[IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 1.2. The Initial Exchanges (Was Editorial changes to RFC5996)
Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> Tue, 12 November 2013 18:55 UTC
Return-Path: <kivinen@iki.fi>
X-Original-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 57DF811E8140 for <ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 12 Nov 2013 10:55:47 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.584
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.584 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.015, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id QFlipNZWOqDM for <ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 12 Nov 2013 10:55:46 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.kivinen.iki.fi (fireball.kivinen.iki.fi [IPv6:2001:1bc8:100d::2]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3750B11E8122 for <ipsec@ietf.org>; Tue, 12 Nov 2013 10:55:44 -0800 (PST)
Received: from fireball.kivinen.iki.fi (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.kivinen.iki.fi (8.14.7/8.14.5) with ESMTP id rACItcFX023073 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 12 Nov 2013 20:55:38 +0200 (EET)
Received: (from kivinen@localhost) by fireball.kivinen.iki.fi (8.14.7/8.12.11) id rACItckD028604; Tue, 12 Nov 2013 20:55:38 +0200 (EET)
X-Authentication-Warning: fireball.kivinen.iki.fi: kivinen set sender to kivinen@iki.fi using -f
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-ID: <21122.31146.72395.590469@fireball.kivinen.iki.fi>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2013 20:55:38 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: Valery Smyslov <svanru@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <7C1EFED8998C4309B562F2224DD39AA2@buildpc>
References: <21087.60447.758422.672867@fireball.kivinen.iki.fi> <7C1EFED8998C4309B562F2224DD39AA2@buildpc>
X-Mailer: VM 8.2.0b under 24.3.1 (x86_64--netbsd)
X-Edit-Time: 18 min
X-Total-Time: 35 min
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 1.2. The Initial Exchanges (Was Editorial changes to RFC5996)
X-BeenThere: ipsec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion of IPsec protocols <ipsec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec>
List-Post: <mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2013 18:55:47 -0000
Valery Smyslov writes: > 5. Page 14, 15 and 16 > "The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the > accepted offer in an SA payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the > KEr payload if KEi was included in the request and the selected > cryptographic suite includes that group." > > "The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the > accepted offer in an SA payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the > KEr payload if the selected cryptographic suite includes that group." > > "The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the > accepted offer in an SA payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the > KEr payload if KEi was included in the request and the selected > cryptographic suite includes that group." > > All three sentencies look like they were copy-pasted and all three > lacks mention Nonce Payload. I think it should be explicitely > mentioned here, as it was mentioned in descriptions of Initiator's message, > above each of this sentencies. I agree on adding the comment about nonce in those copied sections. The reason for copying is because the original section 1.3 in RFC4306 was split 3 ways in RFC5996. > And I also think that words in parentheses here are superfluous, as > this requirement is comon for all exchanges, not only for > CREATE_CHILD_SA, and stated several times in the document. So, I > suggest to change: This was propsed for the RFC5996 already (by me :-) and there was ticket #34 opened for it and the change was not done as it was considered important to keep it there: My original email opening the issue: http://www6.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec/current/msg02953.html ticket opened by it http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/ipsecme/trac/ticket/34 and more of my comments to the issue: http://www6.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec/current/msg03155.html and I think this caused we to add definition of Message ID in the beginning of section 1.2. > "The responder replies with the accepted offer in an SA payload, > nonce in the Nr payload and a Diffie-Hellman value in the > KEr payload if KEi was included in the request and the selected > cryptographic suite includes that group." > > "The responder replies with the accepted offer in an SA payload, > nonce in the Nr payload and a Diffie-Hellman value in the > KEr payload if the selected cryptographic suite includes that group." > > "The responder replies with the accepted offer in an SA payload, > nonce in the Nr payload and a Diffie-Hellman value in the > KEr payload if KEi was included in the request and the selected > cryptographic suite includes that group." Changed: <t>The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the accepted offer in an SA payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the KEr payload if KEi was included in the request and the selected cryptographic suite includes that group.</t> ... <t>The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the accepted offer in an SA payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the KEr payload if the selected cryptographic suite includes that group. A new responder SPI is supplied in the SPI field of the SA payload.</t> ... <t>The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the accepted offer in an SA payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the KEr payload if KEi was included in the request and the selected cryptographic suite includes that group.</t> To: <t>The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the accepted offer in an SA payload, nonce in the Nr payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the KEr payload if KEi was included in the request and the selected cryptographic suite includes that group.</t> ... <t>The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the accepted offer in an SA payload, nonce in the Nr payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the KEr payload if the selected cryptographic suite includes that group. A new responder SPI is supplied in the SPI field of the SA payload.</t> ... <t>The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the accepted offer in an SA payload, nonce in the Nr, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the KEr payload if KEi was included in the request and the selected cryptographic suite includes that group.</t> -- kivinen@iki.fi
- [IPsec] Updated version of RFC5996bis Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] Updated version of RFC5996bis Paul Wouters
- Re: [IPsec] Updated version of RFC5996bis Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [IPsec] Updated version of RFC5996bis Yoav Nir
- Re: [IPsec] Updated version of RFC5996bis Paul Wouters
- Re: [IPsec] Updated version of RFC5996bis Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] Editorial changes to RFC5996 Valery Smyslov
- Re: [IPsec] Editorial changes to RFC5996 Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [IPsec] Editorial changes to RFC5996 Valery Smyslov
- Re: [IPsec] Editorial changes to RFC5996 Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [IPsec] Editorial changes to RFC5996 Yoav Nir
- Re: [IPsec] Editorial changes to RFC5996 Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [IPsec] Editorial changes to RFC5996 Valery Smyslov
- Re: [IPsec] Editorial changes to RFC5996 Yaron Sheffer
- [IPsec] One more editorial issue in RFC5996 Valery Smyslov
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 1.… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in sectio… Yaron Sheffer
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 1.… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in sectio… Valery Smyslov
- Re: [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in sectio… Yaron Sheffer
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 1.… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 1.… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 1.… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 1.… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 2.… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 2.… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 2.… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 2.… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 2.… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 3.… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis section 3.1 comment Paul Wouters
- [IPsec] RFC5996bis section 3.1 comment Tero Kivinen