Re: [dmarc-ietf] DMARC alignment conflicts with RFC 5322 on the use of the From and Sender header fields

Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> Sun, 07 June 2020 10:18 UTC

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From: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] DMARC alignment conflicts with RFC 5322 on the use of the From and Sender header fields
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On Sun 07/Jun/2020 00:03:28 +0200 Jim Fenton wrote:
> On 6/6/20 2:42 PM, Scott Kitterman wrote:
>> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 5:26:08 PM EDT Dave Crocker wrote:
>>> On 6/6/2020 2:23 PM, Scott Kitterman wrote:
>>>> If things like DMARC, SPF, and DKIM do nothing more than get abusers
>>>> to use different domains than they would otherwise, I think that's a
>>>> win.>>> The issue here is DMARC, not SPF or DKIM, since DMARC is the only one of
>>> the 3 that restricts the choice of domain name.
>>>
>>> With that in mind, I'll ask you why you think the kind of change you
>>> cite is a win.
>> 1.  I think the domain displayed to the end user matters.  In my sample size 
>> of 1, it matters to me.  I know I'm not the average user, but independent of 
>> the question of how many users it matters to, there are some.
> Same with me, but again I'm not the average user.


+1, but then we're mailing list subscribers (leaving aside this list's topic.)

>>
>> 2.  When abusers use different domains to send mail, it adds more information 
>> for filters to work on, so even if this is all about filtering, that works 
>> better too.
> 
> But when abusers use different domains, the DMARC policy that applies is
> controlled by them and is therefore meaningless. And the reports, if any
> (probably none), are sent back to the attacker or their designate.
> 
> Filtering might be done based on the DKIM signing domain or thesimilar
> envelope-from domain if SPF is used, but neither of those require DMARC.


The From: domain was chosen because that's the field that users can see.  Now
we conjecture that users don't actually see it.  Oh boy.  Certainly, if the
From: domain is not visible we could filter on X-Filter-On-Me: and gracefully
avoid the mailing list problem.

On closer view, we seem to be discovering that the From: domain is obscured by
the display name.  We always neglected the display name.  Furthermore, by
letting the mailing list problem be dodged by creative From: rewriting, such as

    From: User@Example.com <actually@someone.else>

we are granting full citizenship to devious display names.  Some clients (e.g.
Thunderbird) can show only display name for people in the address book.[*]  A
close, perhaps formally easier, subject is the IDN homograph attack.[†]

Would it make sense to ban, say, the use of the at sign (@) in display names?


Best
Ale
-- 

[*]
https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/names-bug-no-email-addresses-are-displayed

[†] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IDN_homograph_attack