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Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Wed, 07 May 2014 17:10 UTC

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Date: Wed, 07 May 2014 12:09:56 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration
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On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 12:05 PM, Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:
> Nico Williams wrote:
>>
>>
>> One can always get anon ciphersuites by just taking a peer's cert with
>> no validation.  There's no way to prove to them that you did validate
>> their cert.  Of course, that's a rather expensive way to get anon
>> ciphersuites.
>
>
> Yes, but it's riskier for a MitM to hope that a certificate isn't being
> checked.  When they see "DH_anon" they know they can't be caught in the
> act.

You're not listening.  Some of us have uses for anon ciphersuites.

Nico
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