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[IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 2.15 Authentication of the IKE SA (Was Editorial changes to RFC5996)

Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> Tue, 12 November 2013 19:40 UTC

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Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2013 21:40:38 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: Valery Smyslov <svanru@gmail.com>
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Subject: [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 2.15 Authentication of the IKE SA (Was Editorial changes to RFC5996)
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Valery Smyslov writes:
> 9. Page 49.
>     "There are two types of EAP authentication (described in
>    Section 2.16), and each type uses different values in the AUTH
>    computations shown above.  If the EAP method is key-generating,
>    substitute master session key (MSK) for the shared secret in the
>    computation.  For non-key-generating methods, substitute SK_pi and
>    SK_pr, respectively, for the shared secret in the two AUTH
>    computations."
> 
> Isn't this para superfluous here? Its content belongs to EAP
> authentication and in fact it is described in more details two pages
> below.

That text was added in the draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis-08 because of
the ticket #151:

http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/ipsecme/trac/ticket/151

Because of that I would like to get more feedback from WG before I
revert that change. I.e no changes done.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi

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