Re: [lamps] Proposed re-charter text for hybrid and dual crypto modes

Michael Jenkins <m.jenkins.364706@gmail.com> Sun, 31 January 2021 16:20 UTC

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From: Michael Jenkins <m.jenkins.364706@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2021 11:20:00 -0500
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: LAMPS <spasm@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] Proposed re-charter text for hybrid and dual crypto modes
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Not that I object to any of the work being proposed, but we seem to have
put paid to the notion of "limited". This is looking like PKIXme.

On Sat, Jan 30, 2021 at 4:14 PM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> Building on the text proposed by Mike, I want to address a point raised by
> Max and a point raised by Sean.
>
> First, Max observed that PQC algorithms will be used in both the one
> certificate and the two certificate models.  So, I propose charter text
> that has a place for each of them.
>
> Second, Sean observed that the charter will need some background text to
> explain what we are doing to the IESG.  So, I propose some charter text for
> additional context.
>
> Third, the charter is structured as a list of deliverables for the LAMPS
> WG.  So, I structured the proposed charter text as a new numbered item "X".
>
> ~~~
>
> X. Recent progress in the development of quantum computers pose a threat
> to widely deployed public key algorithms.  As a result, there is a need
> to prepare for a day when cryptosystems such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman,
> ECDSA, ECDH, and EdDSA cannot be depended upon.  As a result, there are
> efforts to develop standards for post-quantum cryptosystem (PQC)
> algorithms that that will be secure if large-scale quantum computers
> are ever developed.
>
> a. Specify the use of PQC public key algorithms with the PKIX
> certificates and the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
>
> b. Develop specifications to facilitate a lengthy transition from
> today's public key algorithms to PQC public key algorithms.  Unlike
> previous algorithm transitions, time will be needed before there is
> full confidence in the PQC public key algorithms.  Therefore,
> transition mechanisms that combine traditional algorithms with PQC
> algorithms will be needed for "hybrid key establishment" and "dual
> signatures".  NIST defines "hybrid key establishment" as any key
> establishment scheme that is a combination of two or more components
> that are themselves cryptographic key-establishment schemes.  NIST
> defines "dual signatures" as any signature scheme that consists of
> two or more signatures on a common message.  The specifications
> developed will enable PKIX and S/MIME protocols to support hybrid key
> establishment and dual signature mechanisms.
>
> ~~~
>
> Review and comments welcome.
>
> Russ
>
>
> > On Jan 28, 2021, at 2:27 PM, Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth=
> 40entrust.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> >
> > Proposed charter text:
> >
> > Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) will require a transition period in some
> ways similar to previous crypto migrations, but unique in that timelines
> require deployment of PQC before cryptographers have full confidence in the
> replacement algorithms. NIST has called for transition mechanisms that
> "layer" traditional and PQ crypto together, referred to as "hybrid key
> establishment" and "dual signatures". The LAMPS working group will update
> documents produced by the PKIX and S/MIME WG to support hybrid key
> establishment, encryption, and dual signature mechanisms.
> >
> > ---
> > Mike Ounsworth
> > Software Security Architect, Entrust
>
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-- 
Mike Jenkins
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