Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")
Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> Wed, 16 August 2023 22:04 UTC
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From: Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com>
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Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 15:04:05 -0700
Cc: "Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)" <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org>, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com>, Leonid Reyzin <leonid.reyzin@gmail.com>, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com>, Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk>, IRSG <irsg@irtf.org>, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com>, Nick Sullivan <nick@cloudflare.com>, "rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org" <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>, auth48archive@rfc-editor.org
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To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was "Re: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15> for your review")
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Hi, Chris. So noted: https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383 Thank you! RFC Editor/lb > On Aug 16, 2023, at 2:39 PM, Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote: > > Thanks, Lynne. I approve publication of RFC9383. > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On Aug 16, 2023, at 5:19 PM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >> >> Dear Chris, Eliot, Sharon, Leonid, and Tim, >> >> Thank you for your replies. We have updated RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 to use "Prover" and "Verifier". >> >> ** RFC-to-be 9381: The latest files are posted here. Please refresh your browser: >> >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html >> >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >> >> >> ** RFC-to-be 9383: The latest files are posted here. Please refresh your browser: >> >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.txt >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.pdf >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383.xml >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-diff.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-rfcdiff.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-auth48diff.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastdiff.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-lastrfcdiff.html >> >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff1.html >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9383-xmldiff2.html >> >> We will continue the publication process for RFC-to-be 9381. >> >> RFC-to-be 9383 will be published when RFC-to-be 9382 is published, as noted on <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9383>. >> >> Thanks again! >> >> RFC Editor/lb >> >> >>> On Aug 16, 2023, at 8:06 AM, Tim Taubert <ttaubert@apple.com> wrote: >>> >>> Capitalized is fine to me as well. Thanks! >>> >>> — Tim >>> >>> >>>>> On 16. Aug 2023, at 02:48, Leonid Reyzin <leonid.reyzin@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Agreed. Capitalized makes more sense to me, but I don't feel strongly. Thanks for catching! >>>> >>>> Since my email forwarding seems wonky still, can you contact me at leonid.reyzin@gmail.com instead of @bu? >> >>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 3:55 PM, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> I agree with Chris. Go with capitals. >>> >>> Thanks >>> Sharon >> >>> On Aug 15, 2023, at 1:53 PM, Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear) <rfc-ise@rfc-editor.org> wrote: >>> >>> I generally prefer lowercase - we're not writing legal contracts here, but the authors can have the final say, so long as they agree. >>> >>> Eliot >>> >>>> On 15.08.23 22:42, Lynne Bartholomew wrote: >>>> Hi, Chris and *Eliot. >>>> >>>> Chris, thank you for the quick reply! We'll wait a bit to see if anyone objects; if not, we'll update per your note. >>>> >>>> *Eliot, as ISE for RFC-to-be 9383, please let us know if you're OK with us updating per Chris's note. >>>> >>>> Thanks again! >>>> >>>> RFC Editor/lb >> >>> >>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 4:34 PM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote: >>> Hi Lynne, >>> >>> Specifications I've worked with in the past have capitalized these sorts of terms as proper nouns, but I don't think it really matters much. If we need to choose, and assuming no one else cares strongly, I would go with Prover and Verifier. >>> >>> Best, >>> Chris >>> >>>> On Tue, Aug 15, 2023, at 3:09 PM, Lynne Bartholomew wrote: >>>> Dear authors of RFCs-to-be 9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) and 9383 >>>> (draft-bar-cfrg-spake2plus-08), >>>> >>>> Apologies, but while preparing RFC-to-be 9381 for publication, we found >>>> two items that we had previously flagged internally for these two >>>> documents but that were not conveyed to you when these documents were >>>> moved to the AUTH48 state last Spring: >>>> >>>> These documents use both "prover" and "Prover", and both "verifier" and >>>> "Verifier" (e.g., "the prover", "the Prover", "the verifier", "the >>>> Verifier"). >>>> >>>> We believe that usage (capitalization or not) for these terms within >>>> and between these documents should be consistent. Please let us know >>>> which form is preferred for each. >>>> >>>> Thank you, and again, apologies for not asking about this earlier. >>>> >>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>> >>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 10:13 AM, Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear Dimitris, Sharon, and Jan, >>>>> >>>>> We have noted your approvals on the AUTH48 status page: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 >>>>> >>>>> As this document is part of Cluster C450 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C450) and normatively depends on RFC-to-be 9380 (draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve), this document will be published when RFC-to-be 9380 is published. You can follow the progress of RFC-to-be 9380 at <https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9380>. >>>>> >>>>> Thank you! >>>>> >>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On May 22, 2023, at 1:43 AM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you for the edits, everyone. The document looks good to me. I >>>>>> also approve it for publication. >>>>>> >>>>>> Jan >>>>> >>>>>> On May 20, 2023, at 8:50 AM, Sharon Goldberg <sharon.goldbe@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you, I approve this as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, May 20, 2023 at 4:05 AM Dimitrios Papadopoulos <dipapado@cse.ust.hk> wrote: >>>>>> Many thanks for the detailed editing. >>>>>> >>>>>> I also approve its publication. >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> -Dimitris >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 19 May 2023, at 11:52 PM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thank you! I now approve it for publication. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (NB: Jan, Sharon, Dimitris: you each need to send your approval before it can be published.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, May 18, 2023 at 6:29 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>>> Hi, Leo. No worries! Fixed, and the latest files are posted here. Please refresh your browser: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thank you! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On May 17, 2023, at 3:00 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Oh, so sorry for that bug. It should be 3.2.1.3. Could you please fix that? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 4:00 AM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> Dear Leo, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thank you for the latest updated XML file as well! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks also for the working NIST URL. We updated the reference listing accordingly. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, please note that the NIST document associated with this URL does not have a Section 3.1.2.3. Which section should be cited in the following sentence (from Section 5.5 of this document)? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> * The EC group G is the NIST P-256 elliptic curve, with the finite >>>>>>>> field and curve parameters as specified in Section 3.1.2.3 of >>>>>>>> [SP-800-186] and Section 2.6 of [RFC5114]. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We have posted the latest files here: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastdiff.html >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-lastrfcdiff.html >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks again! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On May 12, 2023, at 7:43 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks so much for the quick turnaround! I made the change I had failed to make the previous time; fixed another nit for clarity; changed the mailing addresses for two of the authors; and provided an alternative URL for the NIST document. All new changes are annotated with [auth48response] in the attached xml file. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Leo >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 8:31 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>> Dear Leo, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for the updated XML file! The updates and your notes were most helpful. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Regarding this item: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> <!-- [auth48response] Removed "four" becuase it's incorrect. Added "to" before >>>>>>>>> "each other". ... >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> We did not see this update. Should "unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs" be changed to "unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs"? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Regarding your note related to the stability of [X25519]: Thank you for the information. We left as is; seventeen years seems a good track record and indicates that it should remain stable. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here (please refresh your browser): >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-auth48diff.html >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff2.html >>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks again! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On May 10, 2023, at 10:58 AM, Leonid Reyzin <reyzin@bu.edu> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Dear Lynne et al., >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Attaching the updated XML file. Responses to edits / comments, as well as a few new minor edits, are explained in the comments prefixed with [auth48response]. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thank you very much for such a thorough pass through the document and for all the excellent suggestions! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Sincerely, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Leo >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 5:40 PM Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Hi, Jan. Thank you for checking in with us! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 26, 2023, at 10:19 PM, Jan Včelák <jvcelak@ns1.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hello Lynne. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thank you. We will look at the questions and get back to you soon. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Jan >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Dne pá 21. 4. 2023 20:13 uživatel Lynne Bartholomew <lbartholomew@amsl.com> napsal: >>>>>>>>>>> Dear authors, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Checking in with you regarding the status of this document. Please review the questions below, and let us know how this document should be updated. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The latest files are posted here: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The AUTH48 status page is here: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thank you! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, at 11:03 PM, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Authors, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) the following questions, which are also in the XML file. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 1) <!-- [rfced] Please ensure that the guidelines listed in >>>>>>>>>>>> Section 2.1 of RFC 5743 have been adhered to in this document. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 2) <!-- [rfced] Would you like the references to be listed in >>>>>>>>>>>> alphanumeric order? --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 3) <!-- [rfced] Jan: We have seen both "Vcelak" and "Včelák" >>>>>>>>>>>> in recent RFCs-to-be. Please let us know your preference. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 4) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5: We could not find anything in Section 3.4 >>>>>>>>>>>> that indicates that pseudorandomness cannot hold against malicious >>>>>>>>>>>> key generation. Please confirm that this section number is correct and >>>>>>>>>>>> will be clear to readers. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> As explained in Section 3.4, pseudorandomness cannot hold against >>>>>>>>>>>> malicious key generation. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 5) <!-- [rfced] Sections 4.2 and 5.2: Is pi_string sometimes known to >>>>>>>>>>>> have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove (in which case "only on a >>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string value that is known to have been produced by >>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_prove" would be correct), or always (in which case "only on >>>>>>>>>>>> pi_string, which is known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove" >>>>>>>>>>>> would be correct)? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is >>>>>>>>>>>> known to have been produced by RSAFDHVRF_prove, or from within >>>>>>>>>>>> RSAFDHVRF_verify as specified in Section 4.3. >>>>>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_proof_to_hash should be run only on pi_string that is known >>>>>>>>>>>> to have been produced by ECVRF_prove, or from within ECVRF_verify >>>>>>>>>>>> as specified in Section 5.3. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 6) <!-- [rfced] Section 5: We don't see any mention of the field F in >>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5. Please confirm that this listing will be clear to >>>>>>>>>>>> readers. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> Fixed options (specified in Section 5.5): >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> F - finite field --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 7) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.1.1: This sentence does not parse. If the >>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify >>>>>>>>>>>> "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified"* and >>>>>>>>>>>> "roughly half hash_string values". >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> * We see "interpret_hash_value_as_a_point - a function that attempts" >>>>>>>>>>>> earlier in this section.) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> Note even though the loop is infinite as written, and >>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, >>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions specified in Section 5.5 >>>>>>>>>>>> will succeed on roughly half hash_string values. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested (we could not find evidence of multiple >>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point functions): >>>>>>>>>>>> Note that even though the loop is infinite as written and >>>>>>>>>>>> int_to_string(ctr,1) may fail when ctr reaches 256, the >>>>>>>>>>>> interpret_hash_value_as_a_point function, as specified in >>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.5, will succeed on roughly half of the hash_string >>>>>>>>>>>> values. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 8) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1: This sentence is confusing as written, >>>>>>>>>>>> because the ECVRF_nonce_generation function is not specified in >>>>>>>>>>>> [RFC6979]. If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the >>>>>>>>>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is as specified in [RFC6979] >>>>>>>>>>>> Section 3.2 where >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>> The ECVRF_nonce_generation function is implemented per the process >>>>>>>>>>>> specified in Section 3.2 of [RFC6979], where --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 9) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.2.1: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> a) Please confirm that "output length hlen" is correct (i.e., should >>>>>>>>>>>> not be "output length hLen"). We ask because this is the only >>>>>>>>>>>> instance of "hlen" in this document. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Is this something that should be clarified, along the lines of the >>>>>>>>>>>> "this qlen is not to be confused with qLen" text a few lines later? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> The hash function H is Hash and its output length hlen (in bits) >>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8 >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Possibly: >>>>>>>>>>>> * The hash function H is Hash, and its output length hlen (in bits) >>>>>>>>>>>> is set as hLen*8 (this hlen is not to be confused with hLen, >>>>>>>>>>>> which is used in this document to represent the length of Hash in >>>>>>>>>>>> octets). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> b) The last bullet item in this list was the only sentence fragment. >>>>>>>>>>>> We added a verb ("are"). If this is incorrect, please let us know >>>>>>>>>>>> how we can make this list parallel (i.e., either all sentence >>>>>>>>>>>> fragments or all complete sentences). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> All the other values and primitives as defined in [RFC6979] >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Currently: >>>>>>>>>>>> * All the other values and primitives are as defined in [RFC6979]. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 10) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: We changed "given to this procedure" to >>>>>>>>>>>> "used in this procedure" here. If this is incorrect, please provide >>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying text. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: the public key Y given to this procedure MUST be a >>>>>>>>>>>> valid point on E. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Currently: >>>>>>>>>>>> Important note: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The public key Y used in this procedure MUST be a valid point on >>>>>>>>>>>> E. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 11) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: Does "in order to" refer to clearing >>>>>>>>>>>> the x-coordinate or something else? If the suggested text is not >>>>>>>>>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4), >>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad >>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared >>>>>>>>>>>> in step 3, in order to make sure that it does not affect the >>>>>>>>>>>> comparison. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, bad_pk[0] (of order 4), >>>>>>>>>>>> bad_pk[2] (of order 8), and bad_pk[3] (of order 8) each match two bad >>>>>>>>>>>> points, depending on the sign of the x-coordinate, which was cleared >>>>>>>>>>>> in Step 3 in order to make sure that it does not affect the >>>>>>>>>>>> comparison. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 12) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.4.5: Please confirm that "their y-coordinate" >>>>>>>>>>>> should not be "their y-coordinates" here. We ask because of the >>>>>>>>>>>> plural "Their y-coordinates" in the third sentence of this paragraph. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> There is no need to >>>>>>>>>>>> shift the other bad_pk values by p (or any bad_pk values by a larger >>>>>>>>>>>> multiple of p), because their y coordinate would exceed 2^255; and we >>>>>>>>>>>> ensure that y_string corresponds to an integer less than 2^255 in >>>>>>>>>>>> step 3.) --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 13) <!-- [rfced] Section 5.5: This sentence is confusing as written, >>>>>>>>>>>> because the int_to_string function is not specified in [RFC8032]. >>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify the meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> * The int_to_string function as specified in the first paragraph of >>>>>>>>>>>> Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>> * The int_to_string function is implemented as specified in the >>>>>>>>>>>> first paragraph of Section 5.1.2 of [RFC8032]. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 14) <!-- [rfced] Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3: We had trouble following >>>>>>>>>>>> this sentence. Does "the modulus n or the exponent e are chosen not >>>>>>>>>>>> in compliance with [RFC8017]" mean "the modulus n or the exponent e >>>>>>>>>>>> is not chosen, in compliance with [RFC8017]" or >>>>>>>>>>>> "the modulus n or the exponent e is chosen without complying >>>>>>>>>>>> with [RFC8017]" or otherwise? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> Thus, for RSA-FDH-VRF, uniqueness and >>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance may not hold if the keys are generated >>>>>>>>>>>> adversarially (specifically, if the RSA function specified in the >>>>>>>>>>>> public key is not bijective because the modulus n or the exponent e >>>>>>>>>>>> are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017]); thus, RSA-FDH-VRF >>>>>>>>>>>> defined in this document does not have "full uniqueness" and "full >>>>>>>>>>>> collision resistance". >>>>>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>>>>> (Specifically, the >>>>>>>>>>>> VRF output may be predictable if the RSA function specified in the >>>>>>>>>>>> public key is far from bijective because the modulus n or the >>>>>>>>>>>> exponent e are chosen not in compliance with [RFC8017].) --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 15) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.2: We found the phrasing in these sentences >>>>>>>>>>>> confusing, as the text appears to indicate that the equations in >>>>>>>>>>>> question can be found in the cited documents. >>>>>>>>>>>> If the suggested updates would preserve your intended meaning, may we >>>>>>>>>>>> rephrase? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> * For trusted collision resistance: approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2) >>>>>>>>>>>> (as shown in [PWHVNRG17]). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> * For selective pseudorandomness: approximately as strong as the >>>>>>>>>>>> security, in bits, of the RSA problem for the key (n, e) (as shown >>>>>>>>>>>> in [GNPRVZ15]). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> As shown in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, measured in >>>>>>>>>>>> bits, is as follows (in the random oracle model for the functions >>>>>>>>>>>> Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>> For trusted collision resistance (as discussed in [PWHVNRG17]): >>>>>>>>>>>> approximately 8*min(k/2, hLen/2). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> For selective pseudorandomness (as discussed in [GNPRVZ15]: >>>>>>>>>>>> approximately as strong as the security, in bits, of the RSA >>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the key (n, e). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> As discussed in [PWHVNRG17], the security level of the ECVRF, >>>>>>>>>>>> measured in bits, would be as follows (in the random oracle model >>>>>>>>>>>> for the functions Hash and ECVRF_encode_to_curve): --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 16) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.3: Please confirm that "loose", and not >>>>>>>>>>>> "lossy", is correct here. We ask because we see "lossier security >>>>>>>>>>>> reduction" in Appendix B of [PWHVNRG17] but do not see any words >>>>>>>>>>>> that have "loose" in them in that document. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> * They may increase security parameters to make up for the loose >>>>>>>>>>>> security reduction. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 17) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.5: Does "must run in time independent of" >>>>>>>>>>>> mean "must run in a time that is independent of", or does >>>>>>>>>>>> "independent" refer to "run" (in which case it should be >>>>>>>>>>>> "independently")? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (Please note that this question has also been raised for "run in time >>>>>>>>>>>> independent of" as also found in companion document >>>>>>>>>>>> draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve.) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF-P256-SHA256-SSWU and ECVRF-EDWARDS25519-SHA512-ELL2 can be made >>>>>>>>>>>> to run in time independent of alpha, following recommendations in >>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 18) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.8: We had trouble following several sentences >>>>>>>>>>>> in this section. Please review the following. If the suggestions >>>>>>>>>>>> below are not correct, please clarify the following: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the four inputs (where are these defined?) >>>>>>>>>>>> to equal each other or to any inputs (to be equal to?) >>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the input (plural "octets", singular "input") >>>>>>>>>>>> second octets of the inputs (plural "octets", plural "inputs") >>>>>>>>>>>> last octet of the input (singular "octet", singular "input") >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds >>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs >>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are >>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to equal each other or to any inputs given to >>>>>>>>>>>> the hash function for the same SK and different alpha. This is >>>>>>>>>>>> indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this document, because >>>>>>>>>>>> the second octets of the input to the hash function used in MGF1 and >>>>>>>>>>>> in proof_to_hash are different. >>>>>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>>>>> * the second octets of the inputs to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different. >>>>>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>>>>> * the last octet of the input to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero, and therefore >>>>>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the input to the hash function >>>>>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the >>>>>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag by >>>>>>>>>>>> [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>> This analysis still holds >>>>>>>>>>>> even if the same hash function is used, as long as the four inputs >>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for a given SK and alpha are >>>>>>>>>>>> overwhelmingly unlikely to be equal to each other or to any inputs >>>>>>>>>>>> given to the hash function for the same SK and different alpha. >>>>>>>>>>>> This is indeed the case for the RSA-FDH-VRF defined in this >>>>>>>>>>>> document, because the second octet of the inputs to the hash >>>>>>>>>>>> function used in MGF1 and in proof_to_hash are different. >>>>>>>>>>>> ... >>>>>>>>>>>> * The second octet of the inputs to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment are all different. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> * The last octet of the inputs to the hash function used in >>>>>>>>>>>> proof_to_hash, challenge_generation, and >>>>>>>>>>>> encode_to_curve_try_and_increment is always zero and is therefore >>>>>>>>>>>> different from the last octet of the inputs to the hash function >>>>>>>>>>>> used in ECVRF_encode_to_curve_h2c_suite, which is set equal to the >>>>>>>>>>>> nonzero length of the domain separation tag per [RFC9380]. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 19) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.9: This sentence does not parse. If the >>>>>>>>>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify "if a group of public >>>>>>>>>>>> keys to share the same salt" and "group of public keys, which may aid >>>>>>>>>>>> in some protocol". >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys to share the >>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for >>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys, which may aid in some protocol that >>>>>>>>>>>> uses the VRF. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Suggested: >>>>>>>>>>>> For example, if a group of public keys shares the >>>>>>>>>>>> same salt, then the hash of the VRF input alpha will be the same for >>>>>>>>>>>> the entire group of public keys; this can be helpful for any >>>>>>>>>>>> protocol that uses the VRF. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 20) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.10: It appears that one or more words were >>>>>>>>>>>> missing in this sentence. We added the words "to the" as shown below. >>>>>>>>>>>> If this is incorrect, please provide clarifying text. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs ECVRF_encode_to_curve hash >>>>>>>>>>>> function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different from >>>>>>>>>>>> other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the prover >>>>>>>>>>>> depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the prover >>>>>>>>>>>> will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as >>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Currently: >>>>>>>>>>>> For the ECVRF, the inputs to the ECVRF_encode_to_curve >>>>>>>>>>>> hash function used in producing H are then guaranteed to be different >>>>>>>>>>>> from other ciphersuites; since all the other hashing done by the >>>>>>>>>>>> prover depends on H, inputs to all the hash functions used by the >>>>>>>>>>>> prover will also be different from other ciphersuites as long as >>>>>>>>>>>> ECVRF_encode_to_curve is collision resistant. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 21) <!-- [rfced] [DGKR18]: We see that <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573> >>>>>>>>>>>> lists the title of this reference as "Ouroboros Praos: An >>>>>>>>>>>> adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake protocol", but >>>>>>>>>>>> when we click the "PDF" box on the page, the title of the PDF version >>>>>>>>>>>> of the paper has one word different ("protocol" vs. "blockchain"): >>>>>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake >>>>>>>>>>>> blockchain". How should the title be updated in this reference? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> [DGKR18] David, B., Gazi, P., Kiayias, A., and A. Russell, >>>>>>>>>>>> "Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous >>>>>>>>>>>> proof-of-stake protocol", in Advances in Cryptology - >>>>>>>>>>>> EUROCRYPT, 2018, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573>. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 22) <!-- [rfced] [GNPRVZ15]: This listing is the only "eprint.iacr.org" >>>>>>>>>>>> listing to provide a direct link to the PDF copy. Should all >>>>>>>>>>>> "eprint.iacr.org" URLs in this document be updated to point to >>>>>>>>>>>> the PDF copy, or should the ".pdf" be removed from this link? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> [GNPRVZ15] Goldberg, S., Naor, M., Papadopoulos, D., Reyzin, L., >>>>>>>>>>>> Vasant, S., and A. Ziv, "NSEC5: Provably Preventing DNSSEC >>>>>>>>>>>> Zone Enumeration", in NDSS, 2015, >>>>>>>>>>>> <https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/582.pdf>. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 23) <!-- [rfced] [X25519]: We see that the provided URL resolves to what >>>>>>>>>>>> appears to be a personal website. Please confirm that this page is >>>>>>>>>>>> stable and will continue to be available to readers. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Original: >>>>>>>>>>>> [X25519] Bernstein, D.J., "How do I validate Curve25519 public >>>>>>>>>>>> keys?", 2006, <https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate>. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 24) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the >>>>>>>>>>>> online Style Guide at >>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>, >>>>>>>>>>>> and let us know if any changes are needed. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this >>>>>>>>>>>> should still be reviewed as a best practice. --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 25) <!-- [rfced] Please let us know if any changes are needed for the >>>>>>>>>>>> following: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> a) The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in this >>>>>>>>>>>> document. Please let us know which form is preferred. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> INVALID / "INVALID" >>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., 'may output INVALID', 'output "INVALID" and stop') >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> VALID / "VALID" >>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., '(VALID, beta1)', '("VALID", beta_string)') >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> b) As ptLen is defined as "length, in octets, of a point on E", it >>>>>>>>>>>> appears that ptLen would be pronounced as either "pee-tee-len" or >>>>>>>>>>>> "point-len". We changed the two instances of "an ptLen" to "a ptLen" >>>>>>>>>>>> accordingly. Please let us know any concerns. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> c) Should spacing be made consistent for the following? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ctr = 1 >>>>>>>>>>>> ctr=1 >>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr, 1) >>>>>>>>>>>> (ctr,1) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Please note that in the context of "ctr" the use of spaces between >>>>>>>>>>>> entries appears to be more common; we suggest adding spaces >>>>>>>>>>>> for these items (e.g., ctr = 1, (ctr, 1)). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 2^(8qLen)>q >>>>>>>>>>>> 2^qlen > q >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> d) Last paragraph of Section 5.4.5: For consistency, should numerals >>>>>>>>>>>> or spelled-out numbers be used for the following? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 8 bad points >>>>>>>>>>>> two bad points >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (If the spelled-out "eight" is preferred, we will also change >>>>>>>>>>>> "5 list elements" to "five list elements".) --> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Apr 17, 2023, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *****IMPORTANT***** >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Updated 2023/04/17 >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Author(s): >>>>>>>>>>>>> -------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Instructions for Completing AUTH48 >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Your document has now entered AUTH48. Once it has been reviewed and >>>>>>>>>>>>> approved by you and all coauthors, it will be published as an RFC. >>>>>>>>>>>>> If an author is no longer available, there are several remedies >>>>>>>>>>>>> available as listed in the FAQ (https://www.rfc-editor.org/faq/). >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> You and you coauthors are responsible for engaging other parties >>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g., Contributors or Working Group) as necessary before providing >>>>>>>>>>>>> your approval. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Planning your review >>>>>>>>>>>>> --------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the following aspects of your document: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * RFC Editor questions >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review and resolve any questions raised by the RFC Editor >>>>>>>>>>>>> that have been included in the XML file as comments marked as >>>>>>>>>>>>> follows: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> <!-- [rfced] ... --> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> These questions will also be sent in a subsequent email. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * Changes submitted by coauthors >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Please ensure that you review any changes submitted by your >>>>>>>>>>>>> coauthors. We assume that if you do not speak up that you >>>>>>>>>>>>> agree to changes submitted by your coauthors. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * Content >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the full content of the document, as this cannot >>>>>>>>>>>>> change once the RFC is published. Please pay particular attention to: >>>>>>>>>>>>> - IANA considerations updates (if applicable) >>>>>>>>>>>>> - contact information >>>>>>>>>>>>> - references >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * Copyright notices and legends >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the copyright notice and legends as defined in >>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC 5378 and the Trust Legal Provisions >>>>>>>>>>>>> (TLP – https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info/). >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * Semantic markup >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the markup in the XML file to ensure that elements of >>>>>>>>>>>>> content are correctly tagged. For example, ensure that <sourcecode> >>>>>>>>>>>>> and <artwork> are set correctly. See details at >>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://authors.ietf.org/rfcxml-vocabulary>. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * Formatted output >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Please review the PDF, HTML, and TXT files to ensure that the >>>>>>>>>>>>> formatted output, as generated from the markup in the XML file, is >>>>>>>>>>>>> reasonable. Please note that the TXT will have formatting >>>>>>>>>>>>> limitations compared to the PDF and HTML. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Submitting changes >>>>>>>>>>>>> ------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> To submit changes, please reply to this email using ‘REPLY ALL’ as all >>>>>>>>>>>>> the parties CCed on this message need to see your changes. The parties >>>>>>>>>>>>> include: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * your coauthors >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org (the RPC team) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * other document participants, depending on the stream (e.g., >>>>>>>>>>>>> IETF Stream participants are your working group chairs, the >>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible ADs, and the document shepherd). >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * auth48archive@rfc-editor.org, which is a new archival mailing list >>>>>>>>>>>>> to preserve AUTH48 conversations; it is not an active discussion >>>>>>>>>>>>> list: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * More info: >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/yb6lpIGh-4Q9l2USxIAe6P8O4Zc >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * The archive itself: >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/auth48archive/ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * Note: If only absolutely necessary, you may temporarily opt out >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the archiving of messages (e.g., to discuss a sensitive matter). >>>>>>>>>>>>> If needed, please add a note at the top of the message that you >>>>>>>>>>>>> have dropped the address. When the discussion is concluded, >>>>>>>>>>>>> auth48archive@rfc-editor.org will be re-added to the CC list and >>>>>>>>>>>>> its addition will be noted at the top of the message. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> You may submit your changes in one of two ways: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> An update to the provided XML file >>>>>>>>>>>>> — OR — >>>>>>>>>>>>> An explicit list of changes in this format >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Section # (or indicate Global) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> OLD: >>>>>>>>>>>>> old text >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> NEW: >>>>>>>>>>>>> new text >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> You do not need to reply with both an updated XML file and an explicit >>>>>>>>>>>>> list of changes, as either form is sufficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> We will ask a stream manager to review and approve any changes that seem >>>>>>>>>>>>> beyond editorial in nature, e.g., addition of new text, deletion of text, >>>>>>>>>>>>> and technical changes. Information about stream managers can be found in >>>>>>>>>>>>> the FAQ. Editorial changes do not require approval from a stream manager. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Approving for publication >>>>>>>>>>>>> -------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> To approve your RFC for publication, please reply to this email stating >>>>>>>>>>>>> that you approve this RFC for publication. Please use ‘REPLY ALL’, >>>>>>>>>>>>> as all the parties CCed on this message need to see your approval. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Files >>>>>>>>>>>>> ----- >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The files are available here: >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.xml >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.html >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.pdf >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381.txt >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Diff file of the text: >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-rfcdiff.html (side by side) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> This diff file compares an altered original and the RFC (in order >>>>>>>>>>>>> to make the changes in the moved "Contributors" viewable): >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-alt-diff.html >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Diff of the XML: >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9381-xmldiff1.html >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Tracking progress >>>>>>>>>>>>> ----------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The details of the AUTH48 status of your document are here: >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9381 >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Please let us know if you have any questions. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your cooperation, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC Editor/lb/ar >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>>>>> RFC9381 (draft-irtf-cfrg-vrf-15) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Title : Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) >>>>>>>>>>>>> Author(s) : S. Goldberg, L. Reyzin, D. Papadopoulos, J. Včelák >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> <rfc9381.xml> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> --- >>>>>> Sharon Goldberg >>>>>> Computer Science, Boston University >>>>>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> -- >>> --- >>> Sharon Goldberg >>> Computer Science, Boston University >>> http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe >> >> > >
- [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-cfrg-… rfc-editor
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… rfc-editor
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Christopher Wood
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9381 <draft-irtf-c… Tim Taubert
- [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 (was… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Christopher Wood
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Tim Taubert
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- [auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] Re: AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381… Independent Submissions Editor (Eliot Lear)
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] [ISE] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and… Sharon Goldberg
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Jan Včelák
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Leonid Reyzin
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Lynne Bartholomew
- Re: [auth48] AUTH48 for RFCs-to-be 9381 and 9383 … Sandy Ginoza