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Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Wed, 07 May 2014 15:57 UTC

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Date: Wed, 07 May 2014 10:57:50 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration
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Watson,

How would you prevent PKI trust anchor set misconfiguration?  Or the
dreaded "give your money away to the bad guy?" pop-up?

One can always get anon ciphersuites by just taking a peer's cert with
no validation.  There's no way to prove to them that you did validate
their cert.  Of course, that's a rather expensive way to get anon
ciphersuites.

Nico
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