IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Thu, 08 May 2014 13:47 UTC

Return-Path: <rsalz@akamai.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E4771A031B for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 8 May 2014 06:47:37 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.551
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.551 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.651] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BodUr4O_qs00 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 8 May 2014 06:47:36 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from prod-mail-xrelay08.akamai.com (prod-mail-xrelay08.akamai.com [96.6.114.112]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F15991A0654 for <tls@ietf.org>; Thu, 8 May 2014 06:47:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from prod-mail-xrelay08.akamai.com (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by postfix.imss70 (Postfix) with ESMTP id 33AAC48215; Thu, 8 May 2014 13:47:31 +0000 (GMT)
Received: from prod-mail-relay09.akamai.com (unknown [172.27.22.68]) by prod-mail-xrelay08.akamai.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2892548164; Thu, 8 May 2014 13:47:31 +0000 (GMT)
Received: from usma1ex-cashub.kendall.corp.akamai.com (usma1ex-cashub4.kendall.corp.akamai.com [172.27.105.20]) by prod-mail-relay09.akamai.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04C581E041; Thu, 8 May 2014 13:47:31 +0000 (GMT)
Received: from USMBX1.msg.corp.akamai.com ([169.254.1.79]) by USMA1EX-CASHUB4.kendall.corp.akamai.com ([172.27.105.20]) with mapi; Thu, 8 May 2014 09:47:15 -0400
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 08 May 2014 09:47:15 -0400
Thread-Topic: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration
Thread-Index: Ac9qiKHjxQQyx97yQNyyJGx2lumDigAOpdMw
Message-ID: <2A0EFB9C05D0164E98F19BB0AF3708C7130A13E5A5@USMBX1.msg.corp.akamai.com>
References: <2A0EFB9C05D0164E98F19BB0AF3708C7130A13E3A2@USMBX1.msg.corp.akamai.com> <536A8804.8000207@akr.io> <CAK3OfOgVAg8MLSmRVLe-6vVVzX361xYo4uma3-GQQmn=qoWWbQ@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0ckrnbQbz-KCEY6u-WU7ULPTQv46g3noz44jMjW5HmFU0g@mail.gmail.com> <CAK3OfOiSKkeknHMwS-a90rR4hF9J9HaNn_XL_b75Mrx3o_wVMQ@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0cksBt3Mj587cG-U5O5=Kc2p5T1NCP_-LrMRBv1V2hR2wQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAK3OfOibPMSriPsgO286PEZ=N+sdnuDpPyJ_xDr9KdATA_QjLQ@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0cmB3TQVzsCthYCuY1q-z10wPbmat32Ys9ABT361fYNZLQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAK3OfOgan_JvsuwGNgpzk4tUfoo+JhxbNaHkbZCtAs7DHufr-w@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0cmeq66S8LS38FmooWpOf534Gda5t09Ro1F3anLb-fJMMQ@mail.gmail.com> <20140508001532.GG27883@mournblade.imrryr.org> <CACsn0ck4mq3LnUwmBwBTgtuA+tHW9_FLHi1zdkz-ApkmtZs7eg@mail.gmail.com> <2A0EFB9C05D0164E98F19BB0AF3708C7130A13E47E@USMBX1.msg.corp.akamai.com> <E78496F5-0992-4286-927C-B92FB788D8AE@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <E78496F5-0992-4286-927C-B92FB788D8AE@gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
acceptlanguage: en-US
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/qYW3A7OHDz4ghdQWgUvmON5ekVw
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 May 2014 13:47:37 -0000

Yes, perhaps a new alert, e_wtf, MUST/SHOULD be sent if a client offers a nonsensical combination.

Less flippantly a new AlertDescription, unsupported_policy, that can be used during a handshake to indicate that a combination of ciphers, extensions, etc., is not acceptable.  We could say a server MUST send it if a client in the null/non-null case. But this lets us add other policy concerns in a compatible  way.

	/r$

--  
Principal Security Engineer
Akamai Technologies, Cambridge, MA
IM: rsalz@jabber.me; Twitter: RichSalz

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email