Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00

[Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

virtual interim meeting on 2021-02-10 from 16:00 to 17:00 UTC
https://intuit.zoom.us/j/99481776837?from=addon

- Review of changes since IETF109 (including edits since -03)
- Interaction mode changes (issue #122)
- Discussion of next steps

Cheers.
Fabien

On Mon, Feb 8, 2021 at 5:33 PM Francis Pouatcha <
[e-mail]> wrote:

> Hello Fabian,
>
> what time is the interim Meeting on Wednesday?
>
> Can you forward the invite?
>
> Best regards,
> /Francis
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> *Sent:* Monday, February 8, 2021 9:57 AM
> *To:* Tom Jones <[e-mail]>
> *Cc:* Justin Richer <[e-mail]>; Francis Pouatcha <[e-mail]>;
> Adrian Gropper <[e-mail]>; txauth gnap <[e-mail]>
> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
>
> +1
> The interim meeting planned on Wednesday will be a good opportunity to
> discuss interactions !
>
> Fabien
>
> On Mon, Feb 8, 2021 at 2:22 PM Tom Jones <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Justin +1
>
> thx ..Tom (mobile)
>
> On Mon, Feb 8, 2021, 5:19 AM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> I agree that the focus of this group does need to be on an HTTP-based AS —
> this particular use case is the one that we have to solve for, and that’s
> why those details are called out in the charter. We aren’t here to try to
> build a transport-independent security language, with abstractions and
> bindings and things of that sort. But that said, the “on-device AS” use
> case is being brought up a lot, and solutions have been hacked together in
> the OAuth 2 world in several different ways. As such, we as a WG should be
> paying attention to them, and if there are things we can do in our design
> to allow for that kind of deployment then we need to consider them. That
> doesn’t mean we have to have that fully specified in the core protocol, but
> if there’s a way to design this so that it can be extended in that
> direction without the kind of hacks that the OAuth 2 solutions have to rely
> on, then it’ll be better for everyone. This can’t distract us from solving
> the core use cases, or drive us to making the core so complex that it
> becomes irrelevant, but we shouldn’t be blind to these other possibilities.
>
> In my opinion as a contributor, the best opportunities we have for that
> kind of extension in the way the protocol’s built right now are in the
> interaction and continuation pieces of GNAP. Interaction we’ve always known
> was going to allow for a move off-browser, and less dependence on
> user-in-a-browser is baked into the charter as well. But we need more
> experience and more details about :how: that works, and that’s a lot of
> what this current conversation is going to be about. You are completely
> right that there are another set of challenges, but in my mind it’s that
> the trust model is simply different. What do I trust more, a device in my
> pocket or a web server in someone else’s data center? There isn’t an easy
> or universal answer to that question, as it turns out.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Feb 7, 2021, at 5:51 PM, Francis Pouatcha <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Hello Fabian,
>
> I am sorry for the delayed reply, but very busy working on those
> decentralized use cases where tokens a produced on the user device.
>
>
> Like we can see in this thread, it is not obvious to have those use cases
> considered in GNAP (as the GNAP charter mentions reliance on HTTP based AS).
>
> If the role of an AS is to produce an authorization, a user device hosted
> AS can be build, but the negotiation process will be different from the one
> defined by GNAP. Means interaction protocol will need more than just HTTP.
>
> The biggest challenge we are facing on user device produced auth tokens is
> on how to preserve those crypto keys held on user device from malware, loss
> of device...
>
> For the moment keeping focus of GNAP on (http) server-based production of
> token looks like a good decision.
>
> I will review the draft sometime as soon as possible and provide my
> feedback.
>
> Best regards,
>
> /Francis
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* TXAuth <[e-mail]> on behalf of Fabien Imbault <
> [e-mail]>
> *Sent:* Friday, February 5, 2021 3:41 PM
> *To:* Adrian Gropper <[e-mail]>
> *Cc:* Tom Jones <[e-mail]>; txauth gnap <
> [e-mail]>; Justin Richer <[e-mail]>
> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
>
> Hi Adrian,
>
> We would be glad to get your expertise on that. Not sure DIDComm is
> essential yet, so far I see it personally as something to look into,
> especially for use cases when we want to reach out to a RO. I agree with
> the potential issues.
>
> I have a few ideas on how to implement privacy, but it's quite involved in
> terms of crypto (again using Ristretto groups :-)).
>
> Of course there will be a question of priority in the features we plan to
> implement. I guess we should aim for a first publication without the parts
> which are blurry, and take the time to prototype the rest.
>
> Cheers
> Fabien
>
> Le ven. 5 févr. 2021 à 21:19, Adrian Gropper <[e-mail]> a
> écrit :
>
> There are privacy implications as well as the cost of processing spam. A
> service endpoint associated with a DID can be presumed to be a public
> broadcast. Any party can attempt to send a message or an authorization
> request to that service endpoint. The operator of that service, typically
> the DID controller, will bear the cost and risk of processing the message.
> They may request a bond be posted by the party responding to the
> "broadcast" in order to mitigate spam and phishing. They may also require
> that the party seeking to communicate offer credentials, which poses a
> privacy risk to that party in the form of phishing "broadcasts" via DIDs
> and lures that lead to DIDs.
>
> In my role as invited expert on privacy to some W3C WGs and, to some
> extent, DIF WGs, I have not managed to understand the privacy engineering
> and implications in DIDcomm. I will try harder if DIDcomm has an essential
> role with GNAP and I can understand it in the self-sovereign or fiduciary
> authorization server context. Does it?
>
> Adrian
>
> On Fri, Feb 5, 2021 at 1:08 PM Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Probably (and to be honest even for industrial users I find it complex),
> but alternatives are not ready for prime time either.
> Maybe some day DIDComm could be useful as a basic block, what we suggest
> is to first use that as a potential interaction (and there's already a lot
> of questions that arise just from that).
>
> Fabien
>
> On Fri, Feb 5, 2021 at 6:55 PM Tom Jones <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> No, you didn't misunderstand me. It's just that the ux for that is not
> acceptable to retail users. As long as gnap sticks to industrial users you
> should do fine.
>
> thx ..Tom (mobile)
>
> On Fri, Feb 5, 2021, 7:56 AM Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Targeting existing browsers and types of applications (web, pwa, mobile,
> etc.) seems like a reasonable option for an industrial standard. Improving
> security, privacy, ease of use and interoperability (including
> decentralized identity as well) should be good enough objectives.
> Plus from our previous discussions, I was under the impression you were
> fine with the approach of deploying the AS on the phone as a loopback, for
> mobile apps. Did I miss something?
>
> Cheers,
> Fabien
>
> Le ven. 5 févr. 2021 à 16:33, Tom Jones <[e-mail]> a
> écrit :
>
> If you mean can GNAP work on old fashioned apps running with existing
> browsers and existing identity providers, then yes, i guess you are ok.
>
> If you want to work on apps where the user is in control of authn and
> authz, then no, GNAP cannot work. It is not alone in that OIDC wont work
> there either.
>
> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>
>
> On Fri, Feb 5, 2021 at 3:19 AM Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Tom,
>
> Thanks, your responses made it clearer for me what you expect from an AS
> deployed on a mobile.
>
> I think we're on the right path to meet the rest of your concerns. There
> are already a few items on these:
> - privacy preserving techniques have been discussed and are likely to be
> included (I think). It's been recognized as a core concern
> - not exactly sure the meaning you give to discovery here (it's already
> been used in the WG but with a different meaning I believe). The request or
> the continuation api provide entry points to pay attention to.
>
> Is that enough for your use case ? Do you need something else ? (like SSE?)
>
> Cheers
> Fabien
>
> Le jeu. 4 févr. 2021 à 22:10, Tom Jones <[e-mail]> a
> écrit :
>
> discovery is the prime problem.  What causes the wallet/AS to wake up and
> pay attention. How does the RP know what to ask for without violating user
> privacy rights?
>
> CHAPI would be ok i guess, but that requires cred man to be fixed. Not
> sure if it fixes discovery or privacy even then.
>
> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 12:45 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Tom, what additional functionality do you see that a browser would need to
> support in order for GNAP to be adopted? For the elements of the core
> protocol today, nothing is needed to change within the browsers —
> everything is built on existing functions. GNAP uses browsers as a tool,
> and I would argue depends on them even less so than OAuth 2 does.
> Extensions could use browser functionality, like using CHAPI to pass
> interaction elements, but the core protocol functions on vanilla browsers
> today.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Feb 4, 2021, at 3:20 PM, Tom Jones <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> i assumed that the wallet (aka AS) needed to be a native app, not a PWA
> (which can come from a traditional web server).
> There are folks, lke Kim C, who are working on a PWA, but i agree the
> blocks there seem to be large.
> THe blocks on a native app are simple, easy to describe, and easy to ask
> the browser guys to fix. Not sure if they care tho.
> I have trouble seeing a path to GNAP adoption for retail customers w/o
> some browser support.
> That's why i am mostly silent here.
>
> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 11:43 AM Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Fair enough. But loopback limits a lot what you can do... Just for debug
> it's a pain.
> But as soon as you try more, it's a bit crazy. Fun to test ipv6 (luckily
> supported by my ISP) and ddns. But it feels really hacky.
> Also deployment is a pain, compared to a traditional webserver.
>
> Le jeu. 4 févr. 2021 à 20:20, Tom Jones <[e-mail]> a
> écrit :
>
> doesn't work very well on windows uwp. works fine on smartphones
> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 11:18 AM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> OK, thanks — in that case, there are no changes at all to GNAP, which is
> already HTTP driven. The harder parts tend to be where you can’t (or don’t
> want to) use something like that.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Feb 4, 2021, at 2:16 PM, Tom Jones <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> yes, loopback
>
> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 11:01 AM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Tom, can you expand on how exactly the back-channel  communication works
> between on-device components? Do you use HTTP locally?
>
> Thanks,
>  — Justin
>
> On Feb 4, 2021, at 1:03 PM, Tom Jones <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Justin's analysis of use of the front channel is misleading.
> It could equally be argued that what i have done is installed an AS on the
> phone and the communications with it & the PR is back channel.
> Basically the point is that the old OIDC paradigms are no longer valid.
> Be the change you want to see in the world ..tom
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 7:47 AM Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Yes, issue (#168) message based interaction / DIDComm is a tentative
> alternative mecanism for the interaction part. Not sure how that would work
> in details though, prototyping will probably help here.
> Token delivery through continuation seems fine to me. The client will
> probably have to wait for the next polling before it receives a token
> issued as the result of an asynchronous interaction, but that's not a big
> issue.
>
> But the AS on the phone seems like a harder nut to crack, at least at
> first sight. I think that would be awesome, but it gives me headaches, so I
> think I'll work on easier stuff right now ;-)
>
> Fabien
>
> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 4:30 PM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> One of the biggest drawbacks of the current app-centric approaches in OIDC
> (self-issued OP, or SIOP) is that they depend on using the front channel
> and browser redirects to pass everything, which is something that GNAP is
> deliberately getting away from by starting in the back channel.
>
> That said, once a request is kicked off in GNAP, the interaction and
> fulfillment can happen through any number of means. Part of the work that’s
> being done with the “interaction” section is going to help facilitate this,
> and I think that there are some other potential branches here.
>
> Token delivery is where things get extra weird though — we are explicitly
> not delivering tokens in the front channel in the core of GNAP, we’re using
> the response from the continuation API. One idea (that isn’t particularly
> well thought out and hasn’t been implemented at all) is to have an
> extension declare an alternative response from the “continue” section
> that’s defined today, which points to the GNPA continuation API. If an
> extension defines some alternative way to deliver tokens, that could live
> alongside a continuation API and the client could indicate support for it
> in its initial request.
>
> In any event, alternative interaction and delivery methods are important,
> and even if we aren’t going to support every last one of them directly, the
> protocol design should at least be aware of them.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Feb 4, 2021, at 8:35 AM, Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Tom,
>
> Sure, any experience on that would be greatly appreciated, we're calling
> for help here (the point being that I suspect what they're doing is not
> trivial).
>
> Fabien
>
> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021 at 2:21 PM Tom Jones <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> I've had such an app working for over a year. There are issues which are
> being addressed by the browser Interaction team of oidc.
>
> thx ..Tom (mobile)
>
> On Thu, Feb 4, 2021, 3:12 AM Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Francis,
>
> I've tried a few things with regards to using the AS on a phone, but it's
> really quite complex.
>
> Making that run on a phone comes with quite a bit of trouble. The most
> difficult part if that we'd need to use a secure element, but just
> installing and hosting a http server securely is not a standard setup at
> all. I suggest interested people step in to work on this, as we already
> have a lot of work for the (more usual) server case and already handle a
> privacy preserving scheme.
>
> Please let us know what you think.
>
> Cheers,
> Fabien
>
> On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 5:55 AM Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Francis,
>
> I've thought a bit more to what you said. I think I'll give it a try as a
> separate experiment (in code, not in theory). Not that I would expect it to
> be included in GNAP, but I kind of like the idea :-)
>
> The direct impact for GNAP would be to think about multiple ASs.
>
> Will let you know.
>
> Fabien
>
>
> Le mer. 18 nov. 2020 à 13:06, Francis Pouatcha <[e-mail]> a écrit :
>
> It would be nice if the protocol was designed at many layers of
> abstraction.
>
>
>    - The first layer shall design abstract protocol flows, without
>    specification of the mode and mechanism of interaction.
>    - The second layer can instantiate the first layer for dedicated
>    interaction. Here we can talk http, we can define interactions that presume
>    server based token generation, we can define interaction that run on user
>    device based token generation.
>
> This is also the fundament of the structure I proposed for the spec (
> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/30).
>
> /Francis
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 18, 2020 6:35 AM
> *To:* Francis Pouatcha <[e-mail]>
> *Cc:* [e-mail] <[e-mail]>; Dick Hardt <[e-mail]>;
> Tom Jones <[e-mail]>; Denis <[e-mail]>;
> Justin Richer <[e-mail]>
> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
>
> Would make sense, but not so easy as we rely heavily on HTTP. Hence the
> discussion about deep links and so on.
>
> An alternative might be provided by wasm/wasi (running a local sandbox on
> your phone, for your own AS), but it's really early stage. This also poses
> another question that Denis has put forward, i.e. how do we handle the
> multiple AS scenario (likely to occur then).
>
> Fabien
>
> On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 12:16 PM Francis Pouatcha <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> We are drifting away from the original problem space.
>
>    - My original mention was about the "POST" request, that subsumes that
>    the "AS" is a "Server". Designing a new protocol, we cannot afford this
>    limitation.
>    - I just mentioned SIOP to show a known and closed example? Let us not
>    focus on the device local discovery scheme (like openid:) for now.
>    - As capability of holding private keys on user device evolves,
>    server-based issuing of token will be fading out giving way to device local
>    generation of token.
>
> While designing GNAP, let us assume the AS-Role can be exercised on a user
> device and design the protocol to honor that.
>
> Best regards,
> /Francis
> ------------------------------
> *From:* TXAuth <[e-mail]> on behalf of Dick Hardt <
> [e-mail]>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 17, 2020 1:28 PM
> *To:* Tom Jones <[e-mail]>
> *Cc:* Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>; Denis <[e-mail]>;
> GNAP Mailing List <[e-mail]>; Justin Richer <[e-mail]>
> *Subject:* Re: [GNAP] Review of draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-00
>
> Got it.
>
> So web apps invoke a openid: deep link and hope there is an app to handle
> the openid: scheme? ... and that it is the user's wallet rather than some
> malware that has registered openid: on the mobile device?
>
> A native app can attempt to open a deep link associated with an app, and
> will fail if the app is not there. If the app is there, it will be opened,
> so this can't be used to silently test if an app is present, but it does
> allow a native app to provide an alternative experience if an app is not
> present. I don't think this works with custom schemes ... and I don't know
> how it could work from a web app on the phone with the current Safari APIs.
>
> Apple warns against using custom schemes [1] ... but perhaps they can be
> convinced to make openid: a managed scheme similar to mailto:, tel:,
> sms:, facetime: ?
>
> [1]
> https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/allowing_apps_and_websites_to_link_to_your_content/defining_a_custom_url_scheme_for_your_app
>
>
> ᐧ
>
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 10:06 AM Tom Jones <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> You are - that is not standard which is opeind://
> This is the one step that still needs to be optimized for SIOP to have
> good UX.
> Peace ..tom
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:59 AM Dick Hardt <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Hi Tom
>
> I watched your video (I watched at 2X speed)
>
> Looks like the employment website app that is using localhost:8765 to
> communicate with the wallet. Am I correct?
>
> /Dick
> ᐧ
>
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:46 AM Tom Jones <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Well, here's a demo. Note that in this case the AS is not online all of
> the time, so it is really implicit flow and the OIDC id-token comes from
> the siop device directly.
> (whether this is front-channel or back channel is no longer an interesting
> question.)
> Now if an always-on AS is required, that is possible, but probably beyond
> the scope of this effort and would require something like an
> agent-in-the-sky (with diamonds).
> here is the link to the 9 min video   https://youtu.be/Tq4hw7X5SW0
> <https://urldefense.us/v2/url?u=https-3A__youtu.be_Tq4hw7X5SW0&d=DwMFaQ&c=2plI3hXH8ww3j2g8pV19QHIf4SmK_I-Eol_p9P0CttE&r=D5lnfoa2MVZWELqVbbz71ooelbP7rVGCjGDSBNvUpYQ&m=ixsudGSr_dhG-SLiatb4Sz9FWslmywnYyZAOLgZxhl8&s=jdLLy0G1JTQCAOBZ6PeUgI0kiCtVJXrru0VToYWlNZ8&e=>
> Peace ..tom
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 9:20 AM Justin Richer <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Ultimately, in most situations like these in the real world, the hurdle
> isn’t technical compatibility so much as it is trust compatibility. The RP
> (client) needs to have some incentive to trust the assertions and identity
> information that’s coming from the AS. The same is true for an RS trusting
> tokens from the AS. The hard question is less “how” to do that (which SSI
> answers), but more “why” to do that (which SSI doesn’t answer very well,
> because it’s a hard question).
>
> Still: it’s definitely a question about how to support this “AS on device”
> element. We’ve got the start of it more than OAuth2/OIDC have by allowing
> the bootstrap of the process from a starting call: the interaction and
> continuation URIs handed back by the AS don’t need to be the same URIs that
> the client starts with, so just like SIOP the process can start in HTTP and
> potentially move to other communication channels. A major difference is
> that we aren’t dependent on the assumption that the user will always be in
> a browser at some stage, and so the whole raft of front-channel messages
> that SIOP relies on doesn’t fly. That said, we’ve got an opportunity to
> more explicitly open up alternative communication channels here, and that’s
> something I’d like to see engineered, even if it’s an extension. I’d love
> to see a concrete proposal as to how that would work over specific
> protocols, starting with what we’ve got today.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Nov 17, 2020, at 12:03 PM, Fabien Imbault <[e-mail]>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Denis, hi Francis,
>
> At some point integration with SSI (on the authentication side) will
> probably occur, including amongst other possibilities SIOP (since they work
> with OpenID a part of the work will probably be made easier).
>
> That being said, Denis is right. It's not an AS. Technically it's entirely
> possible to rely on a decentralized wallet (for instance on your phone) and
> a centralized AS. I know of a few studies on how to decentralize the AS
> itself (for instance
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardjono-oauth-decentralized-02).
> Maybe it exists, but I'm still looking for real scenarios (or even
> architectures) where an AS is deployed directly on a phone, and under the
> sole authority of the RO, while being compatible with the rest of the
> world.
>
> Cheers,
> Fabien
>
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 5:45 PM Denis <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Hello  Francis,
>
> See two comments in line.
>
>
> B) Current Document
>
> Roles description shall not hold any assumption on the physical structure
> of the party fulfilling the roles.
> [FI] not sure what you mean
>
>  [FP] for example, we assume the AS is a server! In most SSI based use
> cases, the AS will be running on the user device. See SIOP (
> https://identity.foundation/did-siop/).
>
> I browsed through the two drafts, i.e. :
>
>    - Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0 Core architecture, data model,
>    and representations W3C Working Draft 08 November 2020
>    - Self-Issued OpenID Connect Provider DID Profile v0.1. DIF Working
>    Group Draft
>
> At no place within these two documents, it is possible to imagine that
> "the AS will be running on the user device".
> From section 3 of the DIF Working Group Draft:
>       "Unlike the OIDC Authorization Code Flow as per [OIDC.Core], the
> SIOP will not return an access token to the RP".
> An Identity Wallet is not an AS.
>
>
> Roles:
> -> grant endpoint of the AS: Why is this a post request? This eliminates
> the chance of having user device hosted AS (no server).
> [FI] what would you propose instead?
> Would also be interested to understand better the deployment model when
> there is no server. That's something that was discussed several times but
> I'm still missing the underlying architecture and use case.
>
>  [FP] See above (SIOP). There will be a lot of identity wallets operated
> on end user device.
>
> See the above comment. Please, do not confuse an Identity Wallet with an
> Authentication Server (AS).
> Denis
>
>
> -> Resource Owner (RO) : Authorizes the request? Does it authorize the
> request or the access to a resource?
> [FI] yes, we should make the wording clearer
>
> Missing Section Interactions:
> --> This section shall introduce the notion of interaction before we start
> listing interaction types.
> [FI] yes
>
> Interaction Types:
> --> I prefer a classification with Redirect, Decoupled and Embedded is. In
> the draft, we have one redirect and 2 decouple interactions and nothing
> else.
> [FI] this should be handled as a specific discussion item. As a reminder,
> how would you define embedded?
>
> In practice there's at least these modes:
> - redirect and redirect back
> - redirect to different browser or device
> - user code
> - CIBA
>
> [FP] This classification is limited.
>
>    - Redirect: same device, same or different user agents (browser,
>    mobile app, desktop app, ...)
>    - Decoupled: different devices
>    - Embedded : RC carries RO authorization to AS
>
>
>
> Resource Access Request vs. Resource Request
> --> Both are mixed up. No clarification of the context of each section.
> [FI] could you clarify what you'd expect.  Btw on this topic, there's a
> more general discussion on whether we should make a distinction or not.
>
> [FP]: Here:
>
>    - Resource Access Request: Requesting Access to a resource. Response
>    is an access token (or any type of grant)
>    - Resource Request: Request the resource. Response is the resource (or
>    a corresponding execution)
>
>
> Token Content Negotiation
> --> Not expressed as such. This is central to GNAP and not represented
> enough  in the document.
> [FI] right. This should be a specific discussion item.
>
> Requesting "User" Information
> we identify two types of users: RQ and RO. It will be better not to refer
> to a user in this draft, but either to a RQ or an RO.
> [FI] yes that would avoid potential misunderstandings. Although in the
> end, people will translate RQ into user or end-user most of the time. Cf in
> definition, currently we have Requesting Party (RQ, aka "user")
>
>
> Interaction Again
> -> For each interaction type, we will have to describe the protocol flow
> and the nature and behavior of involved Roles (Parties), Elements, Requests.
> [FI] yes
>
>
> [FP] Will these and into tickets?
>
> Best regards.
> /Francis
>
>
>
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