security, in bits, of the RSA problem for the key (n, e) > (as shown > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in [GNPRVZ15]). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As shown in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, > measured in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bits, is as follows (in the random oracle model for the > functions > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For trusted collision resistance (as discussed in > [PWHVNRG17]): > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For selective pseudorandomness (as discussed in [GNPRVZ15]: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approximately as strong as the security, in bits, of the > RSA > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the key (n, e). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the > ECVRF, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measured in bits, would be as follows (in the random > oracle model > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the functions Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 16) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.3: Please confirm that > "loose", and not > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "lossy", is correct here. We ask because we see "lossier > security > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reduction" in Appendix B of [PWHVNRG17] but do not see any > words > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that have "loose" in them in that document. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * They may increase security parameters to make up for > the loose > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> security reduction. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 17) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.5: Does "must run in time > independent of" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "must run in a time that is independent of", or does > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "independent" refer to "run" (in which case it should be > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "independently")? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Please note that this question has also been raised for > "run in time > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> independent of" as also found in companion document > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve.) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF-P256-SHA256-SSWU and ECVRF-EDWARDS25519-SHA512-ELL2 > can be made > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to run in time independent of alpha, following > recommendations in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 18) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.8: We had trouble following > several sentences > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in this section. Please review the following. If the > suggestions > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> below are not correct, please clarify the following: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the four inputs (where are these defined?) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to equal each other or to any inputs (to be equal to?) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the input (plural "octets", singular > "input") > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the inputs (plural "octets", plural > "inputs") > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last octet of the input (singular "octet", singular > "input") > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the > four inputs > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to equal each other or to any > inputs given to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the hash function for the same SK and different alpha. > This is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this > document, because > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the second octets of the input to the hash function used > in MGF1 and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in proof_to_hash are different. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * the second octets of the inputs to the hash function > used in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * the last octet of the input to the hash function used in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero, and > therefore > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the input to the hash > function > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set > equal to the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag by > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the > four inputs > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to be equal to each other or to > any inputs > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for the same SK and different > alpha. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> document, because the second octet of the inputs to the > hash > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function used in MGF1 and in proof_to_hash are different. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * The second octet of the inputs to the hash function > used in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * The last octet of the inputs to the hash function used > in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero and is > therefore > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the inputs to the hash > function > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set > equal to the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag per [RFC9380]. > --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.9: This sentence does not > parse. If the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify "if a group > of public > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keys to share the same salt" and "group of public keys, > which may aid > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in some protocol". > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys to share the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be > the same for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys, which may aid in some > protocol that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> uses the VRF. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys shares the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be > the same for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys; this can be helpful for > any > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> protocol that uses the VRF. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 20) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.10: It appears that one or > more words were > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> missing in this sentence. We added the words "to the" as > shown below. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If this is incorrect, please provide clarifying text. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs ECVRF_encode_to_curve hash > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be > different from > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by > the prover > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the > prover > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs to the ECVRF_encode_to_curve > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hash function used in producing H are then guaranteed to > be different > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done > by the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prover depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used > by the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prover will also be different from other ciphersuites as > long as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 21) <!-- [rfced] [DGKR18]: We see that < > https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lists the title of this reference as "Ouroboros Praos: An > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake > protocol", but > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when we click the "PDF" box on the page, the title of the > PDF version > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the paper has one word different ("protocol" vs. > "blockchain"): > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous > proof-of-stake > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blockchain". How should the title be updated in this > reference? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [DGKR18] David, B., Gazi, P., Kiayias, A., and A. > Russell, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, > semi-synchronous > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof-of-stake protocol", in Advances in Cryptology - > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> EUROCRYPT, 2018, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>. > --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 22) <!-- [rfced] [GNPRVZ15]: This listing is the only " > eprint.iacr.org" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> listing to provide a direct link to the PDF copy. Should > all > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "eprint.iacr.org" URLs in this document be updated to > point to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the PDF copy, or should the ".pdf" be removed from this > link? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [GNPRVZ15] Goldberg, S., Naor, M., Papadopoulos, D., > Reyzin, L., > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vasant, S., and A. Ziv, "NSEC5: Provably Preventing > DNSSEC > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zone Enumeration", in NDSS, 2015, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/582.pdf>. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 23) <!-- [rfced] [X25519]: We see that the provided URL > resolves to what > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appears to be a personal website. Please confirm that > this page is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stable and will continue to be available to readers. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [X25519] Bernstein, D.J., "How do I validate Curve25519 > public > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keys?", 2006, <https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate>. > --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 24) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" > portion of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> online Style Guide at > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> < > https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and let us know if any changes are needed. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, > but this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should still be reviewed as a best practice. --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 25) <!-- [rfced] Please let us know if any changes are > needed for the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a) The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in > this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> document. Please let us know which form is preferred. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> INVALID / "INVALID" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., 'may output INVALID', 'output "INVALID" and stop') > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> VALID / "VALID" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., '(VALID, beta1)', '("VALID", beta_string)') > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> b) As ptLen is defined as "length, in octets, of a point > on E", it > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appears that ptLen would be pronounced as either > "pee-tee-len" or > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "point-len". We changed the two instances of "an ptLen" > to "a ptLen" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accordingly. Please let us know any concerns. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> c) Should spacing be made consistent for the following? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ctr = 1 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ctr=1 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr, 1) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr,1) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please note that in the context of "ctr" the use of spaces > between > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entries appears to be more common; we suggest adding spaces > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for these items (e.g., ctr = 1, (ctr, 1)). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2^(8qLen)>q > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2^qlen > q > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> d) Last paragraph of Section 5.4.5: For consistency, > should numerals > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or spelled-out numbers be used for the following? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8 bad points > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two bad points > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (If the spelled-out "eight" is preferred, we will also > change > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "5 list elements" to "five list elements".) --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *****IMPORTANT***** > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Updated 2023/04/17 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Author(s): > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -------------- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Instructions for Completing AUTH48 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Your document has now entered AUTH48. Once it has been > reviewed and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approved by you and all coauthors, it will be published > as an RFC. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If an author is no longer available, there are several > remedies > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> available as listed in the FAQ ( > https://www.rfc-editor.org/faq/). > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and you coauthors are responsible for engaging other > parties > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., Contributors or Working Group) as necessary before > providing > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your approval. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Planning your review > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the following aspects of your document: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * RFC Editor questions > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review and resolve any questions raised by the RFC > Editor > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that have been included in the XML file as comments > marked as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> follows: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <!-- [rfced] ... --> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> These questions will also be sent in a subsequent email. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * Changes submitted by coauthors > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please ensure that you review any changes submitted by > your > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coauthors. We assume that if you do not speak up that > you > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agree to changes submitted by your coauthors. >
- [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-… rfc-editor
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… rfc-editor
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Christopher Wood
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Tim Taubert
- [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Christopher Wood
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Tim Taubert
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- [auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381… Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Sandy Ginoza