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Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 08 May 2014 00:01 UTC

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Date: Wed, 07 May 2014 19:01:00 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration
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On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 6:48 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> If it gets fixed anonymous DH will work just fine for channel binding:
>>> the premaster secret will always be unique.
>>
>> Clearly.  No one disagrees with that.  You're making statements that
>> implicitly assume it's not fixed, so I want to know if you're assuming
>> it won't be fixed.
>>
>> Also, really, this is an ancillary issue being dealt with in a
>> separate thread.  It's NOT germane to your proposal to remove features
>> that the rest of us don't want removed.  Please address the arguments
>> against removal.
>
> I changed my mind about anonymous DH: it's useful enough in SASL to

Good.  That's a relief.  You and I both can change our minds about such things.

> keep. You replied to a message that had this sentence in it.

"If it gets fixed anonymous DH will work just fine for channel
binding: ..."  -- I didn't take that to mean that you'd changed your
mind, only that you were explaining something [that I already knew].

> I think the null encryption cipher should definitely stay out: the
> only use I've heard of is extremely niche, namely large datasets with
> slow CPUs on both ends.

I have no opinion yet as to null encryption ciphersuites.  In general
I think they are best left out, but I should hear more about their
uses before agreeing to remove them.

Nico
--

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