Re: [auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")

["Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)" <[e-mail]>]

Approved.

On 18.08.23 22:49, Lynne Bartholomew wrote:
> Hi, Eliot.
>
> A quick check-in with you.  Do you have any further comments, or would you like to confirm your approval of RFC-to-be 9383?
>
> Thank you!
>
> RFC Editor/lb
>
>> On Aug 18, 2023, at 1:45 PM, Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>> Hi, Tim.  We have noted your approval:
>>
>>    https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383
>>
>> Thank you!
>>
>> RFC Editor/lb
>>
>>> On Aug 17, 2023, at 5:44 PM, Tim Taubert <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Thank you Lynne! I also approve publication of RFC 9383.
>>>
>>> — Tim
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Aug 17, 2023, at 00:04, Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi, Chris.  So noted:
>>>>
>>>>   https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383
>>>>
>>>> Thank you!
>>>>
>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>
>>>>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 2:39 PM, Christopher Wood <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks, Lynne. I approve publication of RFC9383.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 5:19 PM, Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dear Chris, Eliot, Sharon, Leonid, and Tim,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thank you for your replies.  We have updated RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 to use "Prover" and "Verifier".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ** RFC-to-be 9381:  The latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ** RFC-to-be 9383:  The latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.txt
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.pdf
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.xml
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-diff.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-auth48diff.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastdiff.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastrfcdiff.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We will continue the publication process for RFC-to-be 9381.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> RFC-to-be 9383 will be published when RFC-to-be 9382 is published, as noted on <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383>.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks again!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 8:06 AM, Tim Taubert <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Capitalized is fine to me as well. Thanks!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> — Tim
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 16. Aug 2023, at 02:48, Leonid Reyzin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>> Agreed. Capitalized makes more sense to me, but I don't feel strongly. Thanks for catching!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Since my email forwarding seems wonky still, can you contact me at [e-mail] instead of @bu?
>>>>>>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 3:55 PM, Sharon Goldberg <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I agree with Chris. Go with capitals.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks
>>>>>>> Sharon
>>>>>>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 1:53 PM, Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear) <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I generally prefer lowercase - we're not writing legal contracts here,  but the authors can have the final say, so long as they agree.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Eliot
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 15.08.23 22:42, Lynne Bartholomew wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hi, Chris and *Eliot.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Chris, thank you for the quick reply!  We'll wait a bit to see if anyone objects; if not, we'll update per your note.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Eliot, as ISE for RFC-to-be 9383, please let us know if you're OK with us updating per Chris's note.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks again!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 4:34 PM Christopher Wood <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>> Hi Lynne,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Specifications I've worked with in the past have capitalized these sorts of terms as proper nouns, but I don't think it really matters much. If we need to choose, and assuming no one else cares strongly, I would go with Prover and Verifier.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023, at 3:09 PM, Lynne Bartholomew wrote:
>>>>>>>> Dear authors of RFCs-to-be 9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) and 9383
>>>>>>>> (draft-bar-cfrg-spake2plus-08),
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Apologies, but while preparing RFC-to-be 9381 for publication, we found
>>>>>>>> two items that we had previously flagged internally for these two
>>>>>>>> documents but that were not conveyed to you when these documents were
>>>>>>>> moved to the AUTH48 state last Spring:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> These documents use both "prover" and "Prover", and both "verifier" and
>>>>>>>> "Verifier" (e.g., "the prover", "the Prover", "the verifier", "the
>>>>>>>> Verifier").
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We believe that usage (capitalization or not) for these terms within
>>>>>>>> and between these documents should be consistent.  Please let us know
>>>>>>>> which form is preferred for each.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thank you, and again, apologies for not asking about this earlier.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 10:13 AM, Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Dear Dimitris, Sharon, and Jan,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We have noted your approvals on the AUTH48 status page:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As this document is part of Cluster C450 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C450) and normatively depends on RFC-to-be 9380 (draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve), this document will be published when RFC-to-be 9380 is published.  You can follow the progress of RFC-to-be 9380 at <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9380>.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 1:43 AM, Jan Včelák <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for the edits, everyone. The document looks good to me. I
>>>>>>>>>> also approve it for publication.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Jan
>>>>>>>>>> On May 20, 2023, at 8:50 AM, Sharon Goldberg <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Thank you, I approve this as well.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, May 20, 2023 at 4:05 AM Dimitrios Papadopoulos <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Many thanks for the detailed editing.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I also approve its publication.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>>> -Dimitris
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 19 May 2023, at 11:52 PM, Leonid Reyzin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you! I now approve it for publication.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> (NB: Jan, Sharon, Dimitris: you each need to send your approval before it can be published.)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 18, 2023 at 6:29 PM Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi, Leo.  No worries!  Fixed, and the latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On May 17, 2023, at 3:00 AM, Leonid Reyzin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Oh, so sorry for that bug. It should be 3.2.1.3. Could you please fix that?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 4:00 AM Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Leo,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for the latest updated XML file as well!
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks also for the working NIST URL.  We updated the reference listing accordingly.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> However, please note that the NIST document associated with this URL does not have a Section 3.1.2.3.  Which section should be cited in the following sentence (from Section 5.5 of this document)?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> * The EC group G is the NIST P-256 elliptic curve, with the finite
>>>>>>>>>>>> field and curve parameters as specified in Section 3.1.2.3 of
>>>>>>>>>>>> [SP-800-186] and Section 2.6 of [RFC5114].
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We have posted the latest files here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks again!
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On May 12, 2023, at 7:43 AM, Leonid Reyzin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks so much for the quick turnaround! I made the change I had failed to make the previous time; fixed another nit for clarity; changed the mailing addresses for two of the authors; and provided an alternative URL for the NIST document. All new changes are annotated with [auth48response] in the attached xml file.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leo
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 8:31 PM Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Leo,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for the updated XML file!  The updates and your notes were most helpful.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Regarding this item:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <!-- [auth48response] Removed "four" becuase it's incorrect. Added "to" before
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "each other". ...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We did not see this update.  Should "unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs" be changed to "unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs"?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Regarding your note related to the stability of [X25519]:  Thank you for the information.  We left as is; seventeen years seems a good track record and indicates that it should remain stable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here (please refresh your browser):
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks again!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On May 10, 2023, at 10:58 AM, Leonid Reyzin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne et al.,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Attaching the updated XML file. Responses to edits / comments, as well as a few new minor edits, are explained in the comments prefixed with [auth48response].
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for such a thorough pass through the document and for all the excellent suggestions!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leo
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 5:40 PM Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi, Jan.  Thank you for checking in with us!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 26, 2023, at 10:19 PM, Jan Včelák <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hello Lynne.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you. We will look at the questions and get back to you soon.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Jan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dne pá 21. 4. 2023 20:13 uživatel Lynne Bartholomew <[e-mail]> napsal:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dear authors,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Checking in with you regarding the status of this document.  Please review the questions below, and let us know how this document should be updated.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The AUTH48 status page is here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, at 11:03 PM, [e-mail] wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Authors,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) the following questions, which are also in the XML file.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) <!-- [rfced] Please ensure that the guidelines listed in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 2.1 of RFC 5743 have been adhered to in this document. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2) <!-- [rfced] Would you like the references to be listed in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alphanumeric order? -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3) <!-- [rfced] Jan: We have seen both "Vcelak" and "Včelák"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in recent RFCs-to-be.  Please let us know your preference. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 4) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5:  We could not find anything in Section 3.4
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that indicates that pseudorandomness cannot hold against malicious
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> key generation.  Please confirm that this section number is correct and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will be clear to readers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As explained in Section 3.4, pseudorandomness cannot hold against
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious key generation. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 5) <!-- [rfced] Sections 4.2 and 5.2:  Is pi_string sometimes known to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove (in which case "only on a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string value that is known to have been produced by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_prove" would be correct), or always (in which case "only on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string, which is known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be correct)?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove, or from within
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_verify as specified in Section 4.3.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is known
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to have been produced by ECVRF_prove, or from within ECVRF_verify
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as specified in Section 5.3. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 6) <!-- [rfced] Section 5:  We don't see any mention of the field F in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5.  Please confirm that this listing will be clear to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> readers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fixed options (specified in Section 5.5):
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> F - finite field -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 7) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.1.1:  This sentence does not parse.  If the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified"* and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "roughly half hash_string values".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * We see "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point - a function that attempts"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> earlier in this section.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note even though the loop is infinite as written, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified in Section 5.5
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will succeed on roughly half hash_string values.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested (we could not find evidence of multiple
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions):
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note that even though the loop is infinite as written and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point function, as specified in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5, will succeed on roughly half of the hash_string
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> values. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1:  This sentence is confusing as written,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because the ECVRF_nonce_generation function is not specified in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [RFC6979].  If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is as specified in [RFC6979]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 3.2 where
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is implemented per the process
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> specified in Section 3.2 of [RFC6979], where -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 9) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a) Please confirm that "output length hlen" is correct (i.e., should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not be "output length hLen").  We ask because this is the only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instance of "hlen" in this document.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is this something that should be clarified, along the lines of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "this qlen is not to be confused with qLen" text a few lines later?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The hash function H is Hash and its output length hlen (in bits)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Possibly:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The hash function H is Hash, and its output length hlen (in bits)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8 (this hlen is not to be confused with hLen,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is used in this document to represent the length of Hash in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> octets).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> b) The last bullet item in this list was the only sentence fragment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We added a verb ("are").  If this is incorrect, please let us know
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how we can make this list parallel (i.e., either all sentence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fragments or all complete sentences).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> All the other values and primitives as defined in [RFC6979]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  All the other values and primitives are as defined in [RFC6979]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 10) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  We changed "given to this procedure" to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "used in this procedure" here.  If this is incorrect, please provide
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: the public key Y given to this procedure MUST be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> valid point on E.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The public key Y used in this procedure MUST be a valid point on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> E. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 11) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  Does "in order to" refer to clearing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the x-coordinate or something else?  If the suggested text is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4),
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in step 3, in order to make sure that it does not affect the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comparison.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4),
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Step 3 in order to make sure that it does not affect the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comparison. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 12) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  Please confirm that "their y-coordinate"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should not be "their y-coordinates" here.  We ask because of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plural "Their y-coordinates" in the third sentence of this paragraph.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no need to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> shift the other bad_pk values by p (or any bad_pk values by a larger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> multiple of p), because their y coordinate would exceed 2^255; and we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ensure that y_string corresponds to an integer less than 2^255 in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> step 3.) -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 13) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.5:  This sentence is confusing as written,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because the int_to_string function is not specified in [RFC8032].
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The int_to_string function as specified in the first paragraph of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032].
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The int_to_string function is implemented as specified in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first paragraph of Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 14) <!-- [rfced] Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3:  We had trouble following
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this sentence.  Does "the modulus n or the exponent e are chosen not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in compliance with [RFC8017]" mean "the modulus n or the exponent e
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not chosen, in compliance with [RFC8017]" or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "the modulus n or the exponent e is chosen without complying
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with [RFC8017]" or otherwise?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, for RSA-FDH-VRF, uniqueness and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance may not hold if the keys are generated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> adversarially (specifically, if the RSA function specified in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> public key is not bijective because the modulus n or the exponent e
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017]); thus, RSA-FDH-VRF
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined in this document does not have "full uniqueness" and "full
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Specifically, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> VRF output may be predictable if the RSA function specified in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> public key is far from bijective because the modulus n or the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exponent e are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017].) -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 15) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.2:  We found the phrasing in these sentences
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> confusing, as the text appears to indicate that the equations in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> question can be found in the cited documents.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested updates would preserve your intended meaning, may we
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rephrase?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  For trusted collision resistance: approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (as shown in [PWHVNRG17]).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  For selective pseudorandomness: approximately as strong as the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> security, in bits, of the RSA problem for the key (n, e) (as shown
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in [GNPRVZ15]).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As shown in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, measured in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bits, is as follows (in the random oracle model for the functions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve):
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For trusted collision resistance (as discussed in [PWHVNRG17]):
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For selective pseudorandomness (as discussed in [GNPRVZ15]:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approximately as strong as the security, in bits, of the RSA
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the key (n, e).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> measured in bits, would be as follows (in the random oracle model
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the functions Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 16) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.3:  Please confirm that "loose", and not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "lossy", is correct here.  We ask because we see "lossier security
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reduction" in Appendix B of [PWHVNRG17] but do not see any words
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that have "loose" in them in that document.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  They may increase security parameters to make up for the loose
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> security reduction. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 17) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.5:  Does "must run in time independent of"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "must run in a time that is independent of", or does
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "independent" refer to "run" (in which case it should be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "independently")?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Please note that this question has also been raised for "run in time
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> independent of" as also found in companion document
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF-P256-SHA256-SSWU and ECVRF-EDWARDS25519-SHA512-ELL2 can be made
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to run in time independent of alpha, following recommendations in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 18) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.8:  We had trouble following several sentences
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in this section.  Please review the following.  If the suggestions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> below are not correct, please clarify the following:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the four inputs (where are these defined?)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to equal each other or to any inputs  (to be equal to?)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the input  (plural "octets", singular "input")
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the inputs  (plural "octets", plural "inputs")
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last octet of the input  (singular "octet", singular "input")
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs given to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the hash function for the same SK and different alpha.  This is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this document, because
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the second octets of the input to the hash function used in MGF1 and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in proof_to_hash are different.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  the second octets of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  the last octet of the input to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero, and therefore
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the input to the hash function
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for the same SK and different alpha.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> document, because the second octet of the inputs to the hash
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function used in MGF1 and in proof_to_hash are different.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The second octet of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The last octet of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero and is therefore
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the inputs to the hash function
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag per [RFC9380]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.9:  This sentence does not parse.  If the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify "if a group of public
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keys to share the same salt" and "group of public keys, which may aid
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in some protocol".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys to share the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys, which may aid in some protocol that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> uses the VRF.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys shares the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys; this can be helpful for any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> protocol that uses the VRF. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 20) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.10:  It appears that one or more words were
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> missing in this sentence.  We added the words "to the" as shown below.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If this is incorrect, please provide clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs ECVRF_encode_to_curve hash
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different from
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the prover
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the prover
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs to the ECVRF_encode_to_curve
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hash function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prover depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prover will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 21) <!-- [rfced] [DGKR18]:  We see that <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lists the title of this reference as "Ouroboros Praos: An
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake protocol", but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when we click the "PDF" box on the page, the title of the PDF version
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the paper has one word different ("protocol" vs. "blockchain"):
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blockchain".  How should the title be updated in this reference?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [DGKR18]   David, B., Gazi, P., Kiayias, A., and A. Russell,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>        "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>        proof-of-stake protocol", in Advances in Cryptology -
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>        EUROCRYPT, 2018, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 22) <!-- [rfced] [GNPRVZ15]:  This listing is the only "eprint.iacr.org"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> listing to provide a direct link to the PDF copy.  Should all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "eprint.iacr.org" URLs in this document be updated to point to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the PDF copy, or should the ".pdf" be removed from this link?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [GNPRVZ15] Goldberg, S., Naor, M., Papadopoulos, D., Reyzin, L.,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>        Vasant, S., and A. Ziv, "NSEC5: Provably Preventing DNSSEC
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>        Zone Enumeration", in NDSS, 2015,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>        <https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/582.pdf>. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 23) <!-- [rfced] [X25519]:  We see that the provided URL resolves to what
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appears to be a personal website.  Please confirm that this page is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stable and will continue to be available to readers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [X25519]   Bernstein, D.J., "How do I validate Curve25519 public
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>        keys?", 2006, <https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate>. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 24) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> online Style Guide at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and let us know if any changes are needed.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should still be reviewed as a best practice. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 25) <!-- [rfced] Please let us know if any changes are needed for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a) The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> document.  Please let us know which form is preferred.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> INVALID / "INVALID"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., 'may output INVALID', 'output "INVALID" and stop')
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> VALID / "VALID"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., '(VALID, beta1)', '("VALID", beta_string)')
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> b) As ptLen is defined as "length, in octets, of a point on E", it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> appears that ptLen would be pronounced as either "pee-tee-len" or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "point-len".  We changed the two instances of "an ptLen" to "a ptLen"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accordingly.  Please let us know any concerns.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> c) Should spacing be made consistent for the following?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ctr = 1
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ctr=1
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr, 1)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr,1)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please note that in the context of "ctr" the use of spaces between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entries appears to be more common; we suggest adding spaces
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for these items (e.g., ctr = 1, (ctr, 1)).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2^(8qLen)>q
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2^qlen > q
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> d) Last paragraph of Section 5.4.5:  For consistency, should numerals
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or spelled-out numbers be used for the following?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 8 bad points
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two bad points
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (If the spelled-out "eight" is preferred, we will also change
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "5 list elements" to "five list elements".) -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, [e-mail] wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *****IMPORTANT*****
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Updated 2023/04/17
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Author(s):
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Instructions for Completing AUTH48
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Your document has now entered AUTH48.  Once it has been reviewed and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approved by you and all coauthors, it will be published as an RFC.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If an author is no longer available, there are several remedies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> available as listed in the FAQ (https://www.rfc-editor.org/faq/).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and you coauthors are responsible for engaging other parties
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., Contributors or Working Group) as necessary before providing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your approval.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Planning your review
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ---------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the following aspects of your document:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  RFC Editor questions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review and resolve any questions raised by the RFC Editor
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that have been included in the XML file as comments marked as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> follows:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <!-- [rfced] ... -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> These questions will also be sent in a subsequent email.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Changes submitted by coauthors
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please ensure that you review any changes submitted by your
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coauthors.  We assume that if you do not speak up that you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> agree to changes submitted by your coauthors.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Content
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the full content of the document, as this cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> change once the RFC is published.  Please pay particular attention to:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - IANA considerations updates (if applicable)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - contact information
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> - references
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Copyright notices and legends
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the copyright notice and legends as defined in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC 5378 and the Trust Legal Provisions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (TLP – https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info/).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Semantic markup
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the markup in the XML file to ensure that elements of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> content are correctly tagged.  For example, ensure that <sourcecode>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and <artwork> are set correctly.  See details at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://authors.ietf.org/rfcxml-vocabulary>.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Formatted output
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the PDF, HTML, and TXT files to ensure that the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formatted output, as generated from the markup in the XML file, is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasonable.  Please note that the TXT will have formatting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> limitations compared to the PDF and HTML.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Submitting changes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To submit changes, please reply to this email using ‘REPLY ALL’ as all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the parties CCed on this message need to see your changes. The parties
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  your coauthors
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  [e-mail] (the RPC team)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  other document participants, depending on the stream (e.g.,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IETF Stream participants are your working group chairs, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible ADs, and the document shepherd).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  [e-mail], which is a new archival mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to preserve AUTH48 conversations; it is not an active discussion
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> list:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  More info:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/yb6lpIGh-4Q9l2USxIAe6P8O4Zc
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The archive itself:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/auth48archive/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Note: If only absolutely necessary, you may temporarily opt out
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>   of the archiving of messages (e.g., to discuss a sensitive matter).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>   If needed, please add a note at the top of the message that you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>   have dropped the address. When the discussion is concluded,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>   [e-mail] will be re-added to the CC list and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>   its addition will be noted at the top of the message.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You may submit your changes in one of two ways:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An update to the provided XML file
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> — OR —
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An explicit list of changes in this format
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section # (or indicate Global)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OLD:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> old text
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> NEW:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> new text
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You do not need to reply with both an updated XML file and an explicit
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> list of changes, as either form is sufficient.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We will ask a stream manager to review and approve any changes that seem
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> beyond editorial in nature, e.g., addition of new text, deletion of text,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and technical changes.  Information about stream managers can be found in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the FAQ.  Editorial changes do not require approval from a stream manager.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Approving for publication
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To approve your RFC for publication, please reply to this email stating
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you approve this RFC for publication.  Please use ‘REPLY ALL’,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as all the parties CCed on this message need to see your approval.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Files
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The files are available here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diff file of the text:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html (side by side)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This diff file compares an altered original and the RFC (in order
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to make the changes in the moved "Contributors" viewable):
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diff of the XML:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tracking progress
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The details of the AUTH48 status of your document are here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please let us know if you have any questions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your cooperation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Title            : Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Author(s)        : S. Goldberg, L. Reyzin, D. Papadopoulos, J. Včelák
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>>> Sharon Goldberg
>>>>>>>>>> Computer Science, Boston University
>>>>>>>>>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>> Sharon Goldberg
>>>>>>> Computer Science, Boston University
>>>>>>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>