RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?

Bernard Aboba <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com> Sat, 23 August 2014 02:13 UTC

Return-Path: <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com>
X-Original-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CF3B91A702D; Fri, 22 Aug 2014 19:13:57 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.668
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.668 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_40=-0.001, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.668, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Txr3BROb5J6w; Fri, 22 Aug 2014 19:13:56 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from BLU004-OMC4S26.hotmail.com (blu004-omc4s26.hotmail.com [65.55.111.165]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AES128-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 07FA11A7026; Fri, 22 Aug 2014 19:13:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from BLU181-W84 ([65.55.111.137]) by BLU004-OMC4S26.hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(7.5.7601.22712); Fri, 22 Aug 2014 19:13:55 -0700
X-TMN: [SIea+3UaYSSLPoFoZAl+PC8nytlxN4uO]
X-Originating-Email: [bernard_aboba@hotmail.com]
Message-ID: <BLU181-W84354FE6BEF12305A2A7DB93D10@phx.gbl>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_17a9aeeb-4068-4189-9be6-f13591c80e37_"
From: Bernard Aboba <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com>
To: "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?
Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 19:13:54 -0700
Importance: Normal
In-Reply-To: <20140822140000.GE14392@mournblade.imrryr.org>
References: <CAMm+Lwh1xzaxqqnnbdgFQrR0pWknsHru8zjnjCMVjihymXtKNw@mail.gmail.com>, <alpine.LFD.2.10.1408202100590.6648@bofh.nohats.ca>, <53F548E5.2070208@cs.tcd.ie> <53F54F1C.1060405@dcrocker.net>, <53F5D303.1090400@cs.tcd.ie>, <CAMm+LwhmJpnU8E9ifA47baneGB=qjHzU_cy+wepPYLXrOhB+Pg@mail.gmail.com>, <20140821160402.GT14392@mournblade.imrryr.org>, <f5d8b5dc37b84f709c8f2df7c7a69daf@AMSPR06MB439.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com>, <CAK3OfOgZzoXVnrE8Nbs6mwN2xD_snbzH9jT8TsYOVt8UASahYQ@mail.gmail.com>, <a354d63505924d76a15b505e60e27a16@AMSPR06MB439.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com>, <20140822140000.GE14392@mournblade.imrryr.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 23 Aug 2014 02:13:55.0306 (UTC) FILETIME=[E406A4A0:01CFBE77]
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf/nGXy1kOYaNCZWvstaBTE3Rznrxw
X-BeenThere: ietf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF-Discussion <ietf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf/>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 02:13:58 -0000

> It used to be easy to dismiss opportunistic security as a waste of time, it is now clear to most that it is ....

[BA] Merely a waste of money. 
"Opportunistic unauthenticated encryption" that does not defend against man-in-the-middle attacks has no value against targeted surveillance.  So if the goal is to protect dissidents, look elsewhere.  Unfortunately, the line between "targeted surveillance" and  "mass surveillance" is a thin one.   
The value against mass surveillance is predicated on the assumption that "large scale targeted surveillance" is infeasible or that the cost of large scale meta-data collection can be increased to the point where it is too costly even for a nation-state.   
The first assertion, is likely to be proven false by the first gear to include built-in man-in-the-middle attack support.  Care to wager which appears first, carrier-class gear supporting man-in-the-middle attacks, or significant deployment of "opportunistic" encryption?  
The second assertion is likely to be proven false as soon as "opportunistic" is deployed widely enough to necessitate a surveillance budget increase (based on purchases of the above gear) necessary to defeat it.