Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Mon, 28 July 2014 13:58 UTC
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Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 09:57:39 -0400
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
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On 07/28/2014 04:55 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > Unless TLS 1.3 intended to include a length hiding mechanism > I see this change as unnecessary and I agree with Watson on that. One of the motivations to support this change is due to the possibility of length-hiding within TLS (which might be indicated by a new content-type), as well as leaving the door open to other future content types that might or might not be sensitive. It was a design error to ever leave this information in the clear in the first place, afaict. We should fix it. If we have to throw a dummy byte (or two, if we need to include the version) per (D)TLS record to appease middleboxes, we can do that, but that should be strictly for the sake of working around the ossified network stack. --dkg
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Juho Vähä-Herttua
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Brian Sniffen
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti