Re: [TLS] Proposed text for removing renegotiation

Martin Thomson <> Wed, 28 May 2014 20:12 UTC

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Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 13:12:27 -0700
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From: Martin Thomson <>
To: Andy Lutomirski <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed text for removing renegotiation
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On 28 May 2014 12:55, Andy Lutomirski <> wrote:
> Separately derive master_secret and temporary_secret from
> premaster_secret.  Use master_secret as it's currently used for
> resumption, but use temporary_secret for encryption and MAC.  When it's
> time to rekey, roll over the temporary_secret but leave the
> master_secret alone.

The problem with that is that you end up with the keys to the kingdom
just lying around.  And they only seem to exist in order to enable
resumption.  One property I was looking to gain here was the ability
to have a state that cannot be used to derive past states.  Having the
master_secret sitting around loses that.

> Getting resumption right might be a little tricky here: unless a new DH
> exchange happens on resumption, the new temporary_secret will have to be
> derived from master_secret.

The whole point is to avoid the DH.  The current resumption process
mixes new randoms with the old master_secret.  The old master_secret
is then discarded.  That would seem to have the property you are
looking at.