Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review
Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> Tue, 15 August 2023 20:34 UTC
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Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2023 16:33:36 -0400
From: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
To: Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com>, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com>, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu>, Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk>, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com>, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com>
Cc: IRSG <irsg@irtf.org>, Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>, "RFC ISE (Adrian Farrel)" <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org>, RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>, auth48archive@rfc-editor.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/auth48archive/KL3Wo5MGdQ4Xv4Jf9w9jMNlDLII>
Subject: Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review
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Hi Lynne, Specifications I've worked with in the past have capitalized these sorts of terms as proper nouns, but I don't think it really matters much. If we need to choose, and assuming no one else cares strongly, I would go with Prover and Verifier. Best, Chris On Tue, Aug 15, 2023, at 3:09 PM, Lynne Bartholomew wrote: > Dear authors of RFCs-to-be 9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) and 9383 > (draft-bar-cfrg-spake2plus-08), > > Apologies, but while preparing RFC-to-be 9381 for publication, we found > two items that we had previously flagged internally for these two > documents but that were not conveyed to you when these documents were > moved to the AUTH48 state last Spring: > > These documents use both "prover" and "Prover", and both "verifier" and > "Verifier" (e.g., "the prover", "the Prover", "the verifier", "the > Verifier"). > > We believe that usage (capitalization or not) for these terms within > and between these documents should be consistent. Please let us know > which form is preferred for each. > > Thank you, and again, apologies for not asking about this earlier. > > RFC Editor/lb > >> On May 22, 2023, at 10:13 AM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >> >> Dear Dimitris, Sharon, and Jan, >> >> We have noted your approvals on the AUTH48 status page: >> >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 >> >> As this document is part of Cluster C450 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C450) and normatively depends on RFC-to-be 9380 (draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve), this document will be published when RFC-to-be 9380 is published. You can follow the progress of RFC-to-be 9380 at <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9380>. >> >> Thank you! >> >> RFC Editor/lb >> >> >>> On May 22, 2023, at 1:43 AM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote: >>> >>> Thank you for the edits, everyone. The document looks good to me. I >>> also approve it for publication. >>> >>> Jan >> >>> On May 20, 2023, at 8:50 AM, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Thank you, I approve this as well. >>> >>> On Sat, May 20, 2023 at 4:05 AM Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk> wrote: >>> Many thanks for the detailed editing. >>> >>> I also approve its publication. >>> >>> Regards, >>> -Dimitris >>> >>>> On 19 May 2023, at 11:52 PM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thank you! I now approve it for publication. >>>> >>>> (NB: Jan, Sharon, Dimitris: you each need to send your approval before it can be published.) >>>> >>>> On Thu, May 18, 2023 at 6:29 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>> Hi, Leo. No worries! Fixed, and the latest files are posted here. Please refresh your browser: >>>> >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html >>>> >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>> >>>> Thank you! >>>> >>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>> >>>>> On May 17, 2023, at 3:00 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Oh, so sorry for that bug. It should be 3.2.1.3. Could you please fix that? >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 4:00 AM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>> Dear Leo, >>>>> >>>>> Thank you for the latest updated XML file as well! >>>>> >>>>> Thanks also for the working NIST URL. We updated the reference listing accordingly. >>>>> >>>>> However, please note that the NIST document associated with this URL does not have a Section 3.1.2.3. Which section should be cited in the following sentence (from Section 5.5 of this document)? >>>>> >>>>> * The EC group G is the NIST P-256 elliptic curve, with the finite >>>>> field and curve parameters as specified in Section 3.1.2.3 of >>>>> [SP-800-186] and Section 2.6 of [RFC5114]. >>>>> >>>>> We have posted the latest files here: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html >>>>> >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>> >>>>> Thanks again! >>>>> >>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>> >>>>>> On May 12, 2023, at 7:43 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Dear Lynne, >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks so much for the quick turnaround! I made the change I had failed to make the previous time; fixed another nit for clarity; changed the mailing addresses for two of the authors; and provided an alternative URL for the NIST document. All new changes are annotated with [auth48response] in the attached xml file. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> >>>>>> Leo >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 8:31 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>> Dear Leo, >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you very much for the updated XML file! The updates and your notes were most helpful. >>>>>> >>>>>> Regarding this item: >>>>>> >>>>>> <!-- [auth48response] Removed "four" becuase it's incorrect. Added "to" before >>>>>> "each other". ... >>>>>> >>>>>> We did not see this update. Should "unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs" be changed to "unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs"? >>>>>> >>>>>> Regarding your note related to the stability of [X25519]: Thank you for the information. We left as is; seventeen years seems a good track record and indicates that it should remain stable. >>>>>> >>>>>> The latest files are posted here (please refresh your browser): >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks again! >>>>>> >>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On May 10, 2023, at 10:58 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dear Lynne et al., >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Attaching the updated XML file. Responses to edits / comments, as well as a few new minor edits, are explained in the comments prefixed with [auth48response]. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thank you very much for such a thorough pass through the document and for all the excellent suggestions! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sincerely, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Leo >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 5:40 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>>> Hi, Jan. Thank you for checking in with us! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Apr 26, 2023, at 10:19 PM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hello Lynne. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thank you. We will look at the questions and get back to you soon. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Jan >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dne pá 21. 4. 2023 20:13 uživatel Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> napsal: >>>>>>>> Dear authors, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Checking in with you regarding the status of this document. Please review the questions below, and let us know how this document should be updated. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The AUTH48 status page is here: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thank you! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, at 11:03 PM, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Authors, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) the following questions, which are also in the XML file. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 1) <!-- [rfced] Please ensure that the guidelines listed in >>>>>>>>> Section 2.1 of RFC 5743 have been adhered to in this document. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 2) <!-- [rfced] Would you like the references to be listed in >>>>>>>>> alphanumeric order? --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 3) <!-- [rfced] Jan: We have seen both "Vcelak" and "Včelák" >>>>>>>>> in recent RFCs-to-be. Please let us know your preference. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 4) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5: We could not find anything in Section 3.4 >>>>>>>>> that indicates that pseudorandomness cannot hold against malicious >>>>>>>>> key generation. Please confirm that this section number is correct and >>>>>>>>> will be clear to readers. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> As explained in Section 3.4, pseudorandomness cannot hold against >>>>>>>>> malicious key generation. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 5) <!-- [rfced] Sections 4.2 and 5.2: Is pi_string sometimes known to >>>>>>>>> have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove (in which case "only on a >>>>>>>>> pi_string value that is known to have been produced by >>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_prove" would be correct), or always (in which case "only on >>>>>>>>> pi_string, which is known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove" >>>>>>>>> would be correct)? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> Important note: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is >>>>>>>>> known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove, or from within >>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_verify as specified in Section 4.3. >>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>> Important note: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ECVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is known >>>>>>>>> to have been produced by ECVRF_prove, or from within ECVRF_verify >>>>>>>>> as specified in Section 5.3. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 6) <!-- [rfced] Section 5: We don't see any mention of the field F in >>>>>>>>> Section 5.5. Please confirm that this listing will be clear to >>>>>>>>> readers. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> Fixed options (specified in Section 5.5): >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> F - finite field --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 7) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.1.1: This sentence does not parse. If the >>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify >>>>>>>>> "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified"* and >>>>>>>>> "roughly half hash_string values". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> * We see "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point - a function that attempts" >>>>>>>>> earlier in this section.) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> Note even though the loop is infinite as written, and >>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, >>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified in Section 5.5 >>>>>>>>> will succeed on roughly half hash_string values. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Suggested (we could not find evidence of multiple >>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions): >>>>>>>>> Note that even though the loop is infinite as written and >>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, the >>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point function, as specified in >>>>>>>>> Section 5.5, will succeed on roughly half of the hash_string >>>>>>>>> values. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 8) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1: This sentence is confusing as written, >>>>>>>>> because the ECVRF_nonce_generation function is not specified in >>>>>>>>> [RFC6979]. If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the >>>>>>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is as specified in [RFC6979] >>>>>>>>> Section 3.2 where >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is implemented per the process >>>>>>>>> specified in Section 3.2 of [RFC6979], where --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 9) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> a) Please confirm that "output length hlen" is correct (i.e., should >>>>>>>>> not be "output length hLen"). We ask because this is the only >>>>>>>>> instance of "hlen" in this document. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Is this something that should be clarified, along the lines of the >>>>>>>>> "this qlen is not to be confused with qLen" text a few lines later? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> The hash function H is Hash and its output length hlen (in bits) >>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Possibly: >>>>>>>>> * The hash function H is Hash, and its output length hlen (in bits) >>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8 (this hlen is not to be confused with hLen, >>>>>>>>> which is used in this document to represent the length of Hash in >>>>>>>>> octets). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> b) The last bullet item in this list was the only sentence fragment. >>>>>>>>> We added a verb ("are"). If this is incorrect, please let us know >>>>>>>>> how we can make this list parallel (i.e., either all sentence >>>>>>>>> fragments or all complete sentences). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> All the other values and primitives as defined in [RFC6979] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Currently: >>>>>>>>> * All the other values and primitives are as defined in [RFC6979]. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 10) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: We changed "given to this procedure" to >>>>>>>>> "used in this procedure" here. If this is incorrect, please provide >>>>>>>>> clarifying text. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> Important note: the public key Y given to this procedure MUST be a >>>>>>>>> valid point on E. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Currently: >>>>>>>>> Important note: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The public key Y used in this procedure MUST be a valid point on >>>>>>>>> E. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 11) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: Does "in order to" refer to clearing >>>>>>>>> the x-coordinate or something else? If the suggested text is not >>>>>>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4), >>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad >>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared >>>>>>>>> in step 3, in order to make sure that it does not affect the >>>>>>>>> comparison. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4), >>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad >>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared >>>>>>>>> in Step 3 in order to make sure that it does not affect the >>>>>>>>> comparison. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 12) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: Please confirm that "their y-coordinate" >>>>>>>>> should not be "their y-coordinates" here. We ask because of the >>>>>>>>> plural "Their y-coordinates" in the third sentence of this paragraph. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> There is no need to >>>>>>>>> shift the other bad_pk values by p (or any bad_pk values by a larger >>>>>>>>> multiple of p), because their y coordinate would exceed 2^255; and we >>>>>>>>> ensure that y_string corresponds to an integer less than 2^255 in >>>>>>>>> step 3.) --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 13) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.5: This sentence is confusing as written, >>>>>>>>> because the int_to_string function is not specified in [RFC8032]. >>>>>>>>> If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the meaning. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> * The int_to_string function as specified in the first paragraph of >>>>>>>>> Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>> * The int_to_string function is implemented as specified in the >>>>>>>>> first paragraph of Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 14) <!-- [rfced] Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3: We had trouble following >>>>>>>>> this sentence. Does "the modulus n or the exponent e are chosen not >>>>>>>>> in compliance with [RFC8017]" mean "the modulus n or the exponent e >>>>>>>>> is not chosen, in compliance with [RFC8017]" or >>>>>>>>> "the modulus n or the exponent e is chosen without complying >>>>>>>>> with [RFC8017]" or otherwise? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> Thus, for RSA-FDH-VRF, uniqueness and >>>>>>>>> collision resistance may not hold if the keys are generated >>>>>>>>> adversarially (specifically, if the RSA function specified in the >>>>>>>>> public key is not bijective because the modulus n or the exponent e >>>>>>>>> are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017]); thus, RSA-FDH-VRF >>>>>>>>> defined in this document does not have "full uniqueness" and "full >>>>>>>>> collision resistance". >>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>> (Specifically, the >>>>>>>>> VRF output may be predictable if the RSA function specified in the >>>>>>>>> public key is far from bijective because the modulus n or the >>>>>>>>> exponent e are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017].) --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 15) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.2: We found the phrasing in these sentences >>>>>>>>> confusing, as the text appears to indicate that the equations in >>>>>>>>> question can be found in the cited documents. >>>>>>>>> If the suggested updates would preserve your intended meaning, may we >>>>>>>>> rephrase? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> * For trusted collision resistance: approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2) >>>>>>>>> (as shown in [PWHVNRG17]). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> * For selective pseudorandomness: approximately as strong as the >>>>>>>>> security, in bits, of the RSA problem for the key (n, e) (as shown >>>>>>>>> in [GNPRVZ15]). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As shown in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, measured in >>>>>>>>> bits, is as follows (in the random oracle model for the functions >>>>>>>>> Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>> For trusted collision resistance (as discussed in [PWHVNRG17]): >>>>>>>>> approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> For selective pseudorandomness (as discussed in [GNPRVZ15]: >>>>>>>>> approximately as strong as the security, in bits, of the RSA >>>>>>>>> problem for the key (n, e). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As discussed in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, >>>>>>>>> measured in bits, would be as follows (in the random oracle model >>>>>>>>> for the functions Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 16) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.3: Please confirm that "loose", and not >>>>>>>>> "lossy", is correct here. We ask because we see "lossier security >>>>>>>>> reduction" in Appendix B of [PWHVNRG17] but do not see any words >>>>>>>>> that have "loose" in them in that document. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> * They may increase security parameters to make up for the loose >>>>>>>>> security reduction. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 17) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.5: Does "must run in time independent of" >>>>>>>>> mean "must run in a time that is independent of", or does >>>>>>>>> "independent" refer to "run" (in which case it should be >>>>>>>>> "independently")? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (Please note that this question has also been raised for "run in time >>>>>>>>> independent of" as also found in companion document >>>>>>>>> draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve.) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> ECVRF-P256-SHA256-SSWU and ECVRF-EDWARDS25519-SHA512-ELL2 can be made >>>>>>>>> to run in time independent of alpha, following recommendations in >>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 18) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.8: We had trouble following several sentences >>>>>>>>> in this section. Please review the following. If the suggestions >>>>>>>>> below are not correct, please clarify the following: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the four inputs (where are these defined?) >>>>>>>>> to equal each other or to any inputs (to be equal to?) >>>>>>>>> second octets of the input (plural "octets", singular "input") >>>>>>>>> second octets of the inputs (plural "octets", plural "inputs") >>>>>>>>> last octet of the input (singular "octet", singular "input") >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds >>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs >>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are >>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs given to >>>>>>>>> the hash function for the same SK and different alpha. This is >>>>>>>>> indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this document, because >>>>>>>>> the second octets of the input to the hash function used in MGF1 and >>>>>>>>> in proof_to_hash are different. >>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>> * the second octets of the inputs to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different. >>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>> * the last octet of the input to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero, and therefore >>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the input to the hash function >>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the >>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag by >>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds >>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs >>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are >>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs >>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for the same SK and different alpha. >>>>>>>>> This is indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this >>>>>>>>> document, because the second octet of the inputs to the hash >>>>>>>>> function used in MGF1 and in proof_to_hash are different. >>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>> * The second octet of the inputs to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> * The last octet of the inputs to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero and is therefore >>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the inputs to the hash function >>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the >>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag per [RFC9380]. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 19) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.9: This sentence does not parse. If the >>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify "if a group of public >>>>>>>>> keys to share the same salt" and "group of public keys, which may aid >>>>>>>>> in some protocol". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys to share the >>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for >>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys, which may aid in some protocol that >>>>>>>>> uses the VRF. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys shares the >>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for >>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys; this can be helpful for any >>>>>>>>> protocol that uses the VRF. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 20) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.10: It appears that one or more words were >>>>>>>>> missing in this sentence. We added the words "to the" as shown below. >>>>>>>>> If this is incorrect, please provide clarifying text. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs ECVRF_encode_to_curve hash >>>>>>>>> function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different from >>>>>>>>> other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the prover >>>>>>>>> depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the prover >>>>>>>>> will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as >>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Currently: >>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs to the ECVRF_encode_to_curve >>>>>>>>> hash function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different >>>>>>>>> from other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the >>>>>>>>> prover depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the >>>>>>>>> prover will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as >>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 21) <!-- [rfced] [DGKR18]: We see that <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573> >>>>>>>>> lists the title of this reference as "Ouroboros Praos: An >>>>>>>>> adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake protocol", but >>>>>>>>> when we click the "PDF" box on the page, the title of the PDF version >>>>>>>>> of the paper has one word different ("protocol" vs. "blockchain"): >>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake >>>>>>>>> blockchain". How should the title be updated in this reference? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> [DGKR18] David, B., Gazi, P., Kiayias, A., and A. Russell, >>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous >>>>>>>>> proof-of-stake protocol", in Advances in Cryptology - >>>>>>>>> EUROCRYPT, 2018, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 22) <!-- [rfced] [GNPRVZ15]: This listing is the only "eprint.iacr.org" >>>>>>>>> listing to provide a direct link to the PDF copy. Should all >>>>>>>>> "eprint.iacr.org" URLs in this document be updated to point to >>>>>>>>> the PDF copy, or should the ".pdf" be removed from this link? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> [GNPRVZ15] Goldberg, S., Naor, M., Papadopoulos, D., Reyzin, L., >>>>>>>>> Vasant, S., and A. Ziv, "NSEC5: Provably Preventing DNSSEC >>>>>>>>> Zone Enumeration", in NDSS, 2015, >>>>>>>>> <https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/582.pdf>. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 23) <!-- [rfced] [X25519]: We see that the provided URL resolves to what >>>>>>>>> appears to be a personal website. Please confirm that this page is >>>>>>>>> stable and will continue to be available to readers. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>> [X25519] Bernstein, D.J., "How do I validate Curve25519 public >>>>>>>>> keys?", 2006, <https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate>. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 24) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the >>>>>>>>> online Style Guide at >>>>>>>>> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>, >>>>>>>>> and let us know if any changes are needed. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this >>>>>>>>> should still be reviewed as a best practice. --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 25) <!-- [rfced] Please let us know if any changes are needed for the >>>>>>>>> following: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> a) The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in this >>>>>>>>> document. Please let us know which form is preferred. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> INVALID / "INVALID" >>>>>>>>> (e.g., 'may output INVALID', 'output "INVALID" and stop') >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> VALID / "VALID" >>>>>>>>> (e.g., '(VALID, beta1)', '("VALID", beta_string)') >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> b) As ptLen is defined as "length, in octets, of a point on E", it >>>>>>>>> appears that ptLen would be pronounced as either "pee-tee-len" or >>>>>>>>> "point-len". We changed the two instances of "an ptLen" to "a ptLen" >>>>>>>>> accordingly. Please let us know any concerns. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> c) Should spacing be made consistent for the following? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ctr = 1 >>>>>>>>> ctr=1 >>>>>>>>> (ctr, 1) >>>>>>>>> (ctr,1) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Please note that in the context of "ctr" the use of spaces between >>>>>>>>> entries appears to be more common; we suggest adding spaces >>>>>>>>> for these items (e.g., ctr = 1, (ctr, 1)). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 2^(8qLen)>q >>>>>>>>> 2^qlen > q >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> d) Last paragraph of Section 5.4.5: For consistency, should numerals >>>>>>>>> or spelled-out numbers be used for the following? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 8 bad points >>>>>>>>> two bad points >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (If the spelled-out "eight" is preferred, we will also change >>>>>>>>> "5 list elements" to "five list elements".) --> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thank you. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *****IMPORTANT***** >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Updated 2023/04/17 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> RFC Author(s): >>>>>>>>>> -------------- >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Instructions for Completing AUTH48 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Your document has now entered AUTH48. Once it has been reviewed and >>>>>>>>>> approved by you and all coauthors, it will be published as an RFC. >>>>>>>>>> If an author is no longer available, there are several remedies >>>>>>>>>> available as listed in the FAQ (https://www.rfc-editor.org/faq/). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You and you coauthors are responsible for engaging other parties >>>>>>>>>> (e.g., Contributors or Working Group) as necessary before providing >>>>>>>>>> your approval. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Planning your review >>>>>>>>>> --------------------- >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Please review the following aspects of your document: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * RFC Editor questions >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Please review and resolve any questions raised by the RFC Editor >>>>>>>>>> that have been included in the XML file as comments marked as >>>>>>>>>> follows: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> <!-- [rfced] ... --> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> These questions will also be sent in a subsequent email. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * Changes submitted by coauthors >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Please ensure that you review any changes submitted by your >>>>>>>>>> coauthors. We assume that if you do not speak up that you >>>>>>>>>> agree to changes submitted by your coauthors. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * Content >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Please review the full content of the document, as this cannot >>>>>>>>>> change once the RFC is published. Please pay particular attention to: >>>>>>>>>> - IANA considerations updates (if applicable) >>>>>>>>>> - contact information >>>>>>>>>> - references >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * Copyright notices and legends >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Please review the copyright notice and legends as defined in >>>>>>>>>> RFC 5378 and the Trust Legal Provisions >>>>>>>>>> (TLP – https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info/). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * Semantic markup >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Please review the markup in the XML file to ensure that elements of >>>>>>>>>> content are correctly tagged. For example, ensure that <sourcecode> >>>>>>>>>> and <artwork> are set correctly. See details at >>>>>>>>>> <https://authors.ietf.org/rfcxml-vocabulary>. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * Formatted output >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Please review the PDF, HTML, and TXT files to ensure that the >>>>>>>>>> formatted output, as generated from the markup in the XML file, is >>>>>>>>>> reasonable. Please note that the TXT will have formatting >>>>>>>>>> limitations compared to the PDF and HTML. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Submitting changes >>>>>>>>>> ------------------ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> To submit changes, please reply to this email using ‘REPLY ALL’ as all >>>>>>>>>> the parties CCed on this message need to see your changes. The parties >>>>>>>>>> include: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * your coauthors >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org (the RPC team) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * other document participants, depending on the stream (e.g., >>>>>>>>>> IETF Stream participants are your working group chairs, the >>>>>>>>>> responsible ADs, and the document shepherd). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * auth48archive@rfc-editor.org, which is a new archival mailing list >>>>>>>>>> to preserve AUTH48 conversations; it is not an active discussion >>>>>>>>>> list: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * More info: >>>>>>>>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/yb6lpIGh-4Q9l2USxIAe6P8O4Zc >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * The archive itself: >>>>>>>>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/auth48archive/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * Note: If only absolutely necessary, you may temporarily opt out >>>>>>>>>> of the archiving of messages (e.g., to discuss a sensitive matter). >>>>>>>>>> If needed, please add a note at the top of the message that you >>>>>>>>>> have dropped the address. 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Editorial changes do not require approval from a stream manager. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Approving for publication >>>>>>>>>> -------------------------- >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> To approve your RFC for publication, please reply to this email stating >>>>>>>>>> that you approve this RFC for publication. Please use ‘REPLY ALL’, >>>>>>>>>> as all the parties CCed on this message need to see your approval. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Files >>>>>>>>>> ----- >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The files are available here: >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Diff file of the text: >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html (side by side) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> This diff file compares an altered original and the RFC (in order >>>>>>>>>> to make the changes in the moved "Contributors" viewable): >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Diff of the XML: >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Tracking progress >>>>>>>>>> ----------------- >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The details of the AUTH48 status of your document are here: >>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Please let us know if you have any questions. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your cooperation, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>> RFC9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Title : Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) >>>>>>>>>> Author(s) : S. Goldberg, L. Reyzin, D. Papadopoulos, J. Včelák >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml> >>>>>> >>>>>> <rfc9381.xml> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> --- >>> Sharon Goldberg >>> Computer Science, Boston University >>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe >> >> >> >>
- [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-… rfc-editor
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… rfc-editor
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Christopher Wood
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Tim Taubert
- [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Christopher Wood
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Tim Taubert
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- [auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381… Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Sandy Ginoza