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Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration

Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org> Fri, 16 May 2014 12:33 UTC

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Date: Fri, 16 May 2014 12:33:39 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration
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On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 08:06:08PM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote:

> > It is perhaps time to retire the belief that TLS for email is in
> > a "sad state".  Of course it would be nice to also have authentication,
> > but for that we need DNSSEC deployment and publication of TLSA RRs.
> 
> So 0% of the email is actually protected from being read by anyone on
> the network. (well, modulo PGP). In another 20 years we might have a
> solution deployed.

You have an odd definition of "protected".  Protection of content
from passive monitoring is not an insignificant benefit.

In the mean-time a second German email provider has enabled DANE
(two this week), so now all posteo.de deliveries to mailbox.org
are authenticated.  While that may be "0%" overall, it is not
0% for posteo.de.

> And for this you want to run the risk of using aDH?

Deja vu all over again.  (No the reasons is to not destroy TLS as
a transport for channel-binding + application-level authentication,
the fact that Postfix offers and accepts aDH in opportunistic mode
is rather secondary, and we've already had this discussion...).

-- 
	Viktor.

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