Re: [dmarc-ietf] DMARC alignment conflicts with RFC 5322 on the use of the From and Sender header fields

Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net> Fri, 05 June 2020 13:31 UTC

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From: Hector Santos <hsantos@isdg.net>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] DMARC alignment conflicts with RFC 5322 on the use of the From and Sender header fields
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On 6/5/2020 1:39 AM, Dotzero wrote:
>
> The goal of DMARC was (and is) to mitigate direct domain abuse.

+1, it was the goal of:

[1] The original proof of concept with DomainKeys' built-in o= policy 
tag for 1st party support, and

[2] The original DKIM draft augmented with the original SSP draft with 
extended o= tags that included 3rd party signer considerations, and

[3] My own DSAP with its full coverage of 1st party and 3rd party 
signer policies, and

[4] SSP/ASP when policy was separated from DKIM to create DKIM-BASE. 
SSP/ASP  was replaced with,

[5] ADSP which was limited to 1st party and ambiguous 3rd party signer 
support which was replaced with,

[6] DMARC with its limited 1st party only support, punting on 
addressing the 3rd party signer issue.

Short of reporting and SPF integration, DMARC did not bring any more 
to the DKIM Policy design picture.  All of the DKIM Policy proposals 
offered the same power for highly detectable, enforcible direct mail, 
exclusive and restrictive 1st policies. From day one, a few of the key 
cogs here stated for the most part, "No will ever use an exclusive 
DKIM policy, and if so, it will be an extremely narrow case with small 
guys, and we don't about them"  was the prevailing attitude about DKIM 
Policy protocols.

Thanks to a non-IETF Trade Group who filled in the abandoned IETF DKIM 
Policy ADSP model with "Super ADSP" aka DMARC, that all changed with 
domains, of all sizes, switching to restrictive, rejectable DMARC 
policy and the verifiers where beginning to honor it.  It brought the 
DKIM Policy theory into practice along with the unhandled indirect 3rd 
party resigner list problem.

> Nothing more and nothing less.

+1 for the most part.


-- 
HLS