Re: [saag] post-X509 cryptographic identities

[Tony Rutkowski <[e-mail]>]

Hi Nico,

Does the OID namespace qualify as true rooted?  Ref. 
http://www.oid-info.com/introduction.htm

--tony


On 2020-02-11 11:57 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 11:55:16AM +0100, Michael Richardson wrote:
>> Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]> wrote in a IETF-last call thread:
>>      > Anyway overall I take this as more evidence that
>>      > x.509-based pki has outlived it's useful lifetime.
>>      > Given the webpki needs CT (which it totally does)
>>      > and now maybe novel revocation mechanisms like this,
>>      > (as well as soon-to-be PQ schemes if we believe
>>      > what people tell us), I'd argue it may well be time
>>      > to try see if there's any consensus on a post-x.509
>>      > direction towards which to head.
>>
>> I agree with you strongly.
>> A centralized, single CRL from the single global PKI was certainly among the
>> original ideas envisioned.
>> Then we decentralized the PKI, add CT and added OCSP.
>>
>> Now we are unifying again :-)
>> Mozilla could, for instance, create a new higher-level CA, sign all of the
>> existing trust anchors they ship, and effectively be back at X509.
> The worst thing about x.509/PKIX was x.500 naming, and that's
> essentially fixed by using appropriate SANs.  Sure, it's still awful
> ugly on the inside, but the naming on the outside is now OK.
>
> That leaves only one lasting bad thing about x.509/PKIX: revocation, and
> the answers to that we already know and have and would implement for
> PKIX as much as for any PK-based replacement.  Short-lived credentials,
> CT, a real root (see below) -- these are things we know to do.
>
> I wouldn't throw the baby out with the bathwater.
>
> However, if we must, then naming is the first thing to get right.
> Naming is where the crypto rubber meets the UI/UX road.
>
> And can I refrain from mentioning that DNSSEC is the _only_ true rooted
> PKI we've ever managed to deploy?  Evidently I can't.
>
> Nico