[IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 2.6 IKE SA SPIs and Cookies (Was Editorial changes to RFC5996)

Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> Tue, 12 November 2013 19:09 UTC

Return-Path: <kivinen@iki.fi>
X-Original-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C21C21F9F8E for <ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 12 Nov 2013 11:09:14 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -102.585
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-102.585 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.014, BAYES_00=-2.599, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WgE7T3CLW3qX for <ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 12 Nov 2013 11:09:14 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.kivinen.iki.fi (fireball.kivinen.iki.fi [IPv6:2001:1bc8:100d::2]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D40CE11E814D for <ipsec@ietf.org>; Tue, 12 Nov 2013 11:08:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from fireball.kivinen.iki.fi (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.kivinen.iki.fi (8.14.7/8.14.5) with ESMTP id rACJ8up4000944 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 12 Nov 2013 21:08:56 +0200 (EET)
Received: (from kivinen@localhost) by fireball.kivinen.iki.fi (8.14.7/8.12.11) id rACJ8udf020538; Tue, 12 Nov 2013 21:08:56 +0200 (EET)
X-Authentication-Warning: fireball.kivinen.iki.fi: kivinen set sender to kivinen@iki.fi using -f
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-ID: <21122.31944.517406.172616@fireball.kivinen.iki.fi>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2013 21:08:56 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: Valery Smyslov <svanru@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <7C1EFED8998C4309B562F2224DD39AA2@buildpc>
References: <21087.60447.758422.672867@fireball.kivinen.iki.fi> <7C1EFED8998C4309B562F2224DD39AA2@buildpc>
X-Mailer: VM 8.2.0b under 24.3.1 (x86_64--netbsd)
X-Edit-Time: 5 min
X-Total-Time: 7 min
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: [IPsec] RFC5996bis editorial change in section 2.6 IKE SA SPIs and Cookies (Was Editorial changes to RFC5996)
X-BeenThere: ipsec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion of IPsec protocols <ipsec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec>
List-Post: <mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2013 19:09:14 -0000

Valery Smyslov writes:
> 7. Page 31.
> Phrase "(see Section 2.6)" actually references the same section. It should 
> either
> be removed or corrected.

Changed:

	<t>In the first message of an initial IKE exchange, the
	initiator will not know the responder's SPI value and will
	therefore set that field to zero. When the IKE_SA_INIT
	exchange does not result in the creation of an IKE SA due to
	INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD, NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN, or COOKIE (see <xref
	target="sect-2.6" />), the responder's SPI will be zero also
	in the response message. However, if the responder sends a
	non-zero responder SPI, the initiator should not reject the
	response for only that reason.</t>

To:

	<t>In the first message of an initial IKE exchange, the
	initiator will not know the responder's SPI value and will
	therefore set that field to zero. When the IKE_SA_INIT
	exchange does not result in the creation of an IKE SA due to
	INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD, NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN, or COOKIE, the
	responder's SPI will be zero also in the response message.
	However, if the responder sends a non-zero responder SPI, the
	initiator should not reject the response for only that
	reason.</t>

Not sure where it could point, so I removed it. And there you can also
see why it is not so easy to see it points to section itself :-)
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi