Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption considered of dubious value
Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io> Mon, 17 March 2014 14:37 UTC
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From: Alyssa Rowan <akr@akr.io>
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2014 14:37:17 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption considered of dubious value
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On 17 March 2014 13:55:22 GMT+00:00, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote: >You're not worried about imbuing a false sense of security? User-agents MUST NOT indicate that an unauthenticated connection is secure. There. Done. No locks, no https:. >> Gosh, that was easy. >Maybe not. Seems easy enough to me. :-) - -- /akr -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: APG v1.0.9 iQI3BAEBCgAhBQJTJwidGhxBbHlzc2EgUm93YW4gPGFrckBha3IuaW8+AAoJEOyE jtkWi2t6O6EQAL3NOlstdclWtKcMBXwzCk380ZI6HxoUvCuKwr104GA69LUGeTtz JUu88LdtlZI2x88EuIoYSFHLoHH/KV5TqZ/Acit64mzT9LO17GYmQu37vKUZVqpR sCztgMvt5xjB8cHyFPLtKFhzTMIC6kI3q+i6jK8rWo/dqifH+pwwx8igNcfPZFqg oQZQbHFbBVaXaGmsZOC1cHfgI6eAiSdi3cj+T9OiMcmmKvpAiIaaURdi2EdRHLKQ ZjYr0LEfskqLLR/r3x+dk4350aMQMyF+l6kYnwzbcsD7NqJDWVnZaNedIgpKkg6v JMs6fz+I/WMdN1zHe99l5PChmO+MScA+jq/eife0jEWBfAfV23N8e87hisHDlVTL hWi2LDY4P59gIdewBa+YAAuIBIaASQLhCm4UEJvxXJz0ZczLXMEijruVBUgRw6aY W5YxzenOgD4ihPDi6i8OWwDVGmCdRFHVVySZemu0bGSpj0JjJnNfAT20qJ7w7ToS Yw1ENca6IifceRooFfktETc0Kg8B9in8KbTIwdf5zfBBPXhHwkrASM7LJzxp0FBu KRSN6ac9GiuYAvTPmy0ryMqXEzH8q0bJFoDpbrPqFgKQnlQX/jgpmWdg/zStK2X5 YS5/8SN7WPtD5FpVUmdDc3wuMOUxWcnO/7GRrZPvSO4/3nDyk/ehr8yv =keLU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
- [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption considere… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Michael Richardson
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Michael Richardson
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Yan Zhu
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Olle E. Johansson
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Leif Johansson
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Alan Johnston
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Yan Zhu
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Michael Richardson
- [Uta] getting back to UTA and injecting clue (was… Eliot Lear
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Salz, Rich
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Olle E. Johansson
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Uta] getting back to UTA and injecting clue Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Uta] getting back to UTA and injecting clue … Olle E. Johansson
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Keith Moore
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Orit Levin (LCA)
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Rick Andrews
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Watson Ladd
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Christian Huitema
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… t.p.
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… Adam Langley
- Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption consi… t.p.
- Re: [Uta] getting back to UTA and injecting clue Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [Uta] getting back to UTA and injecting clue Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [Uta] getting back to UTA and injecting clue Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Uta] getting back to UTA and injecting clue Leif Johansson