[Ntp] Antw: [EXT] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft‑gruessing‑ntp‑ntpv5‑requirements‑03.txt

Ulrich Windl <Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de> Fri, 15 October 2021 06:10 UTC

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Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 08:09:52 +0200
From: Ulrich Windl <Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de>
To: doug.arnold=40meinberg-usa.com@dmarc.ietf.org, james.ietf@gmail.com, "ntp@ietf.org" <ntp@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Ntp] Antw: [EXT] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft‑gruessing‑ntp‑ntpv5‑requirements‑03.txt
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>>> Doug Arnold <doug.arnold=40meinberg-usa.com@dmarc.ietf.org> schrieb am
15.10.2021 um 00:45 in Nachricht
<DB8PR02MB5772AC97BFE2D7C1139EFDC0CFB89@DB8PR02MB5772.eurprd02.prod.outlook.com>

> Thanks James,
> 
> I think that this is pretty close to what is needed for ntpv5.  I like the 
> separation of protocol and algorithms, and the use of monotonic timescale
for 
> timestamp fields (at least by default), and the insistence on security.
> 
> I have two comments:
> 1. Why do you think that encryption should be the default mode? People often

> consider timing information to be critical but not secret.  Also it is
likely 
> to affect accuracy in implementations by adding a variable delay to
encrypt.

When NTP is all about dirstibuting the correct time, encryption really seems
useless there.
However if someone wants to track (passively) how far off a server's time is,
encryption might make sense.

> 
> 2. I think that it is better to allow leap smearing and make it a visible 
> part of the protocol than to pretend it is not going to happen.  On this 
> topic I think that Miroslav’s proposal was more realistic.  Data center 
> network architects tell me they definitely plan to continue to do leap 
> smearing.

I'd strongly support some remote monitoring capability (preferrably being more
efficient than SNMP).
Authentication for any modification should be required, and optionally
encryption for any data exchange.

Regards,
Ulrich