IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [DNSOP] Questions before adopting must-not-sha1

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Wed, 01 May 2024 00:01 UTC

Return-Path: <paul@nohats.ca>
X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F38DC1654EF for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 30 Apr 2024 17:01:28 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.731
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.731 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_SOFTFAIL=0.665, URIBL_DBL_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, URIBL_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=nohats.ca
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xmpLo2i5IiYt for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 30 Apr 2024 17:01:23 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx.nohats.ca (mx.nohats.ca [193.110.157.85]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 23E68C151532 for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Tue, 30 Apr 2024 17:01:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by mx.nohats.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4VTcfm4y6kz5T4; Wed, 1 May 2024 02:01:20 +0200 (CEST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=nohats.ca; s=default; t=1714521680; bh=WLmRVUyf5gjirgi19GJboJwmXV15jwvZj7X5/7oXD8A=; h=Date:From:To:cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References; b=lj7u8zrA67vdGi4wVIxZPVk4BXH21e64EmRSnzcQEk7W2n4LIqdvkaQL7WJLPDQnu ELy3VVGbNmRACNtpuJLQsSeH3hRfst7lc8jQAd4SvL2o6sDUIMiKi9MklR9vlIIOBL 7i1l20HR6wi8g+lFMyF9xG3/dHGNRD0DmX9YkWNY=
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at mx.nohats.ca
Received: from mx.nohats.ca ([IPv6:::1]) by localhost (mx.nohats.ca [IPv6:::1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fIEEo6uzuWHr; Wed, 1 May 2024 02:01:19 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from bofh.nohats.ca (bofh.nohats.ca [193.110.157.194]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx.nohats.ca (Postfix) with ESMTPS; Wed, 1 May 2024 02:01:19 +0200 (CEST)
Received: by bofh.nohats.ca (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 9317B11DEA9A; Tue, 30 Apr 2024 20:01:18 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bofh.nohats.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FD8011DEA99; Tue, 30 Apr 2024 20:01:18 -0400 (EDT)
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 20:01:18 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <0334D9C1-F066-460A-893B-C4075FD0BE07@icann.org>
Message-ID: <dc4d8c3c-4de8-fe97-4644-36feb7dffdad@nohats.ca>
References: <D95A2D1F-1203-4434-B643-DDFB5C24A161@icann.org> <67B93EF4-6B70-402E-9D78-1A079538CA18@strandkip.nl> <m1s1Wur-0000LDC@stereo.hq.phicoh.net> <f0f9c0ce-2911-9b4c-0d60-47c204add2d4@nohats.ca> <DB9D1C93-95D1-4B76-AD74-4C60433D479A@icann.org> <7dd5f090-b8b7-ea5e-82f2-d622298c7299@nohats.ca> <ybl7cgejxcr.fsf@wd.hardakers.net> <4907A4B7-1EAE-460D-91E8-4F7D292C7302@icann.org> <ybl34r2jv3n.fsf@wd.hardakers.net> <0334D9C1-F066-460A-893B-C4075FD0BE07@icann.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"; format="flowed"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/HgQGoUF5DZiIfQj6YAlcF59NIPc>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Questions before adopting must-not-sha1
X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <dnsop.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dnsop/>
List-Post: <mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 01 May 2024 00:01:28 -0000

On Tue, 30 Apr 2024, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> Until someone can show that a reduction in collision resistance can lead to a reduction in real-world security for DNSSEC, we can wait for "MUST NOT validate", possibly forever. There is no good reason for this group to say to a zone operator who signed their zone in good faith "we are now making your zone insecure"; it's even worse for us to say to zone owners "we're forcing you to pick a different TLD if you still want to be secure".

Their zone is already made insecure by a number of OS/DNS implementation
combos. Perhaps someone with RIPE Atlas credits can run a check like the
equivalent of "dig dnskey nic.kpn +dnssec" to see how many endusers
already get insecure answers for this?

Paul

v2.35.0 | Report a Bug | By Email | System Status