Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")

Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> Wed, 16 August 2023 22:04 UTC

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From: Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com>
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Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 15:04:05 -0700
Cc: "Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)" <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org>, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com>, Leonid Reyzin <leonid.reyzin@gmail.com>, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com>, Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk>, IRSG <irsg@irtf.org>, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com>, Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>, "rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org" <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>, auth48archive@rfc-editor.org
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To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")
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Hi, Chris.  So noted:

   https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383

Thank you!

RFC Editor/lb

> On Aug 16, 2023, at 2:39 PM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote:
> 
> Thanks, Lynne. I approve publication of RFC9383.
> 
> Sent from my iPhone
> 
>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 5:19 PM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Dear Chris, Eliot, Sharon, Leonid, and Tim,
>> 
>> Thank you for your replies.  We have updated RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 to use "Prover" and "Verifier".
>> 
>> ** RFC-to-be 9381:  The latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:
>> 
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
>> 
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>> 
>> 
>> ** RFC-to-be 9383:  The latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:
>> 
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.txt
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.pdf
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.xml
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-diff.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-rfcdiff.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-auth48diff.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastdiff.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastrfcdiff.html
>> 
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff1.html
>>  https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff2.html
>> 
>> We will continue the publication process for RFC-to-be 9381.
>> 
>> RFC-to-be 9383 will be published when RFC-to-be 9382 is published, as noted on <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383>. 
>> 
>> Thanks again!
>> 
>> RFC Editor/lb
>> 
>> 
>>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 8:06 AM, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Capitalized is fine to me as well. Thanks!
>>> 
>>> — Tim
>>> 
>>> 
>>>>> On 16. Aug 2023, at 02:48, Leonid Reyzin <leonid.reyzin@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Agreed. Capitalized makes more sense to me, but I don't feel strongly. Thanks for catching!
>>>> 
>>>> Since my email forwarding seems wonky still, can you contact me at leonid.reyzin@gmail.com instead of @bu?
>> 
>>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 3:55 PM, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> I agree with Chris. Go with capitals. 
>>> 
>>> Thanks
>>> Sharon 
>> 
>>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 1:53 PM, Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear) <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>>> 
>>> I generally prefer lowercase - we're not writing legal contracts here,  but the authors can have the final say, so long as they agree.
>>> 
>>> Eliot
>>> 
>>>> On 15.08.23 22:42, Lynne Bartholomew wrote:
>>>> Hi, Chris and *Eliot.
>>>> 
>>>> Chris, thank you for the quick reply!  We'll wait a bit to see if anyone objects; if not, we'll update per your note.
>>>> 
>>>> *Eliot, as ISE for RFC-to-be 9383, please let us know if you're OK with us updating per Chris's note.
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks again!
>>>> 
>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 4:34 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote:
>>> Hi Lynne,
>>> 
>>> Specifications I've worked with in the past have capitalized these sorts of terms as proper nouns, but I don't think it really matters much. If we need to choose, and assuming no one else cares strongly, I would go with Prover and Verifier.
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> Chris
>>> 
>>>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023, at 3:09 PM, Lynne Bartholomew wrote:
>>>> Dear authors of RFCs-to-be 9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) and 9383 
>>>> (draft-bar-cfrg-spake2plus-08),
>>>> 
>>>> Apologies, but while preparing RFC-to-be 9381 for publication, we found 
>>>> two items that we had previously flagged internally for these two 
>>>> documents but that were not conveyed to you when these documents were 
>>>> moved to the AUTH48 state last Spring:
>>>> 
>>>> These documents use both "prover" and "Prover", and both "verifier" and 
>>>> "Verifier" (e.g., "the prover", "the Prover", "the verifier", "the 
>>>> Verifier").
>>>> 
>>>> We believe that usage (capitalization or not) for these terms within 
>>>> and between these documents should be consistent.  Please let us know 
>>>> which form is preferred for each.
>>>> 
>>>> Thank you, and again, apologies for not asking about this earlier.
>>>> 
>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>> 
>>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 10:13 AM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Dear Dimitris, Sharon, and Jan,
>>>>> 
>>>>> We have noted your approvals on the AUTH48 status page:
>>>>> 
>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>>> 
>>>>> As this document is part of Cluster C450 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C450) and normatively depends on RFC-to-be 9380 (draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve), this document will be published when RFC-to-be 9380 is published.  You can follow the progress of RFC-to-be 9380 at <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9380>.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>> 
>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 1:43 AM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thank you for the edits, everyone. The document looks good to me. I
>>>>>> also approve it for publication.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Jan
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On May 20, 2023, at 8:50 AM, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thank you, I approve this as well.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Sat, May 20, 2023 at 4:05 AM Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk> wrote:
>>>>>> Many thanks for the detailed editing. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I also approve its publication.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> -Dimitris
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 19 May 2023, at 11:52 PM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thank you! I now approve it for publication.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> (NB: Jan, Sharon, Dimitris: you each need to send your approval before it can be published.)
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Thu, May 18, 2023 at 6:29 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> Hi, Leo.  No worries!  Fixed, and the latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On May 17, 2023, at 3:00 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Oh, so sorry for that bug. It should be 3.2.1.3. Could you please fix that?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 4:00 AM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>> Dear Leo,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thank you for the latest updated XML file as well!
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thanks also for the working NIST URL.  We updated the reference listing accordingly.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> However, please note that the NIST document associated with this URL does not have a Section 3.1.2.3.  Which section should be cited in the following sentence (from Section 5.5 of this document)?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> * The EC group G is the NIST P-256 elliptic curve, with the finite
>>>>>>>> field and curve parameters as specified in Section 3.1.2.3 of
>>>>>>>> [SP-800-186] and Section 2.6 of [RFC5114].
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> We have posted the latest files here:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Thanks again!
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On May 12, 2023, at 7:43 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Thanks so much for the quick turnaround! I made the change I had failed to make the previous time; fixed another nit for clarity; changed the mailing addresses for two of the authors; and provided an alternative URL for the NIST document. All new changes are annotated with [auth48response] in the attached xml file.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Leo
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 8:31 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Dear Leo,
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for the updated XML file!  The updates and your notes were most helpful.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Regarding this item:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> <!-- [auth48response] Removed "four" becuase it's incorrect. Added "to" before      
>>>>>>>>> "each other". ...
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> We did not see this update.  Should "unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs" be changed to "unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs"?
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Regarding your note related to the stability of [X25519]:  Thank you for the information.  We left as is; seventeen years seems a good track record and indicates that it should remain stable.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here (please refresh your browser):
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html
>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Thanks again!
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On May 10, 2023, at 10:58 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne et al.,
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Attaching the updated XML file. Responses to edits / comments, as well as a few new minor edits, are explained in the comments prefixed with [auth48response].
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for such a thorough pass through the document and for all the excellent suggestions!
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Leo
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 5:40 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Hi, Jan.  Thank you for checking in with us!
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 26, 2023, at 10:19 PM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Hello Lynne.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you. We will look at the questions and get back to you soon.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Jan
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Dne pá 21. 4. 2023 20:13 uživatel Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> napsal:
>>>>>>>>>>> Dear authors,
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Checking in with you regarding the status of this document.  Please review the questions below, and let us know how this document should be updated.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> The AUTH48 status page is here:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, at 11:03 PM, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Authors,
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) the following questions, which are also in the XML file.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) <!-- [rfced] Please ensure that the guidelines listed in
>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 2.1 of RFC 5743 have been adhered to in this document. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 2) <!-- [rfced] Would you like the references to be listed in
>>>>>>>>>>>> alphanumeric order? -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 3) <!-- [rfced] Jan: We have seen both "Vcelak" and "Včelák"
>>>>>>>>>>>> in recent RFCs-to-be.  Please let us know your preference. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 4) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5:  We could not find anything in Section 3.4
>>>>>>>>>>>> that indicates that pseudorandomness cannot hold against malicious
>>>>>>>>>>>> key generation.  Please confirm that this section number is correct and
>>>>>>>>>>>> will be clear to readers.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> As explained in Section 3.4, pseudorandomness cannot hold against
>>>>>>>>>>>> malicious key generation. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 5) <!-- [rfced] Sections 4.2 and 5.2:  Is pi_string sometimes known to
>>>>>>>>>>>> have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove (in which case "only on a
>>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string value that is known to have been produced by
>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_prove" would be correct), or always (in which case "only on
>>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string, which is known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove"
>>>>>>>>>>>> would be correct)?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is
>>>>>>>>>>>> known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove, or from within
>>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_verify as specified in Section 4.3.
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is known
>>>>>>>>>>>> to have been produced by ECVRF_prove, or from within ECVRF_verify
>>>>>>>>>>>> as specified in Section 5.3. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 6) <!-- [rfced] Section 5:  We don't see any mention of the field F in
>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5.  Please confirm that this listing will be clear to
>>>>>>>>>>>> readers.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Fixed options (specified in Section 5.5):
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> F - finite field -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 7) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.1.1:  This sentence does not parse.  If the
>>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify
>>>>>>>>>>>> "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified"* and
>>>>>>>>>>>> "roughly half hash_string values".
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> * We see "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point - a function that attempts"
>>>>>>>>>>>> earlier in this section.)
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Note even though the loop is infinite as written, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256,
>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified in Section 5.5
>>>>>>>>>>>> will succeed on roughly half hash_string values.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested (we could not find evidence of multiple
>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions):
>>>>>>>>>>>> Note that even though the loop is infinite as written and
>>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, the
>>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point function, as specified in
>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5, will succeed on roughly half of the hash_string
>>>>>>>>>>>> values. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 8) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1:  This sentence is confusing as written,
>>>>>>>>>>>> because the ECVRF_nonce_generation function is not specified in
>>>>>>>>>>>> [RFC6979].  If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is as specified in [RFC6979]
>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 3.2 where
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is implemented per the process
>>>>>>>>>>>> specified in Section 3.2 of [RFC6979], where -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 9) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> a) Please confirm that "output length hlen" is correct (i.e., should
>>>>>>>>>>>> not be "output length hLen").  We ask because this is the only
>>>>>>>>>>>> instance of "hlen" in this document.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Is this something that should be clarified, along the lines of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> "this qlen is not to be confused with qLen" text a few lines later?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> The hash function H is Hash and its output length hlen (in bits)
>>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Possibly:
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The hash function H is Hash, and its output length hlen (in bits)
>>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8 (this hlen is not to be confused with hLen,
>>>>>>>>>>>> which is used in this document to represent the length of Hash in
>>>>>>>>>>>> octets).
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> b) The last bullet item in this list was the only sentence fragment.
>>>>>>>>>>>> We added a verb ("are").  If this is incorrect, please let us know
>>>>>>>>>>>> how we can make this list parallel (i.e., either all sentence
>>>>>>>>>>>> fragments or all complete sentences).
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> All the other values and primitives as defined in [RFC6979]
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  All the other values and primitives are as defined in [RFC6979]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 10) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  We changed "given to this procedure" to
>>>>>>>>>>>> "used in this procedure" here.  If this is incorrect, please provide
>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: the public key Y given to this procedure MUST be a
>>>>>>>>>>>> valid point on E.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Important note:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> The public key Y used in this procedure MUST be a valid point on
>>>>>>>>>>>> E. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 11) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  Does "in order to" refer to clearing
>>>>>>>>>>>> the x-coordinate or something else?  If the suggested text is not
>>>>>>>>>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4),
>>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad
>>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared
>>>>>>>>>>>> in step 3, in order to make sure that it does not affect the
>>>>>>>>>>>> comparison.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4),
>>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad
>>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared
>>>>>>>>>>>> in Step 3 in order to make sure that it does not affect the
>>>>>>>>>>>> comparison. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 12) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5:  Please confirm that "their y-coordinate"
>>>>>>>>>>>> should not be "their y-coordinates" here.  We ask because of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> plural "Their y-coordinates" in the third sentence of this paragraph.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no need to
>>>>>>>>>>>> shift the other bad_pk values by p (or any bad_pk values by a larger
>>>>>>>>>>>> multiple of p), because their y coordinate would exceed 2^255; and we
>>>>>>>>>>>> ensure that y_string corresponds to an integer less than 2^255 in
>>>>>>>>>>>> step 3.) -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 13) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.5:  This sentence is confusing as written,
>>>>>>>>>>>> because the int_to_string function is not specified in [RFC8032].
>>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The int_to_string function as specified in the first paragraph of
>>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032].
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The int_to_string function is implemented as specified in the
>>>>>>>>>>>> first paragraph of Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 14) <!-- [rfced] Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3:  We had trouble following
>>>>>>>>>>>> this sentence.  Does "the modulus n or the exponent e are chosen not
>>>>>>>>>>>> in compliance with [RFC8017]" mean "the modulus n or the exponent e
>>>>>>>>>>>> is not chosen, in compliance with [RFC8017]" or 
>>>>>>>>>>>> "the modulus n or the exponent e is chosen without complying 
>>>>>>>>>>>> with [RFC8017]" or otherwise?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, for RSA-FDH-VRF, uniqueness and
>>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance may not hold if the keys are generated
>>>>>>>>>>>> adversarially (specifically, if the RSA function specified in the
>>>>>>>>>>>> public key is not bijective because the modulus n or the exponent e
>>>>>>>>>>>> are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017]); thus, RSA-FDH-VRF
>>>>>>>>>>>> defined in this document does not have "full uniqueness" and "full
>>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance".
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>> (Specifically, the
>>>>>>>>>>>> VRF output may be predictable if the RSA function specified in the
>>>>>>>>>>>> public key is far from bijective because the modulus n or the
>>>>>>>>>>>> exponent e are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017].) -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 15) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.2:  We found the phrasing in these sentences
>>>>>>>>>>>> confusing, as the text appears to indicate that the equations in
>>>>>>>>>>>> question can be found in the cited documents.
>>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested updates would preserve your intended meaning, may we
>>>>>>>>>>>> rephrase?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  For trusted collision resistance: approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2)
>>>>>>>>>>>> (as shown in [PWHVNRG17]).
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  For selective pseudorandomness: approximately as strong as the
>>>>>>>>>>>> security, in bits, of the RSA problem for the key (n, e) (as shown
>>>>>>>>>>>> in [GNPRVZ15]).
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> As shown in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, measured in
>>>>>>>>>>>> bits, is as follows (in the random oracle model for the functions
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve):
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>> For trusted collision resistance (as discussed in [PWHVNRG17]):
>>>>>>>>>>>> approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2).
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> For selective pseudorandomness (as discussed in [GNPRVZ15]:
>>>>>>>>>>>> approximately as strong as the security, in bits, of the RSA
>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the key (n, e).
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF,
>>>>>>>>>>>> measured in bits, would be as follows (in the random oracle model
>>>>>>>>>>>> for the functions Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 16) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.3:  Please confirm that "loose", and not
>>>>>>>>>>>> "lossy", is correct here.  We ask because we see "lossier security
>>>>>>>>>>>> reduction" in Appendix B of [PWHVNRG17] but do not see any words
>>>>>>>>>>>> that have "loose" in them in that document.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  They may increase security parameters to make up for the loose
>>>>>>>>>>>> security reduction. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 17) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.5:  Does "must run in time independent of"
>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "must run in a time that is independent of", or does
>>>>>>>>>>>> "independent" refer to "run" (in which case it should be
>>>>>>>>>>>> "independently")?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> (Please note that this question has also been raised for "run in time
>>>>>>>>>>>> independent of" as also found in companion document
>>>>>>>>>>>> draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve.)
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF-P256-SHA256-SSWU and ECVRF-EDWARDS25519-SHA512-ELL2 can be made
>>>>>>>>>>>> to run in time independent of alpha, following recommendations in
>>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 18) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.8:  We had trouble following several sentences
>>>>>>>>>>>> in this section.  Please review the following.  If the suggestions
>>>>>>>>>>>> below are not correct, please clarify the following:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> the four inputs (where are these defined?)
>>>>>>>>>>>> to equal each other or to any inputs  (to be equal to?)
>>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the input  (plural "octets", singular "input")
>>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the inputs  (plural "octets", plural "inputs")
>>>>>>>>>>>> last octet of the input  (singular "octet", singular "input")
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds
>>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs
>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are
>>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs given to
>>>>>>>>>>>> the hash function for the same SK and different alpha.  This is
>>>>>>>>>>>> indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this document, because
>>>>>>>>>>>> the second octets of the input to the hash function used in MGF1 and
>>>>>>>>>>>> in proof_to_hash are different.
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  the second octets of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different.
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  the last octet of the input to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero, and therefore
>>>>>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the input to the hash function
>>>>>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the
>>>>>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag by
>>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds
>>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs
>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are
>>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs
>>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for the same SK and different alpha.
>>>>>>>>>>>> This is indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this
>>>>>>>>>>>> document, because the second octet of the inputs to the hash
>>>>>>>>>>>> function used in MGF1 and in proof_to_hash are different.
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The second octet of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The last octet of the inputs to the hash function used in
>>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero and is therefore
>>>>>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the inputs to the hash function
>>>>>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the
>>>>>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag per [RFC9380]. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 19) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.9:  This sentence does not parse.  If the
>>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify "if a group of public
>>>>>>>>>>>> keys to share the same salt" and "group of public keys, which may aid
>>>>>>>>>>>> in some protocol".
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys to share the
>>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for
>>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys, which may aid in some protocol that
>>>>>>>>>>>> uses the VRF.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested:
>>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys shares the
>>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for
>>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys; this can be helpful for any
>>>>>>>>>>>> protocol that uses the VRF. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 20) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.10:  It appears that one or more words were
>>>>>>>>>>>> missing in this sentence.  We added the words "to the" as shown below.
>>>>>>>>>>>> If this is incorrect, please provide clarifying text.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs ECVRF_encode_to_curve hash
>>>>>>>>>>>> function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different from
>>>>>>>>>>>> other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the prover
>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the prover
>>>>>>>>>>>> will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as
>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Currently:
>>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs to the ECVRF_encode_to_curve
>>>>>>>>>>>> hash function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different
>>>>>>>>>>>> from other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the
>>>>>>>>>>>> prover depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the
>>>>>>>>>>>> prover will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as
>>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 21) <!-- [rfced] [DGKR18]:  We see that <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>
>>>>>>>>>>>> lists the title of this reference as "Ouroboros Praos: An
>>>>>>>>>>>> adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake protocol", but
>>>>>>>>>>>> when we click the "PDF" box on the page, the title of the PDF version
>>>>>>>>>>>> of the paper has one word different ("protocol" vs. "blockchain"):
>>>>>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake
>>>>>>>>>>>> blockchain".  How should the title be updated in this reference?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> [DGKR18]   David, B., Gazi, P., Kiayias, A., and A. Russell,
>>>>>>>>>>>>         "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous
>>>>>>>>>>>>         proof-of-stake protocol", in Advances in Cryptology -
>>>>>>>>>>>>         EUROCRYPT, 2018, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 22) <!-- [rfced] [GNPRVZ15]:  This listing is the only "eprint.iacr.org"
>>>>>>>>>>>> listing to provide a direct link to the PDF copy.  Should all
>>>>>>>>>>>> "eprint.iacr.org" URLs in this document be updated to point to
>>>>>>>>>>>> the PDF copy, or should the ".pdf" be removed from this link?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> [GNPRVZ15] Goldberg, S., Naor, M., Papadopoulos, D., Reyzin, L.,
>>>>>>>>>>>>         Vasant, S., and A. Ziv, "NSEC5: Provably Preventing DNSSEC
>>>>>>>>>>>>         Zone Enumeration", in NDSS, 2015,
>>>>>>>>>>>>         <https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/582.pdf>. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 23) <!-- [rfced] [X25519]:  We see that the provided URL resolves to what
>>>>>>>>>>>> appears to be a personal website.  Please confirm that this page is
>>>>>>>>>>>> stable and will continue to be available to readers.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Original:
>>>>>>>>>>>> [X25519]   Bernstein, D.J., "How do I validate Curve25519 public
>>>>>>>>>>>>         keys?", 2006, <https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate>. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 24) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> online Style Guide at
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and let us know if any changes are needed.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this
>>>>>>>>>>>> should still be reviewed as a best practice. -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 25) <!-- [rfced] Please let us know if any changes are needed for the
>>>>>>>>>>>> following:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> a) The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in this
>>>>>>>>>>>> document.  Please let us know which form is preferred.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> INVALID / "INVALID"
>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., 'may output INVALID', 'output "INVALID" and stop')
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> VALID / "VALID"
>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., '(VALID, beta1)', '("VALID", beta_string)')
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> b) As ptLen is defined as "length, in octets, of a point on E", it
>>>>>>>>>>>> appears that ptLen would be pronounced as either "pee-tee-len" or
>>>>>>>>>>>> "point-len".  We changed the two instances of "an ptLen" to "a ptLen"
>>>>>>>>>>>> accordingly.  Please let us know any concerns.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> c) Should spacing be made consistent for the following?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> ctr = 1
>>>>>>>>>>>> ctr=1
>>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr, 1)
>>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr,1)
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Please note that in the context of "ctr" the use of spaces between
>>>>>>>>>>>> entries appears to be more common; we suggest adding spaces
>>>>>>>>>>>> for these items (e.g., ctr = 1, (ctr, 1)).
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 2^(8qLen)>q
>>>>>>>>>>>> 2^qlen > q
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> d) Last paragraph of Section 5.4.5:  For consistency, should numerals
>>>>>>>>>>>> or spelled-out numbers be used for the following?
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 8 bad points
>>>>>>>>>>>> two bad points
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> (If the spelled-out "eight" is preferred, we will also change
>>>>>>>>>>>> "5 list elements" to "five list elements".) -->
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *****IMPORTANT*****
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Updated 2023/04/17
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Author(s):
>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Instructions for Completing AUTH48
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Your document has now entered AUTH48.  Once it has been reviewed and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> approved by you and all coauthors, it will be published as an RFC.  
>>>>>>>>>>>>> If an author is no longer available, there are several remedies 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> available as listed in the FAQ (https://www.rfc-editor.org/faq/).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You and you coauthors are responsible for engaging other parties 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., Contributors or Working Group) as necessary before providing 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> your approval.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Planning your review 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ---------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the following aspects of your document:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  RFC Editor questions
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review and resolve any questions raised by the RFC Editor 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that have been included in the XML file as comments marked as 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> follows:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <!-- [rfced] ... -->
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> These questions will also be sent in a subsequent email.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Changes submitted by coauthors 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please ensure that you review any changes submitted by your 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> coauthors.  We assume that if you do not speak up that you 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> agree to changes submitted by your coauthors.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Content 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the full content of the document, as this cannot 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> change once the RFC is published.  Please pay particular attention to:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> - IANA considerations updates (if applicable)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> - contact information
>>>>>>>>>>>>> - references
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Copyright notices and legends
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the copyright notice and legends as defined in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC 5378 and the Trust Legal Provisions 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (TLP – https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info/).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Semantic markup
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the markup in the XML file to ensure that elements of  
>>>>>>>>>>>>> content are correctly tagged.  For example, ensure that <sourcecode> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and <artwork> are set correctly.  See details at 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://authors.ietf.org/rfcxml-vocabulary>.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Formatted output
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the PDF, HTML, and TXT files to ensure that the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> formatted output, as generated from the markup in the XML file, is 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasonable.  Please note that the TXT will have formatting 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> limitations compared to the PDF and HTML.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Submitting changes
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> To submit changes, please reply to this email using ‘REPLY ALL’ as all 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the parties CCed on this message need to see your changes. The parties 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> include:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  your coauthors
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org (the RPC team)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  other document participants, depending on the stream (e.g., 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>  IETF Stream participants are your working group chairs, the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>  responsible ADs, and the document shepherd).
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  auth48archive@rfc-editor.org, which is a new archival mailing list 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>  to preserve AUTH48 conversations; it is not an active discussion 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>  list:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  More info:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/yb6lpIGh-4Q9l2USxIAe6P8O4Zc
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  The archive itself:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/auth48archive/
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *  Note: If only absolutely necessary, you may temporarily opt out 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>    of the archiving of messages (e.g., to discuss a sensitive matter).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>    If needed, please add a note at the top of the message that you 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>    have dropped the address. When the discussion is concluded, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>    auth48archive@rfc-editor.org will be re-added to the CC list and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>    its addition will be noted at the top of the message. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You may submit your changes in one of two ways:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> An update to the provided XML file
>>>>>>>>>>>>> — OR —
>>>>>>>>>>>>> An explicit list of changes in this format
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Section # (or indicate Global)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> OLD:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> old text
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> NEW:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> new text
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You do not need to reply with both an updated XML file and an explicit 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> list of changes, as either form is sufficient.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We will ask a stream manager to review and approve any changes that seem
>>>>>>>>>>>>> beyond editorial in nature, e.g., addition of new text, deletion of text, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and technical changes.  Information about stream managers can be found in 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the FAQ.  Editorial changes do not require approval from a stream manager.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Approving for publication
>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> To approve your RFC for publication, please reply to this email stating
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that you approve this RFC for publication.  Please use ‘REPLY ALL’,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> as all the parties CCed on this message need to see your approval.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Files 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The files are available here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diff file of the text:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html (side by side)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This diff file compares an altered original and the RFC (in order 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> to make the changes in the moved "Contributors" viewable):
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Diff of the XML: 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tracking progress
>>>>>>>>>>>>> -----------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The details of the AUTH48 status of your document are here:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Please let us know if you have any questions.  
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your cooperation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------------------------
>>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Title            : Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Author(s)        : S. Goldberg, L. Reyzin, D. Papadopoulos, J. Včelák
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml>
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml>
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> Sharon Goldberg
>>>>>> Computer Science, Boston University
>>>>>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> ---
>>> Sharon Goldberg
>>> Computer Science, Boston University
>>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe
>> 
>> 
> 
>