Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review

[Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]>]

Hi, Chris and *Eliot.

Chris, thank you for the quick reply!  We'll wait a bit to see if anyone objects; if not, we'll update per your note.

*Eliot, as ISE for RFC-to-be 9383, please let us know if you're OK with us updating per Chris's note.

Thanks again!

RFC Editor/lb

> On Aug 15, 2023, at 1:33 PM, Christopher Wood <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Hi Lynne,
> 
> Specifications I've worked with in the past have capitalized these sorts of terms as proper nouns, but I don't think it really matters much. If we need to choose, and assuming no one else cares strongly, I would go with Prover and Verifier.
> 
> Best,
> Chris
> 
> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023, at 3:09 PM, Lynne Bartholomew wrote:
>> Dear authors of RFCs-to-be 9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) and 9383 
>> (draft-bar-cfrg-spake2plus-08),
>> 
>> Apologies, but while preparing RFC-to-be 9381 for publication, we found 
>> two items that we had previously flagged internally for these two 
>> documents but that were not conveyed to you when these documents were 
>> moved to the AUTH48 state last Spring:
>> 
>> These documents use both "prover" and "Prover", and both "verifier" and 
>> "Verifier" (e.g., "the prover", "the Prover", "the verifier", "the 
>> Verifier").
>> 
>> We believe that usage (capitalization or not) for these terms within 
>> and between these documents should be consistent.  Please let us know 
>> which form is preferred for each.
>> 
>> Thank you, and again, apologies for not asking about this earlier.
>> 
>> RFC Editor/lb
>> 
>>> On May 22, 2023, at 10:13 AM, Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Dear Dimitris, Sharon, and Jan,
>>> 
>>> We have noted your approvals on the AUTH48 status page:
>>> 
>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>> 
>>> As this document is part of Cluster C450 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C450) and normatively depends on RFC-to-be 9380 (draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve), this document will be published when RFC-to-be 9380 is published.  You can follow the progress of RFC-to-be 9380 at <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9380>.
>>> 
>>> Thank you!
>>> 
>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 1:43 AM, Jan Včelák <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Thank you for the edits, everyone. The document looks good to me. I
>>>> also approve it for publication.
>>>> 
>>>> Jan
>>> 
>>>> On May 20, 2023, at 8:50 AM, Sharon Goldberg <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Thank you, I approve this as well.
>>>> 
>>>> On Sat, May 20, 2023 at 4:05 AM Dimitrios Papadopoulos <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>> Many thanks for the detailed editing. 
>>>> 
>>>> I also approve its publication.
>>>> 
>>>> Regards,
>>>> -Dimitris
>>>> 
>>>>> On 19 May 2023, at 11:52 PM, Leonid Reyzin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thank you! I now approve it for publication.
>>>>> 
>>>>> (NB: Jan, Sharon, Dimitris: you each need to send your approval before it can be published.)
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Thu, May 18, 2023 at 6:29 PM Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>> Hi, Leo.  No worries!  Fixed, and the latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:
>>>>> 
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
>>>>> 
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>> 
>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On May 17, 2023, at 3:00 AM, Leonid Reyzin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Oh, so sorry for that bug. It should be 3.2.1.3. Could you please fix that?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 4:00 AM Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>> Dear Leo,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thank you for the latest updated XML file as well!
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thanks also for the working NIST URL.  We updated the reference listing accordingly.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> However, please note that the NIST document associated with this URL does not have a Section 3.1.2.3.  Which section should be cited in the following sentence (from Section 5.5 of this document)?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> * The EC group G is the NIST P-256 elliptic curve, with the finite
>>>>>>  field and curve parameters as specified in Section 3.1.2.3 of
>>>>>>  [SP-800-186] and Section 2.6 of [RFC5114].
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> We have posted the latest files here:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thanks again!
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On May 12, 2023, at 7:43 AM, Leonid Reyzin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Dear Lynne,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thanks so much for the quick turnaround! I made the change I had failed to make the previous time; fixed another nit for clarity; changed the mailing addresses for two of the authors; and provided an alternative URL for the NIST document. All new changes are annotated with [auth48response] in the attached xml file.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Leo
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 8:31 PM Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>> Dear Leo,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thank you very much for the updated XML file!  The updates and your notes were most helpful.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Regarding this item:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> <!-- [auth48response] Removed "four" becuase it's incorrect. Added "to" before      
>>>>>>> "each other". ...
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> We did not see this update.  Should "unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs" be changed to "unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs"?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Regarding your note related to the stability of [X25519]:  Thank you for the information.  We left as is; seventeen years seems a good track record and indicates that it should remain stable.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here (please refresh your browser):
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thanks again!
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On May 10, 2023, at 10:58 AM, Leonid Reyzin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne et al.,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Attaching the updated XML file. Responses to edits / comments, as well as a few new minor edits, are explained in the comments prefixed with [auth48response].
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for such a thorough pass through the document and for all the excellent suggestions!
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Leo
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 5:40 PM Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hi, Jan.  Thank you for checking in with us!
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Apr 26, 2023, at 10:19 PM, Jan Včelák <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Hello Lynne.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Thank you. We will look at the questions and get back to you soon.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Jan
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Dne pá 21. 4. 2023 20:13 uživatel Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> napsal:
>>>>>>>>> Dear authors,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Checking in with you regarding the status of this document.  Please review the questions below, and let us know how this document should be updated.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> The AUTH48 status page is here:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, at 11:03 PM, [e-mail] wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Authors,
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) the following questions, which are also in the XML file.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 1) <!-- [rfced] Please ensure that the guidelines listed in
>>>>>>>>>> Section 2.1 of RFC 5743 have been adhered to in this document. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 2) <!-- [rfced] Would you like the references to be listed in
>>>>>>>>>> alphanumeric order? -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 3) <!-- [rfced] Jan: We have seen both "Vcelak" and "Včelák"
>>>>>>>>>> in recent RFCs-to-be.  Please let us know your preference. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 4) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5:  We could not find anything in Section 3.4
>>>>>>>>>> that indicates that pseudorandomness cannot hold against malicious
>>>>>>>>>> key generation.  Please confirm that this section number is correct and
>>>>>>>>>> will be clear to readers.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> As explained in Section 3.4, pseudorandomness cannot hold against
>>>>>>>>>> malicious key generation. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 5) <!-- [rfced] Sections 4.2 and 5.2:  Is pi_string sometimes known to
>>>>>>>>>> have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove (in which case "only on a
>>>>>>>>>> pi_string value that is known to have been produced by
>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_prove" would be correct), or always (in which case "only on
>>>>>>>>>> pi_string, which is known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove"
>>>>>>>>>> would be correct)?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>  RSAFDHVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is
>>>>>>>>>>  known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove, or from within
>>>>>>>>>>  RSAFDHVRF_verify as specified in Section 4.3.
>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>  ECVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is known
>>>>>>>>>>  to have been produced by ECVRF_prove, or from within ECVRF_verify
>>>>>>>>>>  as specified in Section 5.3. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 6) <!-- [rfced] Section 5:  We don't see any mention of the field F in
>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5.  Please confirm that this listing will be clear to
>>>>>>>>>> readers.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> Fixed options (specified in Section 5.5):
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>  F - finite field -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 7) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.1.1:  This sentence does not parse.  If the
>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify
>>>>>>>>>> "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified"* and
>>>>>>>>>> "roughly half hash_string values".
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> * We see "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point - a function that attempts"
>>>>>>>>>> earlier in this section.)
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> Note even though the loop is infinite as written, and
>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256,
>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified in Section 5.5
>>>>>>>>>> will succeed on roughly half hash_string values.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Suggested (we could not find evidence of multiple
>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions):
>>>>>>>>>> Note that even though the loop is infinite as written and
>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, the
>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point function, as specified in
>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5, will succeed on roughly half of the hash_string
>>>>>>>>>> values. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 8) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1:  This sentence is confusing as written,
>>>>>>>>>> because the ECVRF_nonce_generation function is not specified in
>>>>>>>>>> [RFC6979].  If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the
>>>>>>>>>> meaning.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is as specified in [RFC6979]
>>>>>>>>>> Section 3.2 where
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is implemented per the process
>>>>>>>>>> specified in Section 3.2 of [RFC6979], where -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 9) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> a) Please confirm that "output length hlen" is correct (i.e., should
>>>>>>>>>> not be "output length hLen").  We ask because this is the only
>>>>>>>>>> instance of "hlen" in this document.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Is this something that should be clarified, along the lines of the
>>>>>>>>>> "this qlen is not to be confused with qLen" text a few lines later?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> The hash function H is Hash and its output length hlen (in bits)
>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Possibly:
>>>>>>>>>> *  The hash function H is Hash, and its output length hlen (in bits)
>>>>>>>>>>  is set as hLen*8 (this hlen is not to be confused with hLen,
>>>>>>>>>>  which is used in this document to represent the length of Hash in
>>>>>>>>>>  octets).
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> b) The last bullet item in this list was the only sentence fragment.
>>>>>>>>>> We added a verb ("are").  If this is incorrect, please let us know
>>>>>>>>>> how we can make this list parallel (i.e., either all sentence
>>>>>>>>>> fragments or all complete sentences).
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> All the other values and primitives as defined in [RFC6979]
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>> *  All the other values and primitives are as defined in [RFC6979]. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 10) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  We changed "given to this procedure" to
>>>>>>>>>> "used in this procedure" here.  If this is incorrect, please provide
>>>>>>>>>> clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> Important note: the public key Y given to this procedure MUST be a
>>>>>>>>>> valid point on E.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>  The public key Y used in this procedure MUST be a valid point on
>>>>>>>>>>  E. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 11) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  Does "in order to" refer to clearing
>>>>>>>>>> the x-coordinate or something else?  If the suggested text is not
>>>>>>>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4),
>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad
>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared
>>>>>>>>>> in step 3, in order to make sure that it does not affect the
>>>>>>>>>> comparison.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4),
>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad
>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared
>>>>>>>>>> in Step 3 in order to make sure that it does not affect the
>>>>>>>>>> comparison. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 12) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  Please confirm that "their y-coordinate"
>>>>>>>>>> should not be "their y-coordinates" here.  We ask because of the
>>>>>>>>>> plural "Their y-coordinates" in the third sentence of this paragraph.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> There is no need to
>>>>>>>>>> shift the other bad_pk values by p (or any bad_pk values by a larger
>>>>>>>>>> multiple of p), because their y coordinate would exceed 2^255; and we
>>>>>>>>>> ensure that y_string corresponds to an integer less than 2^255 in
>>>>>>>>>> step 3.) -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 13) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.5:  This sentence is confusing as written,
>>>>>>>>>> because the int_to_string function is not specified in [RFC8032].
>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the meaning.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> *  The int_to_string function as specified in the first paragraph of
>>>>>>>>>>  Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032].
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>> *  The int_to_string function is implemented as specified in the
>>>>>>>>>>  first paragraph of Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 14) <!-- [rfced] Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3:  We had trouble following
>>>>>>>>>> this sentence.  Does "the modulus n or the exponent e are chosen not
>>>>>>>>>> in compliance with [RFC8017]" mean "the modulus n or the exponent e
>>>>>>>>>> is not chosen, in compliance with [RFC8017]" or 
>>>>>>>>>> "the modulus n or the exponent e is chosen without complying 
>>>>>>>>>> with [RFC8017]" or otherwise?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> Thus, for RSA-FDH-VRF, uniqueness and
>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance may not hold if the keys are generated
>>>>>>>>>> adversarially (specifically, if the RSA function specified in the
>>>>>>>>>> public key is not bijective because the modulus n or the exponent e
>>>>>>>>>> are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017]); thus, RSA-FDH-VRF
>>>>>>>>>> defined in this document does not have "full uniqueness" and "full
>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance".
>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>> (Specifically, the
>>>>>>>>>> VRF output may be predictable if the RSA function specified in the
>>>>>>>>>> public key is far from bijective because the modulus n or the
>>>>>>>>>> exponent e are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017].) -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 15) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.2:  We found the phrasing in these sentences
>>>>>>>>>> confusing, as the text appears to indicate that the equations in
>>>>>>>>>> question can be found in the cited documents.
>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested updates would preserve your intended meaning, may we
>>>>>>>>>> rephrase?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> *  For trusted collision resistance: approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2)
>>>>>>>>>>  (as shown in [PWHVNRG17]).
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> *  For selective pseudorandomness: approximately as strong as the
>>>>>>>>>>  security, in bits, of the RSA problem for the key (n, e) (as shown
>>>>>>>>>>  in [GNPRVZ15]).
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> As shown in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, measured in
>>>>>>>>>> bits, is as follows (in the random oracle model for the functions
>>>>>>>>>> Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve):
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>> For trusted collision resistance (as discussed in [PWHVNRG17]):
>>>>>>>>>>  approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2).
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> For selective pseudorandomness (as discussed in [GNPRVZ15]:
>>>>>>>>>>  approximately as strong as the security, in bits, of the RSA
>>>>>>>>>>  problem for the key (n, e).
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> As discussed in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF,
>>>>>>>>>> measured in bits, would be as follows (in the random oracle model
>>>>>>>>>> for the functions Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 16) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.3:  Please confirm that "loose", and not
>>>>>>>>>> "lossy", is correct here.  We ask because we see "lossier security
>>>>>>>>>> reduction" in Appendix B of [PWHVNRG17] but do not see any words
>>>>>>>>>> that have "loose" in them in that document.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> *  They may increase security parameters to make up for the loose
>>>>>>>>>>  security reduction. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 17) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.5:  Does "must run in time independent of"
>>>>>>>>>> mean "must run in a time that is independent of", or does
>>>>>>>>>> "independent" refer to "run" (in which case it should be
>>>>>>>>>> "independently")?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> (Please note that this question has also been raised for "run in time
>>>>>>>>>> independent of" as also found in companion document
>>>>>>>>>> draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve.)
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF-P256-SHA256-SSWU and ECVRF-EDWARDS25519-SHA512-ELL2 can be made
>>>>>>>>>> to run in time independent of alpha, following recommendations in
>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 18) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.8:  We had trouble following several sentences
>>>>>>>>>> in this section.  Please review the following.  If the suggestions
>>>>>>>>>> below are not correct, please clarify the following:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> the four inputs (where are these defined?)
>>>>>>>>>> to equal each other or to any inputs  (to be equal to?)
>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the input  (plural "octets", singular "input")
>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the inputs  (plural "octets", plural "inputs")
>>>>>>>>>> last octet of the input  (singular "octet", singular "input")
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds
>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs
>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are
>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs given to
>>>>>>>>>> the hash function for the same SK and different alpha.  This is
>>>>>>>>>> indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this document, because
>>>>>>>>>> the second octets of the input to the hash function used in MGF1 and
>>>>>>>>>> in proof_to_hash are different.
>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>> *  the second octets of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>  proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>  encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different.
>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>> *  the last octet of the input to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>  proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>  encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero, and therefore
>>>>>>>>>>  different from the last octet of the input to the hash function
>>>>>>>>>>  used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the
>>>>>>>>>>  nonzero length of the domain separation tag by
>>>>>>>>>>  [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds
>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs
>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are
>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs
>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for the same SK and different alpha.
>>>>>>>>>> This is indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this
>>>>>>>>>> document, because the second octet of the inputs to the hash
>>>>>>>>>> function used in MGF1 and in proof_to_hash are different.
>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>> *  The second octet of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>  proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>  encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> *  The last octet of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>  proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>  encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero and is therefore
>>>>>>>>>>  different from the last octet of the inputs to the hash function
>>>>>>>>>>  used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the
>>>>>>>>>>  nonzero length of the domain separation tag per [RFC9380]. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 19) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.9:  This sentence does not parse.  If the
>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify "if a group of public
>>>>>>>>>> keys to share the same salt" and "group of public keys, which may aid
>>>>>>>>>> in some protocol".
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys to share the
>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for
>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys, which may aid in some protocol that
>>>>>>>>>> uses the VRF.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys shares the
>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for
>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys; this can be helpful for any
>>>>>>>>>> protocol that uses the VRF. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 20) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.10:  It appears that one or more words were
>>>>>>>>>> missing in this sentence.  We added the words "to the" as shown below.
>>>>>>>>>> If this is incorrect, please provide clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs ECVRF_encode_to_curve hash
>>>>>>>>>> function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different from
>>>>>>>>>> other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the prover
>>>>>>>>>> depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the prover
>>>>>>>>>> will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as
>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs to the ECVRF_encode_to_curve
>>>>>>>>>> hash function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different
>>>>>>>>>> from other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the
>>>>>>>>>> prover depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the
>>>>>>>>>> prover will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as
>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 21) <!-- [rfced] [DGKR18]:  We see that <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>
>>>>>>>>>> lists the title of this reference as "Ouroboros Praos: An
>>>>>>>>>> adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake protocol", but
>>>>>>>>>> when we click the "PDF" box on the page, the title of the PDF version
>>>>>>>>>> of the paper has one word different ("protocol" vs. "blockchain"):
>>>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake
>>>>>>>>>> blockchain".  How should the title be updated in this reference?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> [DGKR18]   David, B., Gazi, P., Kiayias, A., and A. Russell,
>>>>>>>>>>          "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous
>>>>>>>>>>          proof-of-stake protocol", in Advances in Cryptology -
>>>>>>>>>>          EUROCRYPT, 2018, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 22) <!-- [rfced] [GNPRVZ15]:  This listing is the only "eprint.iacr.org"
>>>>>>>>>> listing to provide a direct link to the PDF copy.  Should all
>>>>>>>>>> "eprint.iacr.org" URLs in this document be updated to point to
>>>>>>>>>> the PDF copy, or should the ".pdf" be removed from this link?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> [GNPRVZ15] Goldberg, S., Naor, M., Papadopoulos, D., Reyzin, L.,
>>>>>>>>>>          Vasant, S., and A. Ziv, "NSEC5: Provably Preventing DNSSEC
>>>>>>>>>>          Zone Enumeration", in NDSS, 2015,
>>>>>>>>>>          <https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/582.pdf>. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 23) <!-- [rfced] [X25519]:  We see that the provided URL resolves to what
>>>>>>>>>> appears to be a personal website.  Please confirm that this page is
>>>>>>>>>> stable and will continue to be available to readers.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>> [X25519]   Bernstein, D.J., "How do I validate Curve25519 public
>>>>>>>>>>          keys?", 2006, <https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate>. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 24) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the
>>>>>>>>>> online Style Guide at
>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>,
>>>>>>>>>> and let us know if any changes are needed.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this
>>>>>>>>>> should still be reviewed as a best practice. -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 25) <!-- [rfced] Please let us know if any changes are needed for the
>>>>>>>>>> following:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> a) The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in this
>>>>>>>>>> document.  Please let us know which form is preferred.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> INVALID / "INVALID"
>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., 'may output INVALID', 'output "INVALID" and stop')
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> VALID / "VALID"
>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., '(VALID, beta1)', '("VALID", beta_string)')
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> b) As ptLen is defined as "length, in octets, of a point on E", it
>>>>>>>>>> appears that ptLen would be pronounced as either "pee-tee-len" or
>>>>>>>>>> "point-len".  We changed the two instances of "an ptLen" to "a ptLen"
>>>>>>>>>> accordingly.  Please let us know any concerns.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> c) Should spacing be made consistent for the following?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> ctr = 1
>>>>>>>>>> ctr=1
>>>>>>>>>> (ctr, 1)
>>>>>>>>>> (ctr,1)
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Please note that in the context of "ctr" the use of spaces between
>>>>>>>>>> entries appears to be more common; we suggest adding spaces
>>>>>>>>>> for these items (e.g., ctr = 1, (ctr, 1)).
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 2^(8qLen)>q
>>>>>>>>>> 2^qlen > q
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> d) Last paragraph of Section 5.4.5:  For consistency, should numerals
>>>>>>>>>> or spelled-out numbers be used for the following?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 8 bad points
>>>>>>>>>> two bad points
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> (If the spelled-out "eight" is preferred, we will also change
>>>>>>>>>> "5 list elements" to "five list elements".) -->
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Thank you.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, [e-mail] wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *****IMPORTANT*****
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Updated 2023/04/17
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Author(s):
>>>>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Instructions for Completing AUTH48
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Your document has now entered AUTH48.  Once it has been reviewed and 
>>>>>>>>>>> approved by you and all coauthors, it will be published as an RFC.  
>>>>>>>>>>> If an author is no longer available, there are several remedies 
>>>>>>>>>>> available as listed in the FAQ (https://www.rfc-editor.org/faq/).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> You and you coauthors are responsible for engaging other parties 
>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., Contributors or Working Group) as necessary before providing 
>>>>>>>>>>> your approval.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Planning your review 
>>>>>>>>>>> ---------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the following aspects of your document:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  RFC Editor questions
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Please review and resolve any questions raised by the RFC Editor 
>>>>>>>>>>> that have been included in the XML file as comments marked as 
>>>>>>>>>>> follows:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> <!-- [rfced] ... -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> These questions will also be sent in a subsequent email.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  Changes submitted by coauthors 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Please ensure that you review any changes submitted by your 
>>>>>>>>>>> coauthors.  We assume that if you do not speak up that you 
>>>>>>>>>>> agree to changes submitted by your coauthors.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  Content 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the full content of the document, as this cannot 
>>>>>>>>>>> change once the RFC is published.  Please pay particular attention to:
>>>>>>>>>>> - IANA considerations updates (if applicable)
>>>>>>>>>>> - contact information
>>>>>>>>>>> - references
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  Copyright notices and legends
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the copyright notice and legends as defined in
>>>>>>>>>>> RFC 5378 and the Trust Legal Provisions 
>>>>>>>>>>> (TLP – https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info/).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  Semantic markup
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the markup in the XML file to ensure that elements of  
>>>>>>>>>>> content are correctly tagged.  For example, ensure that <sourcecode> 
>>>>>>>>>>> and <artwork> are set correctly.  See details at 
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://authors.ietf.org/rfcxml-vocabulary>.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  Formatted output
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the PDF, HTML, and TXT files to ensure that the 
>>>>>>>>>>> formatted output, as generated from the markup in the XML file, is 
>>>>>>>>>>> reasonable.  Please note that the TXT will have formatting 
>>>>>>>>>>> limitations compared to the PDF and HTML.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Submitting changes
>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> To submit changes, please reply to this email using ‘REPLY ALL’ as all 
>>>>>>>>>>> the parties CCed on this message need to see your changes. The parties 
>>>>>>>>>>> include:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  your coauthors
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  [e-mail] (the RPC team)
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  other document participants, depending on the stream (e.g., 
>>>>>>>>>>>   IETF Stream participants are your working group chairs, the 
>>>>>>>>>>>   responsible ADs, and the document shepherd).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  [e-mail], which is a new archival mailing list 
>>>>>>>>>>>   to preserve AUTH48 conversations; it is not an active discussion 
>>>>>>>>>>>   list:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>  *  More info:
>>>>>>>>>>>     https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/yb6lpIGh-4Q9l2USxIAe6P8O4Zc
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>  *  The archive itself:
>>>>>>>>>>>     https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/auth48archive/
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>  *  Note: If only absolutely necessary, you may temporarily opt out 
>>>>>>>>>>>     of the archiving of messages (e.g., to discuss a sensitive matter).
>>>>>>>>>>>     If needed, please add a note at the top of the message that you 
>>>>>>>>>>>     have dropped the address. When the discussion is concluded, 
>>>>>>>>>>>     [e-mail] will be re-added to the CC list and 
>>>>>>>>>>>     its addition will be noted at the top of the message. 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> You may submit your changes in one of two ways:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> An update to the provided XML file
>>>>>>>>>>> — OR —
>>>>>>>>>>> An explicit list of changes in this format
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Section # (or indicate Global)
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> OLD:
>>>>>>>>>>> old text
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> NEW:
>>>>>>>>>>> new text
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> You do not need to reply with both an updated XML file and an explicit 
>>>>>>>>>>> list of changes, as either form is sufficient.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> We will ask a stream manager to review and approve any changes that seem
>>>>>>>>>>> beyond editorial in nature, e.g., addition of new text, deletion of text, 
>>>>>>>>>>> and technical changes.  Information about stream managers can be found in 
>>>>>>>>>>> the FAQ.  Editorial changes do not require approval from a stream manager.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Approving for publication
>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> To approve your RFC for publication, please reply to this email stating
>>>>>>>>>>> that you approve this RFC for publication.  Please use ‘REPLY ALL’,
>>>>>>>>>>> as all the parties CCed on this message need to see your approval.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Files 
>>>>>>>>>>> -----
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> The files are available here:
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Diff file of the text:
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html (side by side)
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> This diff file compares an altered original and the RFC (in order 
>>>>>>>>>>> to make the changes in the moved "Contributors" viewable):
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Diff of the XML: 
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Tracking progress
>>>>>>>>>>> -----------------
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> The details of the AUTH48 status of your document are here:
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Please let us know if you have any questions.  
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your cooperation,
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>> RFC9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15)
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Title            : Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)
>>>>>>>>>>> Author(s)        : S. Goldberg, L. Reyzin, D. Papadopoulos, J. Včelák
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml>
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml>
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> -- 
>>>> ---
>>>> Sharon Goldberg
>>>> Computer Science, Boston University
>>>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>