Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more prominent (Re: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03 preview for comment)
Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 21 August 2014 01:27 UTC
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Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 20:27:51 -0500
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Subject: Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more prominent (Re: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03 preview for comment)
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>
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On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 8:18 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote: > Personally, I think the probability that we suddenly discover > any significantly better term is negligible. Not because OS > is super-good, but rather because nothing is super-good. And > good-enough should be good-enough here. +1. OS is not an awesome term. My hope is that OS will become part of the broader culture, just like "SSL" and "TLS". That means that the term has to be accessible, even if that means it has to be terse. If OS does not become part of the broader culture then the term won't burden us much more than any other term we could pick instead, because it will at the very least become part of IETF culture. Once we're accustomed to a term, the fact that others could have been picked becomes mostly unimportant, and any imperfections of the term we do pick will not be a burden (because we'll be used to them). > In fact, I'd say so its so negligible that attempting to find > such (yet again, maybe for the 8th time?) is counterproductive. Near as I can tell there are no remaining substantive objections to Viktor's draft, only ones related to wordsmithing, writing style, and the name we'll give to this concept. All of these are a flavor of bikeshedding. We should stop arguing about such things, make just one more small effort to adjust Viktor's prose, and publish. Nico --
- Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Paul Wouters
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Nico Williams
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Dave Crocker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Scott Kitterman
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Kent
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Christian Huitema
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: [saag]: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag]: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03… Paul Wouters
- Re: [saag] : Review of: Opportunistic Security -0… Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Stephen Kent
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Theodore Ts'o
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Nico Williams
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Stephen Farrell
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Eric Burger
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Michael StJohns
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Dave Crocker
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… joel jaeggli
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… joel jaeggli
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Mark Andrews
- Re: [saag] Is traffic analysis really a target (w… Henry B (Hank) Hotz, CISSP
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Ted Hardie
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Hosnieh Rafiee
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Brian E Carpenter
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Nico Williams
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Eric Burger