[auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")
Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> Fri, 18 August 2023 20:49 UTC
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From: Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com>
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Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2023 13:49:09 -0700
Cc: Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com>, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com>, Leonid Reyzin <leonid.reyzin@gmail.com>, Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk>, IRSG <irsg@irtf.org>, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com>, Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>, "rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org" <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>, auth48archive@rfc-editor.org
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To: "Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)" <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org>
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Subject: [auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")
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Hi, Eliot. A quick check-in with you. Do you have any further comments, or would you like to confirm your approval of RFC-to-be 9383? Thank you! RFC Editor/lb > On Aug 18, 2023, at 1:45 PM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: > > Hi, Tim. We have noted your approval: > > https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383 > > Thank you! > > RFC Editor/lb > >> On Aug 17, 2023, at 5:44 PM, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com> wrote: >> >> Thank you Lynne! I also approve publication of RFC 9383. >> >> — Tim >> >> >>> On Aug 17, 2023, at 00:04, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hi, Chris. So noted: >>> >>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383 >>> >>> Thank you! >>> >>> RFC Editor/lb >>> >>>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 2:39 PM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks, Lynne. I approve publication of RFC9383. >>>> >>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>> >>>>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 5:19 PM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear Chris, Eliot, Sharon, Leonid, and Tim, >>>>> >>>>> Thank you for your replies. We have updated RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 to use "Prover" and "Verifier". >>>>> >>>>> ** RFC-to-be 9381: The latest files are posted here. Please refresh your browser: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html >>>>> >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ** RFC-to-be 9383: The latest files are posted here. Please refresh your browser: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.txt >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.pdf >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.xml >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-diff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-rfcdiff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-auth48diff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastdiff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastrfcdiff.html >>>>> >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff1.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff2.html >>>>> >>>>> We will continue the publication process for RFC-to-be 9381. >>>>> >>>>> RFC-to-be 9383 will be published when RFC-to-be 9382 is published, as noted on <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383>. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks again! >>>>> >>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 8:06 AM, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Capitalized is fine to me as well. Thanks! >>>>>> >>>>>> — Tim >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 16. Aug 2023, at 02:48, Leonid Reyzin <leonid.reyzin@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Agreed. Capitalized makes more sense to me, but I don't feel strongly. Thanks for catching! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Since my email forwarding seems wonky still, can you contact me at leonid.reyzin@gmail.com instead of @bu? >>>>> >>>>>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 3:55 PM, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree with Chris. Go with capitals. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks >>>>>> Sharon >>>>> >>>>>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 1:53 PM, Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear) <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I generally prefer lowercase - we're not writing legal contracts here, but the authors can have the final say, so long as they agree. >>>>>> >>>>>> Eliot >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15.08.23 22:42, Lynne Bartholomew wrote: >>>>>>> Hi, Chris and *Eliot. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Chris, thank you for the quick reply! We'll wait a bit to see if anyone objects; if not, we'll update per your note. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Eliot, as ISE for RFC-to-be 9383, please let us know if you're OK with us updating per Chris's note. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks again! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 4:34 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote: >>>>>> Hi Lynne, >>>>>> >>>>>> Specifications I've worked with in the past have capitalized these sorts of terms as proper nouns, but I don't think it really matters much. If we need to choose, and assuming no one else cares strongly, I would go with Prover and Verifier. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Chris >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023, at 3:09 PM, Lynne Bartholomew wrote: >>>>>>> Dear authors of RFCs-to-be 9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) and 9383 >>>>>>> (draft-bar-cfrg-spake2plus-08), >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Apologies, but while preparing RFC-to-be 9381 for publication, we found >>>>>>> two items that we had previously flagged internally for these two >>>>>>> documents but that were not conveyed to you when these documents were >>>>>>> moved to the AUTH48 state last Spring: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> These documents use both "prover" and "Prover", and both "verifier" and >>>>>>> "Verifier" (e.g., "the prover", "the Prover", "the verifier", "the >>>>>>> Verifier"). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We believe that usage (capitalization or not) for these terms within >>>>>>> and between these documents should be consistent. Please let us know >>>>>>> which form is preferred for each. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thank you, and again, apologies for not asking about this earlier. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 10:13 AM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dear Dimitris, Sharon, and Jan, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We have noted your approvals on the AUTH48 status page: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As this document is part of Cluster C450 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C450) and normatively depends on RFC-to-be 9380 (draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve), this document will be published when RFC-to-be 9380 is published. You can follow the progress of RFC-to-be 9380 at <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9380>. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thank you! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 1:43 AM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thank you for the edits, everyone. The document looks good to me. I >>>>>>>>> also approve it for publication. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Jan >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On May 20, 2023, at 8:50 AM, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thank you, I approve this as well. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, May 20, 2023 at 4:05 AM Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk> wrote: >>>>>>>>> Many thanks for the detailed editing. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I also approve its publication. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>>>> -Dimitris >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 19 May 2023, at 11:52 PM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thank you! I now approve it for publication. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> (NB: Jan, Sharon, Dimitris: you each need to send your approval before it can be published.) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 18, 2023 at 6:29 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Hi, Leo. No worries! Fixed, and the latest files are posted here. Please refresh your browser: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thank you! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On May 17, 2023, at 3:00 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Oh, so sorry for that bug. It should be 3.2.1.3. Could you please fix that? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 4:00 AM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Dear Leo, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for the latest updated XML file as well! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thanks also for the working NIST URL. We updated the reference listing accordingly. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> However, please note that the NIST document associated with this URL does not have a Section 3.1.2.3. Which section should be cited in the following sentence (from Section 5.5 of this document)? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> * The EC group G is the NIST P-256 elliptic curve, with the finite >>>>>>>>>>> field and curve parameters as specified in Section 3.1.2.3 of >>>>>>>>>>> [SP-800-186] and Section 2.6 of [RFC5114]. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> We have posted the latest files here: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thanks again! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On May 12, 2023, at 7:43 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks so much for the quick turnaround! I made the change I had failed to make the previous time; fixed another nit for clarity; changed the mailing addresses for two of the authors; and provided an alternative URL for the NIST document. All new changes are annotated with [auth48response] in the attached xml file. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Leo >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 8:31 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Leo, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for the updated XML file! The updates and your notes were most helpful. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Regarding this item: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> <!-- [auth48response] Removed "four" becuase it's incorrect. Added "to" before >>>>>>>>>>>> "each other". ... >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> We did not see this update. Should "unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs" be changed to "unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs"? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Regarding your note related to the stability of [X25519]: Thank you for the information. We left as is; seventeen years seems a good track record and indicates that it should remain stable. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here (please refresh your browser): >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks again! >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On May 10, 2023, at 10:58 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne et al., >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Attaching the updated XML file. Responses to edits / comments, as well as a few new minor edits, are explained in the comments prefixed with [auth48response]. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for such a thorough pass through the document and for all the excellent suggestions! >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sincerely, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Leo >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 5:40 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi, Jan. Thank you for checking in with us! >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 26, 2023, at 10:19 PM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hello Lynne. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you. We will look at the questions and get back to you soon. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jan >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dne pá 21. 4. 2023 20:13 uživatel Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> napsal: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear authors, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Checking in with you regarding the status of this document. Please review the questions below, and let us know how this document should be updated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The AUTH48 status page is here: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you! >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, at 11:03 PM, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Authors, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) the following questions, which are also in the XML file. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) <!-- [rfced] Please ensure that the guidelines listed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 2.1 of RFC 5743 have been adhered to in this document. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2) <!-- [rfced] Would you like the references to be listed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alphanumeric order? --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3) <!-- [rfced] Jan: We have seen both "Vcelak" and "Včelák" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in recent RFCs-to-be. Please let us know your preference. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 4) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5: We could not find anything in Section 3.4 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that indicates that pseudorandomness cannot hold against malicious >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> key generation. Please confirm that this section number is correct and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will be clear to readers. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As explained in Section 3.4, pseudorandomness cannot hold against >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious key generation. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 5) <!-- [rfced] Sections 4.2 and 5.2: Is pi_string sometimes known to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove (in which case "only on a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string value that is known to have been produced by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_prove" would be correct), or always (in which case "only on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string, which is known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be correct)? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove, or from within >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_verify as specified in Section 4.3. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is known >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to have been produced by ECVRF_prove, or from within ECVRF_verify >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as specified in Section 5.3. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 6) <!-- [rfced] Section 5: We don't see any mention of the field F in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5. Please confirm that this listing will be clear to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> readers. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fixed options (specified in Section 5.5): >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> F - finite field --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 7) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.1.1: This sentence does not parse. If the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified"* and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "roughly half hash_string values". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * We see "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point - a function that attempts" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> earlier in this section.) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note even though the loop is infinite as written, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified in Section 5.5 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will succeed on roughly half hash_string values. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested (we could not find evidence of multiple >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions): >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note that even though the loop is infinite as written and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point function, as specified in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5, will succeed on roughly half of the hash_string >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> values. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1: This sentence is confusing as written, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because the ECVRF_nonce_generation function is not specified in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [RFC6979]. If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is as specified in [RFC6979] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 3.2 where >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is implemented per the process >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> specified in Section 3.2 of [RFC6979], where --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 9) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a) Please confirm that "output length hlen" is correct (i.e., should >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not be "output length hLen"). We ask because this is the only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instance of "hlen" in this document. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is this something that should be clarified, along the lines of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "this qlen is not to be confused with qLen" text a few lines later? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The hash function H is Hash and its output length hlen (in bits) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Possibly: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * The hash function H is Hash, and its output length hlen (in bits) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8 (this hlen is not to be confused with hLen, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is used in this document to represent the length of Hash in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> octets). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> b) The last bullet item in this list was the only sentence fragment. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We added a verb ("are"). If this is incorrect, please let us know >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how we can make this list parallel (i.e., either all sentence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fragments or all complete sentences). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> All the other values and primitives as defined in [RFC6979] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * All the other values and primitives are as defined in [RFC6979]. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 10) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: We changed "given to this procedure" to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "used in this procedure" here. If this is incorrect, please provide >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying text. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: the public key Y given to this procedure MUST be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid point on E. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The public key Y used in this procedure MUST be a valid point on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> E. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 11) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: Does "in order to" refer to clearing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the x-coordinate or something else? If the suggested text is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in step 3, in order to make sure that it does not affect the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comparison. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Step 3 in order to make sure that it does not affect the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comparison. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 12) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: Please confirm that "their y-coordinate" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should not be "their y-coordinates" here. We ask because of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plural "Their y-coordinates" in the third sentence of this paragraph. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no need to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> shift the other bad_pk values by p (or any bad_pk values by a larger >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> multiple of p), because their y coordinate would exceed 2^255; and we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ensure that y_string corresponds to an integer less than 2^255 in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> step 3.) --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 13) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.5: This sentence is confusing as written, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because the int_to_string function is not specified in [RFC8032]. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * The int_to_string function as specified in the first paragraph of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * The int_to_string function is implemented as specified in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first paragraph of Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14) <!-- [rfced] Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3: We had trouble following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this sentence. Does "the modulus n or the exponent e are chosen not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in compliance with [RFC8017]" mean "the modulus n or the exponent e >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not chosen, in compliance with [RFC8017]" or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "the modulus n or the exponent e is chosen without complying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with [RFC8017]" or otherwise? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, for RSA-FDH-VRF, uniqueness and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance may not hold if the keys are generated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> adversarially (specifically, if the RSA function specified in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> public key is not bijective because the modulus n or the exponent e >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017]); thus, RSA-FDH-VRF >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined in this document does not have "full uniqueness" and "full >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Specifically, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> VRF output may be predictable if the RSA function specified in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> public key is far from bijective because the modulus n or the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exponent e are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017].) --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 15) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.2: We found the phrasing in these sentences >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> confusing, as the text appears to indicate that the equations in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> question can be found in the cited documents. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested updates would preserve your intended meaning, may we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rephrase? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * For trusted collision resistance: approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (as shown in [PWHVNRG17]). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * For selective pseudorandomness: approximately as strong as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> security, in bits, of the RSA problem for the key (n, e) (as shown >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in [GNPRVZ15]). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As shown in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, measured in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bits, is as follows (in the random oracle model for the functions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For trusted collision resistance (as discussed in [PWHVNRG17]): >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For selective pseudorandomness (as discussed in [GNPRVZ15]: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approximately as strong as the security, in bits, of the RSA >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the key (n, e). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measured in bits, would be as follows (in the random oracle model >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the functions Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 16) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.3: Please confirm that "loose", and not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "lossy", is correct here. We ask because we see "lossier security >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reduction" in Appendix B of [PWHVNRG17] but do not see any words >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that have "loose" in them in that document. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * They may increase security parameters to make up for the loose >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> security reduction. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 17) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.5: Does "must run in time independent of" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "must run in a time that is independent of", or does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "independent" refer to "run" (in which case it should be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "independently")? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Please note that this question has also been raised for "run in time >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> independent of" as also found in companion document >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve.) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF-P256-SHA256-SSWU and ECVRF-EDWARDS25519-SHA512-ELL2 can be made >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to run in time independent of alpha, following recommendations in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 18) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.8: We had trouble following several sentences >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in this section. Please review the following. If the suggestions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> below are not correct, please clarify the following: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the four inputs (where are these defined?) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to equal each other or to any inputs (to be equal to?) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the input (plural "octets", singular "input") >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the inputs (plural "octets", plural "inputs") >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last octet of the input (singular "octet", singular "input") >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs given to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the hash function for the same SK and different alpha. This is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this document, because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the second octets of the input to the hash function used in MGF1 and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in proof_to_hash are different. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * the second octets of the inputs to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * the last octet of the input to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero, and therefore >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the input to the hash function >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for the same SK and different alpha. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> document, because the second octet of the inputs to the hash >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function used in MGF1 and in proof_to_hash are different. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * The second octet of the inputs to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * The last octet of the inputs to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero and is therefore >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the inputs to the hash function >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag per [RFC9380]. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.9: This sentence does not parse. If the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify "if a group of public >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keys to share the same salt" and "group of public keys, which may aid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in some protocol". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys to share the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys, which may aid in some protocol that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> uses the VRF. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys shares the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys; this can be helpful for any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> protocol that uses the VRF. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 20) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.10: It appears that one or more words were >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> missing in this sentence. We added the words "to the" as shown below. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If this is incorrect, please provide clarifying text. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs ECVRF_encode_to_curve hash >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the prover >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the prover >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs to the ECVRF_encode_to_curve >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hash function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prover depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prover will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 21) <!-- [rfced] [DGKR18]: We see that <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lists the title of this reference as "Ouroboros Praos: An >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake protocol", but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when we click the "PDF" box on the page, the title of the PDF version >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the paper has one word different ("protocol" vs. "blockchain"): >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blockchain". How should the title be updated in this reference? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [DGKR18] David, B., Gazi, P., Kiayias, A., and A. Russell, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof-of-stake protocol", in Advances in Cryptology - >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> EUROCRYPT, 2018, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 22) <!-- [rfced] [GNPRVZ15]: This listing is the only "eprint.iacr.org" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> listing to provide a direct link to the PDF copy. Should all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "eprint.iacr.org" URLs in this document be updated to point to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the PDF copy, or should the ".pdf" be removed from this link? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [GNPRVZ15] Goldberg, S., Naor, M., Papadopoulos, D., Reyzin, L., >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vasant, S., and A. Ziv, "NSEC5: Provably Preventing DNSSEC >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zone Enumeration", in NDSS, 2015, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/582.pdf>. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 23) <!-- [rfced] [X25519]: We see that the provided URL resolves to what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appears to be a personal website. Please confirm that this page is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stable and will continue to be available to readers. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [X25519] Bernstein, D.J., "How do I validate Curve25519 public >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keys?", 2006, <https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate>. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 24) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> online Style Guide at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and let us know if any changes are needed. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should still be reviewed as a best practice. --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 25) <!-- [rfced] Please let us know if any changes are needed for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a) The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> document. Please let us know which form is preferred. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> INVALID / "INVALID" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., 'may output INVALID', 'output "INVALID" and stop') >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> VALID / "VALID" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., '(VALID, beta1)', '("VALID", beta_string)') >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> b) As ptLen is defined as "length, in octets, of a point on E", it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appears that ptLen would be pronounced as either "pee-tee-len" or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "point-len". We changed the two instances of "an ptLen" to "a ptLen" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accordingly. Please let us know any concerns. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> c) Should spacing be made consistent for the following? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ctr = 1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ctr=1 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr, 1) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr,1) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please note that in the context of "ctr" the use of spaces between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entries appears to be more common; we suggest adding spaces >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for these items (e.g., ctr = 1, (ctr, 1)). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2^(8qLen)>q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2^qlen > q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> d) Last paragraph of Section 5.4.5: For consistency, should numerals >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or spelled-out numbers be used for the following? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8 bad points >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two bad points >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (If the spelled-out "eight" is preferred, we will also change >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "5 list elements" to "five list elements".) --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *****IMPORTANT***** >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Updated 2023/04/17 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Author(s): >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Instructions for Completing AUTH48 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Your document has now entered AUTH48. Once it has been reviewed and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approved by you and all coauthors, it will be published as an RFC. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If an author is no longer available, there are several remedies >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> available as listed in the FAQ (https://www.rfc-editor.org/faq/). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and you coauthors are responsible for engaging other parties >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., Contributors or Working Group) as necessary before providing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your approval. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Planning your review >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the following aspects of your document: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * RFC Editor questions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review and resolve any questions raised by the RFC Editor >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that have been included in the XML file as comments marked as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> follows: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <!-- [rfced] ... --> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> These questions will also be sent in a subsequent email. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * Changes submitted by coauthors >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please ensure that you review any changes submitted by your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coauthors. We assume that if you do not speak up that you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agree to changes submitted by your coauthors. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * Content >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the full content of the document, as this cannot >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> change once the RFC is published. Please pay particular attention to: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - IANA considerations updates (if applicable) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - contact information >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - references >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * Copyright notices and legends >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the copyright notice and legends as defined in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC 5378 and the Trust Legal Provisions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (TLP – https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info/). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * Semantic markup >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the markup in the XML file to ensure that elements of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> content are correctly tagged. For example, ensure that <sourcecode> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and <artwork> are set correctly. See details at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://authors.ietf.org/rfcxml-vocabulary>. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * Formatted output >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the PDF, HTML, and TXT files to ensure that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formatted output, as generated from the markup in the XML file, is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasonable. Please note that the TXT will have formatting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> limitations compared to the PDF and HTML. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Submitting changes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To submit changes, please reply to this email using ‘REPLY ALL’ as all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the parties CCed on this message need to see your changes. 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Please use ‘REPLY ALL’, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as all the parties CCed on this message need to see your approval. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Files >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The files are available here: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diff file of the text: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html (side by side) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This diff file compares an altered original and the RFC (in order >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to make the changes in the moved "Contributors" viewable): >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diff of the XML: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tracking progress >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ----------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The details of the AUTH48 status of your document are here: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please let us know if you have any questions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your cooperation, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Title : Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Author(s) : S. Goldberg, L. Reyzin, D. Papadopoulos, J. Včelák >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> --- >>>>>>>>> Sharon Goldberg >>>>>>>>> Computer Science, Boston University >>>>>>>>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> --- >>>>>> Sharon Goldberg >>>>>> Computer Science, Boston University >>>>>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> > > > >
- [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-… rfc-editor
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… rfc-editor
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Christopher Wood
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Tim Taubert
- [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Christopher Wood
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Tim Taubert
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- [auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381… Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Sandy Ginoza