Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")

Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> Wed, 16 August 2023 21:40 UTC

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From: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 17:39:44 -0400
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References: <6FCF22F0-FE1F-4255-95EC-8FF099BEBF71@amsl.com>
Cc: "Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)" <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org>, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com>, Leonid Reyzin <leonid.reyzin@gmail.com>, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com>, Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk>, IRSG <irsg@irtf.org>, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com>, Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org, auth48archive@rfc-editor.org
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To: Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com>
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Subject: Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")
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Thanks, Lynne. I approve publication of RFC9383.

Sent from my iPhone

> On Aug 16, 2023, at 5:19 PM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
> 
> Dear Chris, Eliot, Sharon, Leonid, and Tim,
> 
> Thank you for your replies.  We have updated RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 to use "Prover" and "Verifier".
> 
> ** RFC-to-be 9381:  The latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:
> 
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
> 
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
> 
> 
> ** RFC-to-be 9383:  The latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:
> 
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.txt
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.pdf
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.xml
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-diff.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-rfcdiff.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-auth48diff.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastdiff.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastrfcdiff.html
> 
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff1.html
>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff2.html
> 
> We will continue the publication process for RFC-to-be 9381.
> 
> RFC-to-be 9383 will be published when RFC-to-be 9382 is published, as noted on <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383>. 
> 
> Thanks again!
> 
> RFC Editor/lb
> 
> 
>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 8:06 AM, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Capitalized is fine to me as well. Thanks!
>> 
>> — Tim
>> 
>> 
>>>> On 16. Aug 2023, at 02:48, Leonid Reyzin <leonid.reyzin@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Agreed. Capitalized makes more sense to me, but I don't feel strongly. Thanks for catching!
>>> 
>>> Since my email forwarding seems wonky still, can you contact me at leonid.reyzin@gmail.com instead of @bu?
> 
>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 3:55 PM, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> I agree with Chris. Go with capitals. 
>> 
>> Thanks
>> Sharon 
> 
>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 1:53 PM, Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear) <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>> 
>> I generally prefer lowercase - we're not writing legal contracts here,  but the authors can have the final say, so long as they agree.
>> 
>> Eliot
>> 
>>> On 15.08.23 22:42, Lynne Bartholomew wrote:
>>> Hi, Chris and *Eliot.
>>> 
>>> Chris, thank you for the quick reply!  We'll wait a bit to see if anyone objects; if not, we'll update per your note.
>>> 
>>> *Eliot, as ISE for RFC-to-be 9383, please let us know if you're OK with us updating per Chris's note.
>>> 
>>> Thanks again!
>>> 
>>> RFC Editor/lb
> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 4:34 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote:
>> Hi Lynne,
>> 
>> Specifications I've worked with in the past have capitalized these sorts of terms as proper nouns, but I don't think it really matters much. If we need to choose, and assuming no one else cares strongly, I would go with Prover and Verifier.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Chris
>> 
>>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023, at 3:09 PM, Lynne Bartholomew wrote:
>>> Dear authors of RFCs-to-be 9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) and 9383 
>>> (draft-bar-cfrg-spake2plus-08),
>>> 
>>> Apologies, but while preparing RFC-to-be 9381 for publication, we found 
>>> two items that we had previously flagged internally for these two 
>>> documents but that were not conveyed to you when these documents were 
>>> moved to the AUTH48 state last Spring:
>>> 
>>> These documents use both "prover" and "Prover", and both "verifier" and 
>>> "Verifier" (e.g., "the prover", "the Prover", "the verifier", "the 
>>> Verifier").
>>> 
>>> We believe that usage (capitalization or not) for these terms within 
>>> and between these documents should be consistent.  Please let us know 
>>> which form is preferred for each.
>>> 
>>> Thank you, and again, apologies for not asking about this earlier.
>>> 
>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>> 
>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 10:13 AM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Dear Dimitris, Sharon, and Jan,
>>>> 
>>>> We have noted your approvals on the AUTH48 status page:
>>>> 
>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>> 
>>>> As this document is part of Cluster C450 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C450) and normatively depends on RFC-to-be 9380 (draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve), this document will be published when RFC-to-be 9380 is published.  You can follow the progress of RFC-to-be 9380 at <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9380>.
>>>> 
>>>> Thank you!
>>>> 
>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 1:43 AM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thank you for the edits, everyone. The document looks good to me. I
>>>>> also approve it for publication.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Jan
>>>> 
>>>>> On May 20, 2023, at 8:50 AM, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thank you, I approve this as well.
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Sat, May 20, 2023 at 4:05 AM Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk> wrote:
>>>>> Many thanks for the detailed editing. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> I also approve its publication.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>> -Dimitris
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 19 May 2023, at 11:52 PM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thank you! I now approve it for publication.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> (NB: Jan, Sharon, Dimitris: you each need to send your approval before it can be published.)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Thu, May 18, 2023 at 6:29 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>>>>>> Hi, Leo.  No worries!  Fixed, and the latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On May 17, 2023, at 3:00 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Oh, so sorry for that bug. It should be 3.2.1.3. Could you please fix that?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 4:00 AM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> Dear Leo,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thank you for the latest updated XML file as well!
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thanks also for the working NIST URL.  We updated the reference listing accordingly.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> However, please note that the NIST document associated with this URL does not have a Section 3.1.2.3.  Which section should be cited in the following sentence (from Section 5.5 of this document)?
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> * The EC group G is the NIST P-256 elliptic curve, with the finite
>>>>>>>  field and curve parameters as specified in Section 3.1.2.3 of
>>>>>>>  [SP-800-186] and Section 2.6 of [RFC5114].
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> We have posted the latest files here:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thanks again!
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On May 12, 2023, at 7:43 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thanks so much for the quick turnaround! I made the change I had failed to make the previous time; fixed another nit for clarity; changed the mailing addresses for two of the authors; and provided an alternative URL for the NIST document. All new changes are annotated with [auth48response] in the attached xml file.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Leo
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 8:31 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>> Dear Leo,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for the updated XML file!  The updates and your notes were most helpful.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Regarding this item:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> <!-- [auth48response] Removed "four" becuase it's incorrect. Added "to" before      
>>>>>>>> "each other". ...
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> We did not see this update.  Should "unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs" be changed to "unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs"?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Regarding your note related to the stability of [X25519]:  Thank you for the information.  We left as is; seventeen years seems a good track record and indicates that it should remain stable.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here (please refresh your browser):
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thanks again!
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On May 10, 2023, at 10:58 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne et al.,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Attaching the updated XML file. Responses to edits / comments, as well as a few new minor edits, are explained in the comments prefixed with [auth48response].
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for such a thorough pass through the document and for all the excellent suggestions!
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Leo
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 5:40 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Hi, Jan.  Thank you for checking in with us!
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 26, 2023, at 10:19 PM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Hello Lynne.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Thank you. We will look at the questions and get back to you soon.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Jan
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Dne pá 21. 4. 2023 20:13 uživatel Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> napsal:
>>>>>>>>>> Dear authors,
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Checking in with you regarding the status of this document.  Please review the questions below, and let us know how this document should be updated.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> The AUTH48 status page is here:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, at 11:03 PM, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Authors,
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) the following questions, which are also in the XML file.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 1) <!-- [rfced] Please ensure that the guidelines listed in
>>>>>>>>>>> Section 2.1 of RFC 5743 have been adhered to in this document. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 2) <!-- [rfced] Would you like the references to be listed in
>>>>>>>>>>> alphanumeric order? -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 3) <!-- [rfced] Jan: We have seen both "Vcelak" and "Včelák"
>>>>>>>>>>> in recent RFCs-to-be.  Please let us know your preference. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 4) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5:  We could not find anything in Section 3.4
>>>>>>>>>>> that indicates that pseudorandomness cannot hold against malicious
>>>>>>>>>>> key generation.  Please confirm that this section number is correct and
>>>>>>>>>>> will be clear to readers.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> As explained in Section 3.4, pseudorandomness cannot hold against
>>>>>>>>>>> malicious key generation. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 5) <!-- [rfced] Sections 4.2 and 5.2:  Is pi_string sometimes known to
>>>>>>>>>>> have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove (in which case "only on a
>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string value that is known to have been produced by
>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_prove" would be correct), or always (in which case "only on
>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string, which is known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove"
>>>>>>>>>>> would be correct)?
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>  RSAFDHVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is
>>>>>>>>>>>  known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove, or from within
>>>>>>>>>>>  RSAFDHVRF_verify as specified in Section 4.3.
>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>  ECVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is known
>>>>>>>>>>>  to have been produced by ECVRF_prove, or from within ECVRF_verify
>>>>>>>>>>>  as specified in Section 5.3. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 6) <!-- [rfced] Section 5:  We don't see any mention of the field F in
>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5.  Please confirm that this listing will be clear to
>>>>>>>>>>> readers.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> Fixed options (specified in Section 5.5):
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>  F - finite field -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 7) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.1.1:  This sentence does not parse.  If the
>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify
>>>>>>>>>>> "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified"* and
>>>>>>>>>>> "roughly half hash_string values".
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> * We see "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point - a function that attempts"
>>>>>>>>>>> earlier in this section.)
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> Note even though the loop is infinite as written, and
>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256,
>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified in Section 5.5
>>>>>>>>>>> will succeed on roughly half hash_string values.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested (we could not find evidence of multiple
>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions):
>>>>>>>>>>> Note that even though the loop is infinite as written and
>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, the
>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point function, as specified in
>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5, will succeed on roughly half of the hash_string
>>>>>>>>>>> values. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 8) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1:  This sentence is confusing as written,
>>>>>>>>>>> because the ECVRF_nonce_generation function is not specified in
>>>>>>>>>>> [RFC6979].  If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is as specified in [RFC6979]
>>>>>>>>>>> Section 3.2 where
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is implemented per the process
>>>>>>>>>>> specified in Section 3.2 of [RFC6979], where -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 9) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> a) Please confirm that "output length hlen" is correct (i.e., should
>>>>>>>>>>> not be "output length hLen").  We ask because this is the only
>>>>>>>>>>> instance of "hlen" in this document.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Is this something that should be clarified, along the lines of the
>>>>>>>>>>> "this qlen is not to be confused with qLen" text a few lines later?
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> The hash function H is Hash and its output length hlen (in bits)
>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Possibly:
>>>>>>>>>>> *  The hash function H is Hash, and its output length hlen (in bits)
>>>>>>>>>>>  is set as hLen*8 (this hlen is not to be confused with hLen,
>>>>>>>>>>>  which is used in this document to represent the length of Hash in
>>>>>>>>>>>  octets).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> b) The last bullet item in this list was the only sentence fragment.
>>>>>>>>>>> We added a verb ("are").  If this is incorrect, please let us know
>>>>>>>>>>> how we can make this list parallel (i.e., either all sentence
>>>>>>>>>>> fragments or all complete sentences).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> All the other values and primitives as defined in [RFC6979]
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>>> *  All the other values and primitives are as defined in [RFC6979]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 10) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  We changed "given to this procedure" to
>>>>>>>>>>> "used in this procedure" here.  If this is incorrect, please provide
>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: the public key Y given to this procedure MUST be a
>>>>>>>>>>> valid point on E.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>  The public key Y used in this procedure MUST be a valid point on
>>>>>>>>>>>  E. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 11) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  Does "in order to" refer to clearing
>>>>>>>>>>> the x-coordinate or something else?  If the suggested text is not
>>>>>>>>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4),
>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad
>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared
>>>>>>>>>>> in step 3, in order to make sure that it does not affect the
>>>>>>>>>>> comparison.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4),
>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad
>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared
>>>>>>>>>>> in Step 3 in order to make sure that it does not affect the
>>>>>>>>>>> comparison. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 12) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  Please confirm that "their y-coordinate"
>>>>>>>>>>> should not be "their y-coordinates" here.  We ask because of the
>>>>>>>>>>> plural "Their y-coordinates" in the third sentence of this paragraph.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> There is no need to
>>>>>>>>>>> shift the other bad_pk values by p (or any bad_pk values by a larger
>>>>>>>>>>> multiple of p), because their y coordinate would exceed 2^255; and we
>>>>>>>>>>> ensure that y_string corresponds to an integer less than 2^255 in
>>>>>>>>>>> step 3.) -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 13) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.5:  This sentence is confusing as written,
>>>>>>>>>>> because the int_to_string function is not specified in [RFC8032].
>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> *  The int_to_string function as specified in the first paragraph of
>>>>>>>>>>>  Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032].
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>> *  The int_to_string function is implemented as specified in the
>>>>>>>>>>>  first paragraph of Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 14) <!-- [rfced] Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3:  We had trouble following
>>>>>>>>>>> this sentence.  Does "the modulus n or the exponent e are chosen not
>>>>>>>>>>> in compliance with [RFC8017]" mean "the modulus n or the exponent e
>>>>>>>>>>> is not chosen, in compliance with [RFC8017]" or 
>>>>>>>>>>> "the modulus n or the exponent e is chosen without complying 
>>>>>>>>>>> with [RFC8017]" or otherwise?
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, for RSA-FDH-VRF, uniqueness and
>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance may not hold if the keys are generated
>>>>>>>>>>> adversarially (specifically, if the RSA function specified in the
>>>>>>>>>>> public key is not bijective because the modulus n or the exponent e
>>>>>>>>>>> are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017]); thus, RSA-FDH-VRF
>>>>>>>>>>> defined in this document does not have "full uniqueness" and "full
>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance".
>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>> (Specifically, the
>>>>>>>>>>> VRF output may be predictable if the RSA function specified in the
>>>>>>>>>>> public key is far from bijective because the modulus n or the
>>>>>>>>>>> exponent e are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017].) -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 15) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.2:  We found the phrasing in these sentences
>>>>>>>>>>> confusing, as the text appears to indicate that the equations in
>>>>>>>>>>> question can be found in the cited documents.
>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested updates would preserve your intended meaning, may we
>>>>>>>>>>> rephrase?
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> *  For trusted collision resistance: approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2)
>>>>>>>>>>>  (as shown in [PWHVNRG17]).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  For selective pseudorandomness: approximately as strong as the
>>>>>>>>>>>  security, in bits, of the RSA problem for the key (n, e) (as shown
>>>>>>>>>>>  in [GNPRVZ15]).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> As shown in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, measured in
>>>>>>>>>>> bits, is as follows (in the random oracle model for the functions
>>>>>>>>>>> Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve):
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>> For trusted collision resistance (as discussed in [PWHVNRG17]):
>>>>>>>>>>>  approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> For selective pseudorandomness (as discussed in [GNPRVZ15]:
>>>>>>>>>>>  approximately as strong as the security, in bits, of the RSA
>>>>>>>>>>>  problem for the key (n, e).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF,
>>>>>>>>>>> measured in bits, would be as follows (in the random oracle model
>>>>>>>>>>> for the functions Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 16) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.3:  Please confirm that "loose", and not
>>>>>>>>>>> "lossy", is correct here.  We ask because we see "lossier security
>>>>>>>>>>> reduction" in Appendix B of [PWHVNRG17] but do not see any words
>>>>>>>>>>> that have "loose" in them in that document.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> *  They may increase security parameters to make up for the loose
>>>>>>>>>>>  security reduction. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 17) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.5:  Does "must run in time independent of"
>>>>>>>>>>> mean "must run in a time that is independent of", or does
>>>>>>>>>>> "independent" refer to "run" (in which case it should be
>>>>>>>>>>> "independently")?
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> (Please note that this question has also been raised for "run in time
>>>>>>>>>>> independent of" as also found in companion document
>>>>>>>>>>> draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve.)
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF-P256-SHA256-SSWU and ECVRF-EDWARDS25519-SHA512-ELL2 can be made
>>>>>>>>>>> to run in time independent of alpha, following recommendations in
>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 18) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.8:  We had trouble following several sentences
>>>>>>>>>>> in this section.  Please review the following.  If the suggestions
>>>>>>>>>>> below are not correct, please clarify the following:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> the four inputs (where are these defined?)
>>>>>>>>>>> to equal each other or to any inputs  (to be equal to?)
>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the input  (plural "octets", singular "input")
>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the inputs  (plural "octets", plural "inputs")
>>>>>>>>>>> last octet of the input  (singular "octet", singular "input")
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds
>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs
>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are
>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs given to
>>>>>>>>>>> the hash function for the same SK and different alpha.  This is
>>>>>>>>>>> indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this document, because
>>>>>>>>>>> the second octets of the input to the hash function used in MGF1 and
>>>>>>>>>>> in proof_to_hash are different.
>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>> *  the second octets of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>  proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>  encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different.
>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>> *  the last octet of the input to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>  proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>  encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero, and therefore
>>>>>>>>>>>  different from the last octet of the input to the hash function
>>>>>>>>>>>  used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the
>>>>>>>>>>>  nonzero length of the domain separation tag by
>>>>>>>>>>>  [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds
>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs
>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are
>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs
>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for the same SK and different alpha.
>>>>>>>>>>> This is indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this
>>>>>>>>>>> document, because the second octet of the inputs to the hash
>>>>>>>>>>> function used in MGF1 and in proof_to_hash are different.
>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>> *  The second octet of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>  proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>  encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> *  The last octet of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>  proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>  encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero and is therefore
>>>>>>>>>>>  different from the last octet of the inputs to the hash function
>>>>>>>>>>>  used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the
>>>>>>>>>>>  nonzero length of the domain separation tag per [RFC9380]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 19) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.9:  This sentence does not parse.  If the
>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify "if a group of public
>>>>>>>>>>> keys to share the same salt" and "group of public keys, which may aid
>>>>>>>>>>> in some protocol".
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys to share the
>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for
>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys, which may aid in some protocol that
>>>>>>>>>>> uses the VRF.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys shares the
>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for
>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys; this can be helpful for any
>>>>>>>>>>> protocol that uses the VRF. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 20) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.10:  It appears that one or more words were
>>>>>>>>>>> missing in this sentence.  We added the words "to the" as shown below.
>>>>>>>>>>> If this is incorrect, please provide clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs ECVRF_encode_to_curve hash
>>>>>>>>>>> function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different from
>>>>>>>>>>> other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the prover
>>>>>>>>>>> depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the prover
>>>>>>>>>>> will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as
>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs to the ECVRF_encode_to_curve
>>>>>>>>>>> hash function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different
>>>>>>>>>>> from other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the
>>>>>>>>>>> prover depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the
>>>>>>>>>>> prover will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as
>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 21) <!-- [rfced] [DGKR18]:  We see that <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>
>>>>>>>>>>> lists the title of this reference as "Ouroboros Praos: An
>>>>>>>>>>> adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake protocol", but
>>>>>>>>>>> when we click the "PDF" box on the page, the title of the PDF version
>>>>>>>>>>> of the paper has one word different ("protocol" vs. "blockchain"):
>>>>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake
>>>>>>>>>>> blockchain".  How should the title be updated in this reference?
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> [DGKR18]   David, B., Gazi, P., Kiayias, A., and A. Russell,
>>>>>>>>>>>          "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous
>>>>>>>>>>>          proof-of-stake protocol", in Advances in Cryptology -
>>>>>>>>>>>          EUROCRYPT, 2018, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 22) <!-- [rfced] [GNPRVZ15]:  This listing is the only "eprint.iacr.org"
>>>>>>>>>>> listing to provide a direct link to the PDF copy.  Should all
>>>>>>>>>>> "eprint.iacr.org" URLs in this document be updated to point to
>>>>>>>>>>> the PDF copy, or should the ".pdf" be removed from this link?
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> [GNPRVZ15] Goldberg, S., Naor, M., Papadopoulos, D., Reyzin, L.,
>>>>>>>>>>>          Vasant, S., and A. Ziv, "NSEC5: Provably Preventing DNSSEC
>>>>>>>>>>>          Zone Enumeration", in NDSS, 2015,
>>>>>>>>>>>          <https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/582.pdf>. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 23) <!-- [rfced] [X25519]:  We see that the provided URL resolves to what
>>>>>>>>>>> appears to be a personal website.  Please confirm that this page is
>>>>>>>>>>> stable and will continue to be available to readers.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>> [X25519]   Bernstein, D.J., "How do I validate Curve25519 public
>>>>>>>>>>>          keys?", 2006, <https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate>. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 24) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the
>>>>>>>>>>> online Style Guide at
>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>,
>>>>>>>>>>> and let us know if any changes are needed.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this
>>>>>>>>>>> should still be reviewed as a best practice. -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 25) <!-- [rfced] Please let us know if any changes are needed for the
>>>>>>>>>>> following:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> a) The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in this
>>>>>>>>>>> document.  Please let us know which form is preferred.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> INVALID / "INVALID"
>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., 'may output INVALID', 'output "INVALID" and stop')
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> VALID / "VALID"
>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., '(VALID, beta1)', '("VALID", beta_string)')
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> b) As ptLen is defined as "length, in octets, of a point on E", it
>>>>>>>>>>> appears that ptLen would be pronounced as either "pee-tee-len" or
>>>>>>>>>>> "point-len".  We changed the two instances of "an ptLen" to "a ptLen"
>>>>>>>>>>> accordingly.  Please let us know any concerns.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> c) Should spacing be made consistent for the following?
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> ctr = 1
>>>>>>>>>>> ctr=1
>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr, 1)
>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr,1)
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Please note that in the context of "ctr" the use of spaces between
>>>>>>>>>>> entries appears to be more common; we suggest adding spaces
>>>>>>>>>>> for these items (e.g., ctr = 1, (ctr, 1)).
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 2^(8qLen)>q
>>>>>>>>>>> 2^qlen > q
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> d) Last paragraph of Section 5.4.5:  For consistency, should numerals
>>>>>>>>>>> or spelled-out numbers be used for the following?
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 8 bad points
>>>>>>>>>>> two bad points
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> (If the spelled-out "eight" is preferred, we will also change
>>>>>>>>>>> "5 list elements" to "five list elements".) -->
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *****IMPORTANT*****
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Updated 2023/04/17
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Author(s):
>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Instructions for Completing AUTH48
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Your document has now entered AUTH48.  Once it has been reviewed and 
>>>>>>>>>>>> approved by you and all coauthors, it will be published as an RFC.  
>>>>>>>>>>>> If an author is no longer available, there are several remedies 
>>>>>>>>>>>> available as listed in the FAQ (https://www.rfc-editor.org/faq/).
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> You and you coauthors are responsible for engaging other parties 
>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., Contributors or Working Group) as necessary before providing 
>>>>>>>>>>>> your approval.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Planning your review 
>>>>>>>>>>>> ---------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the following aspects of your document:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  RFC Editor questions
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review and resolve any questions raised by the RFC Editor 
>>>>>>>>>>>> that have been included in the XML file as comments marked as 
>>>>>>>>>>>> follows:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> <!-- [rfced] ... -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> These questions will also be sent in a subsequent email.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Changes submitted by coauthors 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Please ensure that you review any changes submitted by your 
>>>>>>>>>>>> coauthors.  We assume that if you do not speak up that you 
>>>>>>>>>>>> agree to changes submitted by your coauthors.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Content 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the full content of the document, as this cannot 
>>>>>>>>>>>> change once the RFC is published.  Please pay particular attention to:
>>>>>>>>>>>> - IANA considerations updates (if applicable)
>>>>>>>>>>>> - contact information
>>>>>>>>>>>> - references
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Copyright notices and legends
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the copyright notice and legends as defined in
>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC 5378 and the Trust Legal Provisions 
>>>>>>>>>>>> (TLP – https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info/).
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Semantic markup
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the markup in the XML file to ensure that elements of  
>>>>>>>>>>>> content are correctly tagged.  For example, ensure that <sourcecode> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> and <artwork> are set correctly.  See details at 
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://authors.ietf.org/rfcxml-vocabulary>.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Formatted output
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the PDF, HTML, and TXT files to ensure that the 
>>>>>>>>>>>> formatted output, as generated from the markup in the XML file, is 
>>>>>>>>>>>> reasonable.  Please note that the TXT will have formatting 
>>>>>>>>>>>> limitations compared to the PDF and HTML.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Submitting changes
>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> To submit changes, please reply to this email using ‘REPLY ALL’ as all 
>>>>>>>>>>>> the parties CCed on this message need to see your changes. The parties 
>>>>>>>>>>>> include:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  your coauthors
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org (the RPC team)
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  other document participants, depending on the stream (e.g., 
>>>>>>>>>>>>   IETF Stream participants are your working group chairs, the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>   responsible ADs, and the document shepherd).
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  auth48archive@rfc-editor.org, which is a new archival mailing list 
>>>>>>>>>>>>   to preserve AUTH48 conversations; it is not an active discussion 
>>>>>>>>>>>>   list:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>  *  More info:
>>>>>>>>>>>>     https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/yb6lpIGh-4Q9l2USxIAe6P8O4Zc
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>  *  The archive itself:
>>>>>>>>>>>>     https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/auth48archive/
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>  *  Note: If only absolutely necessary, you may temporarily opt out 
>>>>>>>>>>>>     of the archiving of messages (e.g., to discuss a sensitive matter).
>>>>>>>>>>>>     If needed, please add a note at the top of the message that you 
>>>>>>>>>>>>     have dropped the address. When the discussion is concluded, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>     auth48archive@rfc-editor.org will be re-added to the CC list and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>     its addition will be noted at the top of the message. 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> You may submit your changes in one of two ways:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> An update to the provided XML file
>>>>>>>>>>>> — OR —
>>>>>>>>>>>> An explicit list of changes in this format
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Section # (or indicate Global)
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> OLD:
>>>>>>>>>>>> old text
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> NEW:
>>>>>>>>>>>> new text
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> You do not need to reply with both an updated XML file and an explicit 
>>>>>>>>>>>> list of changes, as either form is sufficient.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> We will ask a stream manager to review and approve any changes that seem
>>>>>>>>>>>> beyond editorial in nature, e.g., addition of new text, deletion of text, 
>>>>>>>>>>>> and technical changes.  Information about stream managers can be found in 
>>>>>>>>>>>> the FAQ.  Editorial changes do not require approval from a stream manager.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Approving for publication
>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> To approve your RFC for publication, please reply to this email stating
>>>>>>>>>>>> that you approve this RFC for publication.  Please use ‘REPLY ALL’,
>>>>>>>>>>>> as all the parties CCed on this message need to see your approval.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Files 
>>>>>>>>>>>> -----
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> The files are available here:
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Diff file of the text:
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html (side by side)
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> This diff file compares an altered original and the RFC (in order 
>>>>>>>>>>>> to make the changes in the moved "Contributors" viewable):
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Diff of the XML: 
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Tracking progress
>>>>>>>>>>>> -----------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> The details of the AUTH48 status of your document are here:
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Please let us know if you have any questions.  
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your cooperation,
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15)
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Title            : Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)
>>>>>>>>>>>> Author(s)        : S. Goldberg, L. Reyzin, D. Papadopoulos, J. Včelák
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml>
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml>
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> -- 
>>>>> ---
>>>>> Sharon Goldberg
>>>>> Computer Science, Boston University
>>>>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>> -- 
>> ---
>> Sharon Goldberg
>> Computer Science, Boston University
>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe
> 
>