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[TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Fri, 10 April 2026 19:21 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 15:20:21 -0400
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To: Muhammad Usama Sardar <muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
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Usama:

> I totally understand the normative reference but what I don't understand is
> that how should I interpret the security considerations as SHOULD NOT or
> MUST NOT? I am claiming that text should explicitly say MUST NOT to resolve
> the mapping ambiguity.

I cannot agree with you on this one.  I just re-read Section 3.4 of FIPS 204, and I do not see any security considerations that a specific to a TLS protocol implementation that need to be called out in this document.

Russ

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