RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?
Christian Huitema <huitema@microsoft.com> Sat, 23 August 2014 03:57 UTC
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From: Christian Huitema <huitema@microsoft.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Bernard Aboba <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com>
Subject: RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?
Thread-Topic: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?
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Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 03:57:22 +0000
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References: <53F548E5.2070208@cs.tcd.ie> <53F54F1C.1060405@dcrocker.net> <53F5D303.1090400@cs.tcd.ie> <CAMm+LwhmJpnU8E9ifA47baneGB=qjHzU_cy+wepPYLXrOhB+Pg@mail.gmail.com> <20140821160402.GT14392@mournblade.imrryr.org> <f5d8b5dc37b84f709c8f2df7c7a69daf@AMSPR06MB439.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com> <CAK3OfOgZzoXVnrE8Nbs6mwN2xD_snbzH9jT8TsYOVt8UASahYQ@mail.gmail.com> <a354d63505924d76a15b505e60e27a16@AMSPR06MB439.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com> <20140822140000.GE14392@mournblade.imrryr.org> <BLU181-W84354FE6BEF12305A2A7DB93D10@phx.gbl> <20140823030250.GT11085@thunk.org>
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> This assumes that the telecom carriers and/or the suppliers of the > carrier grade equipment would cooperate with the nation-states in > question. That could happen, certainly, but it becomes much more > difficult to do this surreptitiously. It is also fairly easy for OS conscious applications to use channel binding schemes and detect the MITM. At that point, the spies have to move from covert monitoring to overt surveillance, which should have some noticeable political consequences. -- Christian Huitema
- Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Paul Wouters
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Nico Williams
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Dave Crocker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Scott Kitterman
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Kent
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Christian Huitema
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: [saag]: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag]: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03… Paul Wouters
- Re: [saag] : Review of: Opportunistic Security -0… Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Stephen Kent
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Theodore Ts'o
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Nico Williams
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Stephen Farrell
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Eric Burger
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Michael StJohns
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Dave Crocker
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… joel jaeggli
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… joel jaeggli
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Mark Andrews
- Re: [saag] Is traffic analysis really a target (w… Henry B (Hank) Hotz, CISSP
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Ted Hardie
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Hosnieh Rafiee
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Brian E Carpenter
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Nico Williams
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Eric Burger