Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Call for Adoption: draft-hardaker-dnsop-rfc8624-bis, must-not-sha1, must-not-ecc-gost

[Philip Homburg <[e-mail]>]

In your letter dated Thu, 2 May 2024 09:21:29 +0200 you wrote:
>In my view, it's fine to disallow signing with SHA-1-based algorithms to help 
>push signers towards other algorithms. 

I appreciate the effort, but I'm curious what that means.

As far as I know, just about all zones that start signing are not using
SHA1 as part of the signature. There is not really an issue with new
installations. The affected algorithms have been marked as not recommended
for many years so we can assume that in just about any signer they are not
the default. The problem is with existing zones who probably have an
existing relationship with signer software.

The IETF is not the protocol police so it seems unlikely that signers are
going to suddenly remove all traces of SHA1 signing and leave their users
in the dark.

Worse, if signers would do that, then there is a distinct risk that people
will just use old software.

This may have the effect that new signers will not implement these
algorithms. However, that will probably be until the first customer comes
along who requests these algorithms. Adding RSA+SHA1 is trivial if you
already have RSA+SHA2.