Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption considered of dubious value

t.p. <daedulus@btconnect.com> Tue, 25 March 2014 09:50 UTC

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From: "t.p." <daedulus@btconnect.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
References: <53249D4E.2080104@network-heretics.com> <5324ECFC.2050004@akr.io> <53256D07.7020005@network-heretics.com> <5325AEB2.9070804@mnt.se> <5325B3E7.3060508@network-heretics.com> <5326271D.40107@eff.org> <532660F5.908@cs.tcd.ie> <CAGZ8ZG0LDrHNo2W-Ho2OssPTYNjoaiRCZ3u4rcvWXhj=vG+3cQ@mail.gmail.com> <532D9B4B.8040106@cs.tcd.ie> <CAGZ8ZG1MKuXbM+AuUt4y0jRVEw4a2o7Mcf_11J=FFR3aOPt1ow@mail.gmail.com> <CACsn0c=DzmuLBX1X5RwKRxv_r4ihPj2M5vgxUKabSf_gyMYOuQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/uta/yD32P915auih2xKFpbqxptFWNK4
Cc: uta@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Uta] opportunistic keying / encryption considered of dubious value
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----- Original Message -----
From: "Watson Ladd" <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: "Trevor Perrin" <trevp@trevp.net>
Cc: <uta@ietf.org>; "Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Sent: Saturday, March 22, 2014 9:25 PM
> On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 1:00 PM, Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
wrote:
> > On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 7:16 AM, Stephen Farrell
> > <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> >.
> >
> > You mean the browser devs who support the world's main TLS libraries
> > and TLS applications, understand the HTTPS ecosystem better than
> > anyone, and are the implementors (and thus gatekeepers) for any
> > changes?
>
> Personally I have never understood why connecting to a site with a bad
> certificate shows me a warning, while visiting a site over HTTP does
> not.

In a similar vein, but perhaps at a slight tangent, I have never
understood why every browser I have installed has CRL checking turned
off.  Or perhaps I do, since when I turn it on, I find that there are
those on IETF lists who send e-mails which invoke CRLs over 1Mbyte in
size which take 30s to download every time I want to view their e-mail
(round trips, not bandwidth, being the problem).

So do we continue to recommend that CRL checking is turned off and so
open certificates to another attack vector?

Tom Petch





> It should simply not indicate security. Perhaps an exemption should be
> made for some websites which have known good certificates but then the
> UI should never permit bypassing checks. Current behavior amounts to
> limiting the use of alternatives to the current PKI, without actually
> providing a gain in security. Browser vendors are working on DANE,
> TACK, and CT, which I think are much more promising for encrypting
> everything if we can reduce the administrative load involved.
>
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> >
> > We should be encouraging more of their participation and viewpoints.
> >
> > It's frustrating when they don't race to support your great new
idea.
> > I've been there.  But working to "beat up" and alienate them is not
> > the solution.
> >
> >
> > Trevor
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Uta mailing list
> > Uta@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta
>
>
>
> --
> "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
> Temporary Safety deserve neither  Liberty nor Safety."
> -- Benjamin Franklin
>
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