Re: QUIC ossification
Jana Iyengar <jri.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 19 February 2019 23:17 UTC
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From: Jana Iyengar <jri.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 15:17:19 -0800
Message-ID: <CACpbDccFRWeSYFGu7cjdsrWAnE_6KbhpPMZJ9kzN1KviAfEGJQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: QUIC ossification
To: Roberto Peon <fenix@fb.com>
Cc: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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Roberto -- yes, that's basically what I'm proposing too, just one variant of how to go about doing it dynamically over time. On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 3:14 PM Roberto Peon <fenix@fb.com> wrote: > As others have intimated in some form or another, you can also use > multiple numbers to express “version 1”. > > > For instance, pick 64 (or some similar constant) random numbers, and call > them all version 1. > -=R > > > > *From: *QUIC <quic-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Jana Iyengar < > jri.ietf@gmail.com> > *Date: *Tuesday, February 19, 2019 at 3:10 PM > *To: *Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> > *Cc: *QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org> > *Subject: *Re: QUIC ossification > > > > On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 7:52 AM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote: > > I don't think that there is much value in using two version numbers to > refer to the same protocol. But even if we did, as long as we didn't > establish any pattern in doing so, that couldn't be used against us. So I > might tentatively agree that 0x1 == 0x2 would be inadvisable, there is no > strong need to do anything special with the first version. Any attempt to > profile QUIC will be done with full knowledge of the version number we > pick, so randomness doesn't serve any real purpose. Subsequent versions > might need to use a randomized value, but we can make that decision then. > > > > I figured that making all version assignments random instead of > special-casing 0x1 made it simpler to reason about and uniform to code for, > but I actually don't care about the IANA assignment for v1 for the reason > you note. v1 will be one specific bit-pattern on the wire to start of with, > and that can just as well be 0x1. It still does segregate the space, but we > can't do anything about it anyways - it'll be 0x1 or some other random > number getting special treatment. > > > > The problem of course being that as long as v1 remains, we might find > places that no other version does. The QUIC "magic number" will be > whatever we pick, and we can't prevent someone from fixating on that.. > We'll convince those people in the same way they will be convinced to open > up UDP for QUIC version 1: by making a QUIC version 2 worth enabling. > > > > That was the entire point of having alternate and preferred versions to > 0x1. If we have downgrade protection in place, and if there are those who > try alternate version numbers for v1, that gives us what we need at the > endpoints. I believe that there would be interest at some major vendors to > do this at some endpoints. Presumably, we can convince Google to do > something, since it has been bit by mbox ossification in the past. I am > operating on the premise that we have buy in from a few major providers. > > > > IANA is for me a publication venue where these alternate versions are > published and other clients/servers interested in keeping the ecosystem > from ossifying can use these alternate versions as well. > > > > I completely get the don't segregate thing. But to - I think - Mikkel's > point about experimentation without permission, I do think that squatting > is a perfectly sound approach in a space this big. TLS people do it in a > much smaller space. As long squatters pick random values, they do so > infrequently, and they get IANA registrations for codepoints relatively > soon afterwards, the risk of collision is low. Randomness here is useful - > but primarily as a collision-avoidance technique. The TLS extension > codepoint 26 is a great example of why. Keeping the bar on registrations > low (FCFS is a reasonable policy) would also have the effect of making the > pool of apparent versions larger, which might be more effective than any > other strategy we might employ. > > > > I'm totally fine with experimentation without permission, and using random > to avoid collision. My point was entirely about using alternate on-wire > version numbers for v1. Nothing here about new or experimental versions. > > >
- QUIC ossification Martin Duke
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Thomson
- Re: QUIC ossification Roberto Peon
- Re: QUIC ossification David Schinazi
- Re: QUIC ossification Roberto Peon
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Duke
- Re: QUIC ossification Ian Swett
- Re: QUIC ossification Ted Hardie
- Re: QUIC ossification Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: QUIC ossification Christian Huitema
- Re: QUIC ossification Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: QUIC ossification Roberto Peon
- Re: QUIC ossification Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Thomson
- Re: QUIC ossification Christian Huitema
- Re: QUIC ossification Christian Huitema
- Re: QUIC ossification Jana Iyengar
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Duke
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Duke
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Thomson
- Re: QUIC ossification Jana Iyengar
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Thomson
- Re: QUIC ossification Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: QUIC ossification Ted Hardie
- Re: QUIC ossification Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: QUIC ossification Christian Huitema
- Re: QUIC ossification Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: QUIC ossification David Benjamin
- RE: QUIC ossification Mike Bishop
- Re: QUIC ossification David Schinazi
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Duke
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Thomson
- Re: QUIC ossification David Schinazi
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Duke
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Thomson
- Re: QUIC ossification Ian Swett
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Thomson
- Re: QUIC ossification Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: QUIC ossification Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: QUIC ossification Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: QUIC ossification Jana Iyengar
- Re: QUIC ossification Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Thomson
- Re: QUIC ossification Ted Hardie
- Re: QUIC ossification Jana Iyengar
- Re: QUIC ossification Roberto Peon
- Re: QUIC ossification Jana Iyengar
- Re: QUIC ossification Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: QUIC ossification Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: QUIC ossification Jana Iyengar
- Re: QUIC ossification Erik Kline
- Re: QUIC ossification Roberto Peon
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Thomson
- Re: QUIC ossification Christian Huitema
- Re: QUIC ossification Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Thomson
- Re: QUIC ossification Jana Iyengar
- Re: QUIC ossification Kazuho Oku
- Re: QUIC ossification Roberto Peon
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Duke
- Re: QUIC ossification Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: QUIC ossification Mike Bishop
- Re: QUIC ossification Martin Duke