Re: [mile] Artart last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rolie-10

[Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>]

On Sun, Oct 08, 2017 at 10:08:26PM -0700, Martin Thomson wrote:
> 
> The requirements in Section 5.3 on TLS use are unnecessarily strict.  It's
> great to recommend the use of TLS 1.2, but given that the document has no real
> requirement on any particular version of TLS, the use of "MUST" here is not

I think that one could make the case that using TLS 1.2 (or higher) greatly
facilitates having a secure system, and so it could plausibly be required
by a consuming protocol.

> needed.  Similarly, the prohibition on the use of 0-RTT is groundless.  The

I am a little surprised to hear you say that this prohibition is "groundless".
Given that we require consumers of TLS 1.3 0-RTT data to explictly specify
an application profile for how it may be used, with the intent to induce
a careful analysis of the security considerations for sending early data
messages, it seems quite reasonable to me that a protocol author might
wish to defer such a painstaking analysis and take the easy choice of
prohibiting early data.

-Ben

> lengthy list of requirements around certificate validation only risk creating a
> conflict with advice in other RFCs.  Many, if not all, of these requirements