Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> Thu, 04 February 2021 13:22 UTC
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References: <160433257633.23038.15047041472414640530@ietfa.amsl.com> <AB11DC08-C6ED-4045-A8F5-872AD263035D@mit.edu> <FR2P281MB01063C2EA739E892B549611D8D110@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAM8feuQcCdQFGUKy-ou7H3Ta38yyN1LR+0XJd9WophRMRdPDEA@mail.gmail.com> <FR2P281MB0106C83420ED3F8DF2723BFD8DE30@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <5b8ac79b-0c0e-18e9-9f80-b5d79e9ae59b@free.fr> <CAM8feuQ346w9EL=-qpJRmMOO_YUp_14gShxcro+pVxnfXTvkzw@mail.gmail.com> <5E214281-2974-4632-AB74-4E068B7EE66B@mit.edu> <CAK2Cwb5ACMxjiph796Lq1U3FZ6Tm_2TCmsKTJZn8Fgc0rzEgZQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAD9ie-vDS9-Cc=cVRc_SDg7z6KxMqySdcfv3ZPSjAzHorZP7UQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAK2Cwb66asqy1MCtW7KNHyW5=H23fWATBds2aKC3Xi88V34=Rw@mail.gmail.com> <CAD9ie-sGRFQMj81g4oWAS=CgHOe5ReDrAXeVzqvW9UL0W0P-Qw@mail.gmail.com> <FR2P281MB0106FEBFFB997265C8A9EF878DE10@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAM8feuQiBij5Be2p3he0HwWfC+WaDRVQ6HqEKoq+FfqYJVGNXA@mail.gmail.com> <FR2P281MB0106245AD7828040C4BF0F7E8DE10@FR2P281MB0106.DEUP281.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAM8feuQc8Thohftk_=ohNByTvZtxRukdQ3xCzMP3K7zdZBO6Lg@mail.gmail.com> <CAM8feuRU-MKuta6fejsLsYXRhpWwfKqZ6D8VaVvkFhbo+sH9pw@mail.gmail.com>
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From: Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2021 05:21:47 -0800
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To: Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
Cc: Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de>, GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>, Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr>, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
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I've had such an app working for over a year. There are issues which are being addressed by the browser Interaction team of oidc. thx ..Tom (mobile) On Thu, Feb 4, 2021, 3:12 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Francis, > > I've tried a few things with regards to using the AS on a phone, but it's > really quite complex. > > Making that run on a phone comes with quite a bit of trouble. The most > difficult part if that we'd need to use a secure element, but just > installing and hosting a http server securely is not a standard setup at > all. I suggest interested people step in to work on this, as we already > have a lot of work for the (more usual) server case and already handle a > privacy preserving scheme. > > Please let us know what you think. > > Cheers, > Fabien > > On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 5:55 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Hi Francis, >> >> I've thought a bit more to what you said. I think I'll give it a try as a >> separate experiment (in code, not in theory). Not that I would expect it to >> be included in GNAP, but I kind of like the idea :-) >> >> The direct impact for GNAP would be to think about multiple ASs. >> >> Will let you know. >> >> Fabien >> >> >> Le mer. 18 nov. 2020 à 13:06, Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> a écrit : >> >>> It would be nice if the protocol was designed at many layers of >>> abstraction. >>> >>> >>> - The first layer shall design abstract protocol flows, without >>> specification of the mode and mechanism of interaction. >>> - The second layer can instantiate the first layer for dedicated >>> interaction. Here we can talk http, we can define interactions that presume >>> server based token generation, we can define interaction that run on user >>> device based token generation. >>> >>> This is also the fundament of the structure I proposed for the spec ( >>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/30). >>> >>> /Francis >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> >>> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 18, 2020 6:35 AM >>> *To:* Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> >>> *Cc:* txauth@ietf.org <txauth@ietf.org>; Dick Hardt < >>> dick.hardt@gmail.com>; Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>; Denis < >>> denis.ietf@free.fr>; Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> >>> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 >>> >>> Would make sense, but not so easy as we rely heavily on HTTP. Hence the >>> discussion about deep links and so on. >>> >>> An alternative might be provided by wasm/wasi (running a local sandbox >>> on your phone, for your own AS), but it's really early stage. This also >>> poses another question that Denis has put forward, i.e. how do we handle >>> the multiple AS scenario (likely to occur then). >>> >>> Fabien >>> >>> On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 12:16 PM Francis Pouatcha <fpo@adorsys.de> >>> wrote: >>> >>> We are drifting away from the original problem space. >>> >>> - My original mention was about the "POST" request, that subsumes >>> that the "AS" is a "Server". Designing a new protocol, we cannot afford >>> this limitation. >>> - I just mentioned SIOP to show a known and closed example? Let us >>> not focus on the device local discovery scheme (like openid:) for now. >>> - As capability of holding private keys on user device evolves, >>> server-based issuing of token will be fading out giving way to device local >>> generation of token. >>> >>> While designing GNAP, let us assume the AS-Role can be exercised on a >>> user device and design the protocol to honor that. >>> >>> Best regards, >>> /Francis >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* TXAuth <txauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Dick Hardt < >>> dick.hardt@gmail.com> >>> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 17, 2020 1:28 PM >>> *To:* Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> >>> *Cc:* Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>; Denis < >>> denis.ietf@free.fr>; GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>; Justin Richer >>> <jricher@mit.edu> >>> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 >>> >>> Got it. >>> >>> So web apps invoke a openid: deep link and hope there is an app to >>> handle the openid: scheme? ... and that it is the user's wallet rather than >>> some malware that has registered openid: on the mobile device? >>> >>> A native app can attempt to open a deep link associated with an app, and >>> will fail if the app is not there. If the app is there, it will be opened, >>> so this can't be used to silently test if an app is present, but it does >>> allow a native app to provide an alternative experience if an app is not >>> present. I don't think this works with custom schemes ... and I don't know >>> how it could work from a web app on the phone with the current Safari APIs. >>> >>> Apple warns against using custom schemes [1] ... but perhaps they can be >>> convinced to make openid: a managed scheme similar to mailto:, tel:, >>> sms:, facetime: ? >>> >>> [1] >>> https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/allowing_apps_and_websites_to_link_to_your_content/defining_a_custom_url_scheme_for_your_app >>> >>> >>> ᐧ >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 10:06 AM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> You are - that is not standard which is opeind:// >>> This is the one step that still needs to be optimized for SIOP to have >>> good UX. >>> Peace ..tom >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:59 AM Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Tom >>> >>> I watched your video (I watched at 2X speed) >>> >>> Looks like the employment website app that is using localhost:8765 to >>> communicate with the wallet. Am I correct? >>> >>> /Dick >>> ᐧ >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:46 AM Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Well, here's a demo. Note that in this case the AS is not online all of >>> the time, so it is really implicit flow and the OIDC id-token comes from >>> the siop device directly. >>> (whether this is front-channel or back channel is no longer an >>> interesting question.) >>> Now if an always-on AS is required, that is possible, but probably >>> beyond the scope of this effort and would require something like an >>> agent-in-the-sky (with diamonds). >>> here is the link to the 9 min video https://youtu.be/Tq4hw7X5SW0 >>> <https://urldefense.us/v2/url?u=https-3A__youtu.be_Tq4hw7X5SW0&d=DwMFaQ&c=2plI3hXH8ww3j2g8pV19QHIf4SmK_I-Eol_p9P0CttE&r=D5lnfoa2MVZWELqVbbz71ooelbP7rVGCjGDSBNvUpYQ&m=ixsudGSr_dhG-SLiatb4Sz9FWslmywnYyZAOLgZxhl8&s=jdLLy0G1JTQCAOBZ6PeUgI0kiCtVJXrru0VToYWlNZ8&e=> >>> Peace ..tom >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:20 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >>> >>> Ultimately, in most situations like these in the real world, the hurdle >>> isn’t technical compatibility so much as it is trust compatibility. The RP >>> (client) needs to have some incentive to trust the assertions and identity >>> information that’s coming from the AS. The same is true for an RS trusting >>> tokens from the AS. The hard question is less “how” to do that (which SSI >>> answers), but more “why” to do that (which SSI doesn’t answer very well, >>> because it’s a hard question). >>> >>> Still: it’s definitely a question about how to support this “AS on >>> device” element. We’ve got the start of it more than OAuth2/OIDC have by >>> allowing the bootstrap of the process from a starting call: the interaction >>> and continuation URIs handed back by the AS don’t need to be the same URIs >>> that the client starts with, so just like SIOP the process can start in >>> HTTP and potentially move to other communication channels. A major >>> difference is that we aren’t dependent on the assumption that the user will >>> always be in a browser at some stage, and so the whole raft of >>> front-channel messages that SIOP relies on doesn’t fly. That said, we’ve >>> got an opportunity to more explicitly open up alternative communication >>> channels here, and that’s something I’d like to see engineered, even if >>> it’s an extension. I’d love to see a concrete proposal as to how that would >>> work over specific protocols, starting with what we’ve got today. >>> >>> — Justin >>> >>> On Nov 17, 2020, at 12:03 PM, Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Denis, hi Francis, >>> >>> At some point integration with SSI (on the authentication side) will >>> probably occur, including amongst other possibilities SIOP (since they work >>> with OpenID a part of the work will probably be made easier). >>> >>> That being said, Denis is right. It's not an AS. Technically it's >>> entirely possible to rely on a decentralized wallet (for instance on your >>> phone) and a centralized AS. I know of a few studies on how to decentralize >>> the AS itself (for instance >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardjono-oauth-decentralized-02). >>> Maybe it exists, but I'm still looking for real scenarios (or even >>> architectures) where an AS is deployed directly on a phone, and under the >>> sole authority of the RO, while being compatible with the rest of the >>> world. >>> >>> Cheers, >>> Fabien >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 5:45 PM Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote: >>> >>> Hello Francis, >>> >>> See two comments in line. >>> >>> >>> B) Current Document >>> >>> Roles description shall not hold any assumption on the physical >>> structure of the party fulfilling the roles. >>> [FI] not sure what you mean >>> >>> [FP] for example, we assume the AS is a server! In most SSI based use >>> cases, the AS will be running on the user device. See SIOP ( >>> https://identity.foundation/did-siop/). >>> >>> I browsed through the two drafts, i.e. : >>> >>> - Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0 Core architecture, data >>> model, and representations W3C Working Draft 08 November 2020 >>> - Self-Issued OpenID Connect Provider DID Profile v0.1. DIF Working >>> Group Draft >>> >>> At no place within these two documents, it is possible to imagine that >>> "the AS will be running on the user device". >>> >>> From section 3 of the DIF Working Group Draft: >>> >>> "Unlike the OIDC Authorization Code Flow as per [OIDC.Core], the >>> SIOP will not return an access token to the RP". >>> >>> An Identity Wallet is not an AS. >>> >>> >>> Roles: >>> -> grant endpoint of the AS: Why is this a post request? This eliminates >>> the chance of having user device hosted AS (no server). >>> [FI] what would you propose instead? >>> Would also be interested to understand better the deployment model when >>> there is no server. That's something that was discussed several times but >>> I'm still missing the underlying architecture and use case. >>> >>> [FP] See above (SIOP). There will be a lot of identity wallets operated >>> on end user device. >>> >>> See the above comment. Please, do not confuse an Identity Wallet with an >>> Authentication Server (AS). >>> >>> Denis >>> >>> >>> -> Resource Owner (RO) : Authorizes the request? Does it authorize the >>> request or the access to a resource? >>> [FI] yes, we should make the wording clearer >>> >>> Missing Section Interactions: >>> --> This section shall introduce the notion of interaction before we >>> start listing interaction types. >>> [FI] yes >>> >>> Interaction Types: >>> --> I prefer a classification with Redirect, Decoupled and Embedded is. >>> In the draft, we have one redirect and 2 decouple interactions and nothing >>> else. >>> [FI] this should be handled as a specific discussion item. As a >>> reminder, how would you define embedded? >>> >>> In practice there's at least these modes: >>> - redirect and redirect back >>> - redirect to different browser or device >>> - user code >>> - CIBA >>> >>> [FP] This classification is limited. >>> >>> - Redirect: same device, same or different user agents (browser, >>> mobile app, desktop app, ...) >>> - Decoupled: different devices >>> - Embedded : RC carries RO authorization to AS >>> >>> >>> >>> Resource Access Request vs. Resource Request >>> --> Both are mixed up. No clarification of the context of each section. >>> [FI] could you clarify what you'd expect. Btw on this topic, there's a >>> more general discussion on whether we should make a distinction or not. >>> >>> [FP]: Here: >>> >>> - Resource Access Request: Requesting Access to a resource. Response >>> is an access token (or any type of grant) >>> - Resource Request: Request the resource. Response is the resource >>> (or a corresponding execution) >>> >>> >>> Token Content Negotiation >>> --> Not expressed as such. This is central to GNAP and not represented >>> enough in the document. >>> [FI] right. This should be a specific discussion item. >>> >>> Requesting "User" Information >>> we identify two types of users: RQ and RO. It will be better not to >>> refer to a user in this draft, but either to a RQ or an RO. >>> [FI] yes that would avoid potential misunderstandings. Although in the >>> end, people will translate RQ into user or end-user most of the time. Cf in >>> definition, currently we have Requesting Party (RQ, aka "user") >>> >>> >>> Interaction Again >>> -> For each interaction type, we will have to describe the protocol flow >>> and the nature and behavior of involved Roles (Parties), Elements, Requests. >>> [FI] yes >>> >>> >>> [FP] Will these and into tickets? >>> >>> Best regards. >>> /Francis >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> TXAuth mailing list >>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>> >>> -- >>> TXAuth mailing list >>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>> >>> >>> -- >>> TXAuth mailing list >>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>> >>> -- >>> TXAuth mailing list >>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>> >>>
- [GNAP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-… internet-drafts
- Re: [GNAP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-gnap-core-proto… Justin Richer
- [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00 Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Dick Hardt
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Francis Pouatcha
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Tom Jones
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protoco… Fabien Imbault