Re: [mile] Artart last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rolie-10

[Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>]

On Sat, Oct 14, 2017 at 1:20 AM, Kathleen Moriarty
<[e-mail]> wrote:
> The systems running ROLIE will be ones that enterprises will regard as
> high value assets. Replay attack and lack of forward secrecy aren't
> acceptable.  The same will be true of many other HTTP enabled
> services.  A performance gain isn't worth the trade off.

My point isn't to reject this sort of analysis, which is possibly
correct, but to point out that this analysis is one that a deployment
makes based on the circumstances

Everyone thinks that their thing is a special snowflake, and that's
OK, but you are asking for a levy on all implementations that would
prevent use of 0-RTT in all deployments.  I think that is
inappropriate.  I don't want to see every draft that the IETF ever
published making its own assessment and a policy statement regarding
this particular feature.  (We don't mandate a particular
authentication mechanism here either.)

Note that TLS 1.3 permits resumption without forward secrecy.  It's
not widely implemented that way, but it is possible.  If you care
about forward secrecy (I'm not sure that it's especially critical in
this context given the time-sensitive nature of the information you
are talking about), then you have to make statements about that as
well.  But again, I would not on the same grounds: the purpose of this
work is to define what interoperability looks like, not to legislate
deployment configuration.  Explain the trade-off and let the
operational teams do their work.