Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption considered of dubious value

[Keith Moore <[e-mail]>]

On 03/15/2014 04:48 PM, Michael Richardson wrote:
>      >> In the SMTP case, I think that some headers and other things might well
>      >> indicate what happened such that if one decides to fail to clear, that at
>      >> least the receiver knows it happened (and has a list which nodes were
>      >> involved).
>
>      > Given that the receiver is rarely in a position to do anything about a
>      > problem with the path by which mail arrived, why does it actually matter in
>      > most cases?   (I mean, I'm fine with gathering statistics, but stats don't
>      > solve the problem of pervasive eavesdropping on mail transmissions.)
>
> awareness of a problem is the first step to fixing it?
> I think that perpass said that detection was valuable.
Detection/awareness are indeed valuable.  But I'm hoping that UTA can 
set the bar higher than that.

Keith