Re: [saag] post-X509 cryptographic identities

Hi all,

  I think that if one is going to rethink security and identity
on the internet one needs to revisit some deep assumptions about
what web site identities are and their relation to legal spaces.

DNSSEC DANE can be an answer to identity of web sites and it can be politically acceptable if DNSSEC moves towards being decentralized on a national basis the way it was designed to be. But it cannot deal with the 
legal aspect of identity which requires deeper tie in to legal systems.

The same is true of X509. It can also work to verify identifiers for
web sites, and Let’s encrypt does a great job for that. 
I explain what is is good and what the limitations are in
"Stopping (https) phishing"
https://medium.com/cybersoton/stopping-https-phishing-42226ca9e7d9

But one has to think much bigger and from an epistemological point
of view. That is one has to consider what it is that the user of
a browser can learn from the information given to him.
I explain that in 
”Epistemology of the Screen”
https://medium.com/cybersoton/phishing-in-context-9c84ca451314

Currently one learns nearly nothing from an X509 certificate. Nothing
that is interesting enough and useful enough to a user, that they would feel 
like looking there. And nothing that really helps establish trust in an international environment. That requires one to tie these into rich data
provided by legal systems tied into a ”Web of Nations” 
https://co-operating.systems/2019/07/29/Web_of_Nations.proposal.pdf

This is following an idea that we are both individuated by the nations
in which we live (or smaller local structures) and individuate them 
(by helping create standards for example, or writing great poetry, or educating children...). We  then individuate each other through commerce
and intellectual exchange.

In the international space it is nations that provide guarantees of legal status. They themselves form a social network of higher level 
agents of which we are part. To defend this requires some deeper philosophical, and I can provide links to some thinkers working on 
it if needed.
The idea is to build a structure for internations, by linking 
them together in an  open non coercive way, and make it possible for companies to make their legal ties visible to citizens around 
the world, in a purely opt-in manner. 

Hope that helps,

Henry Story
https://co-operating.systems/
@bblfish on Twitter

> On 11 Feb 2020, at 17:57, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 11:55:16AM +0100, Michael Richardson wrote:
>> Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote in a IETF-last call thread:
>>> Anyway overall I take this as more evidence that
>>> x.509-based pki has outlived it's useful lifetime.
>>> Given the webpki needs CT (which it totally does)
>>> and now maybe novel revocation mechanisms like this,
>>> (as well as soon-to-be PQ schemes if we believe
>>> what people tell us), I'd argue it may well be time
>>> to try see if there's any consensus on a post-x.509
>>> direction towards which to head.
>> 
>> I agree with you strongly.
>> A centralized, single CRL from the single global PKI was certainly among the
>> original ideas envisioned.
>> Then we decentralized the PKI, add CT and added OCSP.
>> 
>> Now we are unifying again :-)
>> Mozilla could, for instance, create a new higher-level CA, sign all of the
>> existing trust anchors they ship, and effectively be back at X509.
> 
> The worst thing about x.509/PKIX was x.500 naming, and that's
> essentially fixed by using appropriate SANs.  Sure, it's still awful
> ugly on the inside, but the naming on the outside is now OK.
> 
> That leaves only one lasting bad thing about x.509/PKIX: revocation, and
> the answers to that we already know and have and would implement for
> PKIX as much as for any PK-based replacement.  Short-lived credentials,
> CT, a real root (see below) -- these are things we know to do.
> 
> I wouldn't throw the baby out with the bathwater.
> 
> However, if we must, then naming is the first thing to get right.
> Naming is where the crypto rubber meets the UI/UX road.
> 
> And can I refrain from mentioning that DNSSEC is the _only_ true rooted
> PKI we've ever managed to deploy?  Evidently I can't.
> 
> Nico
> -- 
> 
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